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This dissertation explores the politics of disease control in Cuba during the mid-twentieth 
century, and uses tuberculosis as a lens to understand citizenship, state-building, and populism. 
By analyzing the popular press, health reports, medical journals, and official correspondence in 
U.S. and Cuban archives, it argues that ordinary citizens, public intellectuals, and civic actors in 
the interwar era—not the revolutionary government of 1959—introduced the concept of a “right 
to health” and invoked it to demand an efficient state healthcare sector. In response to these 
claims and in his quest to strengthen the state, Fulgencio Batista created the Consejo Nacional de 
Tuberculosis in 1936.   
The heightened visibility of tuberculosis, achieved in part by the claims-making of 
citizens, channeled state attention towards a disease of the poor, but it also distorted the design of 
health projects, making them inefficient and openly political. Thus, although increased state 
attention to tuberculosis improved mortality rates and access to health services by the 1950s, the 
state proved unable to depoliticize the tuberculosis campaign and to uniformly implement the 
right to health care on the ground. The gap between the expectations of citizens and the 
performance of republican administrations influenced the growing de-legitimation of the state, 
the overthrow of Batista’s government, and the new regime’s priorities in health policy. 
Nonetheless, despite the revolutionary rhetoric of radical change, there were clear continuities in 
tuberculosis control policy before and after 1959, such as the new government’s reliance upon 
the resources and institutions developed by republican administrations.  
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 v 
By complementing health outcomes and statistics with a social and political history of 
tuberculosis, and by balancing attention between state health efforts and grassroots definitions of 
medical success, this dissertation shifts the frame of a decades-long debate in Cuban 
historiography that has sought to establish the objective quality of state health care before and 
after the 1959 revolution. Furthermore, it challenges the assumption of a weak Cuban state and 
insists that health projects constituted a fundamental arm of state formation. Finally, “The Sick 
Republic” points to the agency of citizens as they became health activists, shaped state-building 
efforts, and defined citizenship rights. 
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1.0  INTRODUCTION 
“This problem of tuberculosis has always been the Cinderella among governmental 
concerns.” 
-Dr. Luis Ortega Bolaños, 1927.1 
 
“The 4th of September Revolution [of 1933] devoted intense and persevering effort to the 
protection of the people against the Koch bacillus…[The hospitals and dispensaries] we had 
built…represented an effort to eradicate tuberculosis unprecedented in Latin America.” 
-Fulgencio Batista, 1964.2 
 
One morning in 1926, a poor soldier hurried through the streets of Havana, his younger brother, 
Juan, in tow.3 Juan had travelled from the cane fields of eastern Cuba, where medical treatment 
was scarce, to the bustling metropolis where his brother was now stationed, in the hopes of 
gaining admittance to one of the capital’s public hospitals.4 At the tender age of twenty, Juan had 
contracted tuberculosis, one of Cuba’s deadliest infections. 
For victims of the disease, the first harbinger of trouble, a deceptively mundane cough or 
strange aches, often arrived without notice. The next stage unnerved its victims, especially those 
                                                 
1 “Consideraciones sobre algunos puntos importantes,” Vida Nueva 19, no. 5 (May 15, 1927): 201–2. All 
translations are mine, unless otherwise noted.  
2 The Growth and Decline of the Cuban Republic (New York: Devin-Adair Co., 1964), 98–99. Emphasis in original 
text.  
3 The following narrative is derived from Fulgencio Batista, “Inauguración del Sanatorio ‘Topes de Collantes’,” 
May 9, 1954, 5, Box 1, Fulgencio Rubén Batista Papers, 1933–2007 (FRB Papers), Cuban Heritage Collection, 
University of Miami (CHC-UM). This speech was also published in José Manuel Cortina, Fulgencio Batista y 
Zaldívar, and Octavio Montoro, Una historia en dos discursos y un artículo (Havana: Editorial Echevarría, n.d.). 
Frank Argote-Freyre offers a similar narrative in Fulgencio Batista: From Revolutionary to Strongman (New 
Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2006), 30–32.  
4 Argote-Freyre offers a slightly different account, in which Juan travelled from Camagüey, instead of from his 
father’s home in Banes. Fulgencio Batista, 30.   
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who knew what these symptoms portended. The cough was now more persistent, fevers and 
sweats became nightly companions, and then the cough turned bloody and violent. For other 
diseases, medical technologies seemed to advance every year, but defeating the tuberculosis 
bacillus remained an elusive goal for physicians and researchers. Contracting the white plague in 
the 1920s—when no sure cure existed—struck its victims with dread. To have the disease in 
Cuba was surely worse than to suffer from it in a country with a more developed health 
infrastructure, for the island had only 150 beds in one state sanatorium. Its waiting list numbered 
over 600; the wealthy often traveled to the U.S. or Europe to seek treatment.5 To be a poor 
Cuban and hear the diagnosis of tuberculosis must have been received with the same anguish as 
the pronouncement of a death sentence.6 Entering a public sanatorium or hospital was often the 
only chance of survival, and to achieve this end, ordinary men and women devoted substantial 
energy and time. 
For weeks, the two brothers trekked along the well-worn path of what had become a 
ritual “pilgrimage” of the poor. With no political connections to gain admittance to a hospital and 
no money to travel overseas for medical care, they spent their days going from one hospital to 
another, hoping to arrive when a bed had been vacated.7 In December, Juan’s prayers were 
answered when he was admitted to the Calixto García General Hospital. With the exception of a 
brief hiatus in January, Juan stayed there for twenty-three long months. The elder brother first 
found himself frustrated with the scarcity of hospital beds and later, during his frequent visits to 
                                                 
5 “La lucha contra la funesta tuberculosis,” Bohemia 19, no. 51 (December 18, 1927): 29. 
6 See, for example the story of Julián Acosta Rodríguez, Havana Post, April 27, 1932, 1, cited in Louis A. Pérez, Jr., 
To Die in Cuba: Suicide and Society (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2005), 201.  
7 See, for example, “Editorial,” Bohemia 29, no. 48 (November 28, 1937): n.p.; “Triste odisea de una mujer que es 
abatida por el Mal de Koch,” El País, August 25, 1937, 8, leg. “Recortes de prensa,” expediente (exp.) “Maternidad 
e infancia,” 17/10/3/1-251, Fondo José Chelala Aguilera (JCA), Museo Histórico de las Ciencias “Carlos J. Finlay” 
(MHC). This experience seems to have been shared across borders, with one Argentinian calling it the “vía crucis.” 
Diego Armus, The Ailing City: Health, Tuberculosis, and Culture in Buenos Aires, 1870–1950 (Durham: Duke 
University Press, 2011), 23.   
 3 
provide company and food to Juan, disgusted with the quality of care. The small tuberculosis 
ward was “miserable and poor, neglected and dilapidated.”8 He believed that “more than 
devoting itself to the treatment of tuberculosis,” it served as a “repository of the sick.”9 Then, 
almost two years after Juan’s arrival in Havana, he took a turn for the worse. On the morning of 
November 5, 1928, he suffered a violent episode of hemoptysis. His elder brother was there, 
helplessly watching Juan choke on his own blood. “[H]e died…in my own arms,” the brother 
recounted, “bathing me in his almost adolescent blood.”10 
This scene must have been repeated over and over in Cuba, where thousands died 
annually from the white plague, yet its recurrence surely made it no less tragic. The elder 
brother’s experience was ordinary, in the sense that he suffered a loss that hundreds of others had 
borne. But the brother was also as exceptional as the times in which he lived. This bloody 
morning would haunt the young soldier, never far from memory as he climbed the ranks to 
become the de facto ruler of Cuba following the 1933 revolution: the elder brother was none 
other than Fulgencio Batista, the central political figure of Cuba’s Second Republic.11 Upon 
reaching power, he unexpectedly launched the largest national tuberculosis campaign the island 
had ever seen. Remembering his brother’s death in a conversation with a journalist in 1937, and 
laying blame on the insufficient tuberculosis facilities on the island, he brashly declared, “That 
will not happen again in Cuba.”12   
Despite Batista’s declaration, the history of tuberculosis in Cuba does not originate from 
nor center on contributions from one of history’s “great men.” Poverty had woven tuberculosis 
                                                 
8 Batista, “Inauguración,” 2, Box 1, FRB Papers, CHC-UM. 
9 Ibid.  
10 Ibid. 
11 Almost three decades after Juan’s death, Batista revealed that the loss was the second greatest of his life, the first 
being the death of his mother when he was a teenager. Ibid. 
12 Quentin Reynolds, “Otra entrevista con el Coronel Fulgencio Batista: El dictador sorprendido,” Carteles 29, no. 
27 (July 4, 1937): 40.  
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into the fabric of Cuban society. When that fabric began to tear under the pressure of ordinary 
people demanding that their government act on their behalf, their frustration with the state’s 
indifference toward those with the disease reached from rural bohíos and shantytown hovels, on 
the peripheries of the nation, into the halls of the presidential palace, the very center of power 
itself.  
1.1 HISTORICAL OVERVIEW 
The statesmen of the early republic, however, had prioritized other health issues. During the 
latter half of the nineteenth century, yellow fever had frequently traveled from the port of 
Havana to the gulf cities of the southern U.S., where epidemics exploded and spread into the 
surrounding countryside. Worried about the economic toll these events exacted, American 
authorities began to keep a close eye on Cuba’s sanitary landscape. In 1898, when the island was 
drawing near to declaring victory against Spain in its final war for independence (1895–1898), 
the U.S. intervened, partially in response to worsening sanitary conditions in the midst of war.13 
Under the U.S. occupation of the fledgling nation (1898–1902), military authorities spearheaded 
a massive sanitation campaign in its cities. The Americans made Cuban acceptance of the terms 
of the Platt Amendment a prerequisite for their departure in 1902.14 One of the Amendment’s 
eight clauses linked Cuban sovereignty to the absence of epidemic diseases, namely yellow 
fever:  
                                                 
13 Mariola Espinosa, Epidemic Invasions: Yellow Fever and the Limits of Cuban Independence, 1878–1930 
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2009).  
14 The text of the Platt Amendment was included as an appendix to the Cuban Constitution of 1901. Louis A. Pérez, 
Jr., The War of 1898: The United States and Cuba in History and Historiography (Chapel Hill: University of North 
Carolina Press, 1998), 34. 
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V. That the government of Cuba will execute, and as far as necessary extend, the plans 
already devised or other plans to be mutually agreed upon, for the sanitation of the cities 
of the island, to the end that a recurrence of epidemic and infectious diseases may be 
prevented, thereby assuring protection to the people and commerce of Cuba, as well as to 
the commerce of the southern ports of the United States and the people residing therein.15 
 
If there were any doubt about the seriousness of the Americans in this matter, it dissipated in the 
first decade of independence when the U.S. occupied the island a second time (1906–1909), 
justified in part by the presence of yellow fever on the island.16  
The looming threat of U.S. intervention shaped the national politics of disease. Cuban 
authorities directed the bulk of resources to keeping their streets clean and destroying mosquito-
breeding grounds. While Cuban scientists had been renowned for medical advances and research 
innovation in the late nineteenth century, in the early twentieth century they instead spent their 
time doing routine work in order to prevent yellow fever outbreaks.17 Racial ideology also 
affected the distribution of resources. The virus ravaged white foreigners, especially Spaniards, 
so Spanish colonial authorities and Cuban scientists prioritized yellow fever research and control 
in pursuit of “whitening” their nation through immigration.18 
Cubans died from yellow fever in smaller numbers, for most had built up immunity from 
mild childhood infections. Tuberculosis, on the other hand, was a disease highly fatal to the 
native-born population. Following the devastation unleashed by war, almost 3,000 Cubans died 
                                                 
15 Treaty Between the United States and the Republic of Cuba Embodying the Provisions Defining Their Future 
Relations as Contained in the Act of Congress Approved March 2, 1901, signed 05/22/1903; General Records of the 
United States Government, 1778–2006, RG 11, National Archives. 
16 Espinosa, Epidemic Invasions, chapter 6.  
17 Steven Palmer, “Shifting Sands of Cuban Science, 1875–1933,” in State of Ambiguity: Civic Life and Culture in 
Cuba’s First Republic, eds. Steven Palmer, José Antonio Piqueras, and Amparo Sánchez Cobos (Durham: Duke 
University Press, 2014), 55.  
18 Nancy Stepan, “The Interplay between Socio-Economic Factors and Medical Science: Yellow Fever Research, 
Cuba and the United States,” Social Studies of Science 8, no. 4 (Nov. 1978): 400–1; José Amador, Medicine and 
Nation Building in the Americas, 1890–1940 (Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 2015), chapter 2, “Beyond 
Yellow Fever Eradication: Nation and Racial Gatekeeping in Cuba.” 
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of tuberculosis in Havana alone in 1898; in contrast, yellow fever claimed 70% fewer lives.19 
While 900 Cubans died of tuberculosis in Havana in 1901, only 18 died from yellow fever.20 
Two decades later, in 1919, tuberculosis mortality in Havana had dropped only slightly (from 
360.8 to 344.1 deaths per 100,000 people) and was still the second highest cause of death.21 
While Cuban officials did not completely neglect tuberculosis, it was far from a priority. Even 
with pressure from the Cuban Anti-Tuberculosis League, the proposal for a public tuberculosis 
sanatorium languished in Congress; construction began only when the authorities of the second 
U.S. military occupation pushed Cuban politicians to act.22 
The landscape of Cuba’s public health sector began to change under president-turned-
dictator Gerardo Machado (1925–1933). His administration prioritized the control of a host of 
diseases and health issues considered to be national problems, such as mental hygiene, infant 
mortality, eugenics, and tuberculosis.23 Machado created an Anti-Tuberculosis Board, which 
increased epidemiological surveillance and expanded the infrastructure of tuberculosis services. 
These efforts were further expanded when military strongman Fulgencio Batista founded the 
autonomous Consejo Nacional de Tuberculosis (National Tuberculosis Council, CNT) in 1936. 
In its first years, the institution began construction on multiple sanatoriums, opened new 
dispensaries across the island, administered over 20,000 tuberculin tests in slums and schools, 
and widely disseminated educational propaganda. Once the CNT was established, tuberculosis 
                                                 
19 Espinosa, Epidemic Invasions, 69. 
20 “Defunciones ocurridas en la Ciudad de la Habana por las enfermedades que se expresan y mortalidad total por 
todas las causas,” Boletín Oficial de la Secretaria de Sanidad y Beneficencia 1 (Havana: Secretaría de Sanidad y 
Beneficencia, 1909), 135. 
21 Sergio Díaz-Briquets, The Health Revolution in Cuba (Austin: The University of Texas Press, 1983), 58–59. 
22 John Gutiérrez, “Disease, Empire, and Modernity in the Caribbean: Tuberculosis in Cuba, 1899–1909” (PhD diss., 
The City University of New York, 2013), 191. 
23 Cuba, Secretaría de Sanidad y Beneficencia, 1926–1931: Cinco años de labor sanitaria y de beneficencia pública 
(Havana: Imprenta y Librería La Propagandista, 1931). On Machado’s reformist national platform, see Louis A. 
Pérez, Jr., Cuba: Between Reform and Revolution, 3rd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), 187. 
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and politics became even more intricately interwoven: the issue shaped how people saw their 
government, and political processes affected the development of care on the island.  
Tuberculosis persisted as a visible issue across all the changes of the mid-twentieth 
century in Cuba. This dissertation contends, then, that understanding the history of tuberculosis 
on the island is central to understanding modern Cuban history.24 Building on recent literature on 
public health in Latin America, I also argue that disease eradication and public health efforts 
were key to processes of state formation in the region and became intertwined with debates about 
citizenship, race, and national belonging. 
1.2 SCHOLARLY CONTEXT 
Over the past three decades social and cultural historians have produced a large body of work on 
the politics of tuberculosis.25 Taken as a whole, they have demonstrated that it remained a 
                                                 
24 Frank Snowden made this argument for malaria in Italy in The Conquest of Malaria: Italy, 1900–1962 (New 
Haven: Yale, 2006), 3.  
25 The literature includes Randall Packard, White Plague, Black Labor: Tuberculosis and the Political Economy of 
Health and Disease in South Africa (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989); Linda Bryder, Below the 
Magic Mountain: A Social History of Tuberculosis in Twentieth-Century Britain (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1988), 95, 227; Barbara Bates, Bargaining for Life: A Social History of Tuberculosis, 1876–1938 (University 
of Pennsylvania Press, 1992); Barron H. Lerner, “New York City’s Tuberculosis Control Efforts: The Historical 
Limitations of the ‘War on Consumption’,” American Journal of Public Health 83, no. 5 (May 1993): 758–66; 
Sheila M. Rothman, Living in the Shadow of Death: Tuberculosis and the Social Experience of Illness in American 
History (New York: Basic Books, 1994); David S. Barnes, The Making of a Social Disease: Tuberculosis in 
Nineteenth-Century France (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995); Georgina D. Feldberg, Disease and 
Class: Tuberculosis and the Shaping of Modern North American Society (New Brunswick: Rutgers University 
Press, 1995); William Johnston, The Modern Epidemic: A History of Tuberculosis in Japan (Cambridge, MA: 
Council of East Asia Studies, Harvard University, 1995); Katherine Ott, Fevered Lives: Tuberculosis in American 
Culture since 1870 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996);  Katherine McCuaig, The Weariness, the 
Fever, and the Fret: The Campaign Against Tuberculosis in Canada, 1900–1950 (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s 
University Press, 1999); Diego Armus, “Tango, Gender, and Tuberculosis in Buenos Aires, 1900–1940,” in Disease 
in the History of Modern Latin America: From Malaria to AIDS, ed. Diego Armus (Durham: Duke University Press, 
2003), 101–29; Diego Armus, La ciudad impura: Salud, tuberculosis y cultura en Buenos Aires, 1870–1950 
(Buenos Aires: Edhasa, 2007), 279–80; Alison Bashford, “The Great White Plague Turns Alien: Tuberculosis and 
Immigration in Australia, 1901–2001,” in Tuberculosis Then and Now: Perspectives on the History of an Infectious 
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“Cinderella” disease throughout the early- to mid-twentieth century. Despite its demographic 
significance, tuberculosis often “lacked both the ‘glamour’ necessary to sustain political and 
scientific interest and the economic impact necessary to ensure official intervention.”26 Its 
sufferers were often on the geographic, racial, and economic peripheries of nations or empires, 
and they faced a financially-strapped and insufficient public health infrastructure and 
encountered national governments that were reluctant to take on the burden of the disease.  
Scholars propose varied reasons for the neglect of tuberculosis, including local social 
relations, attitudes toward the welfare state, and international norms of disease control. For 
instance, in many places, public figures and physicians placed blame for high mortality on the 
behavior and biology of non-white groups, and racial politics and science provided the language 
to block proposals for increased funding for the treatment of the disease.27 Debates over the 
proper role of state intervention in health matters influenced many national governments’ refusal 
to accept responsibility for the ailment.28 Tuberculosis constitutes a chronic disease, and 
historically, these have garnered less national visibility than the chaos-inducing epidemic 
crises.29 Most national governments did not begin to fund and spearhead tuberculosis treatment, 
prevention, and diagnostic programs until the post-war period, when they were confronted with 
very high mortality and morbidity rates (induced by wartime conditions) and could take 
                                                                                                                                                             
Disease, eds. Flurin Condrau and Michael Worboys (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2010), 100–22; 
Armus, The Ailing City, 123–25. 
26 Mark Harrison and Michael Worboys, “A Disease of Civilisation: Tuberculosis in Britain, Africa and India, 1900–
39,” in Migrants, Minorities, and Health: Historical and Contemporary Studies, eds. Lara Marks and Michael 
Worboys (London: Routledge, 1997), 116. 
27 Packard, White Plague, Black; Tera W. Hunter, To ‘Joy My Freedom: Southern Black Women’s Lives and Labors 
after the Civil War (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1997), 187–218; Emily K. Abel, Tuberculosis and the 
Politics of Exclusion: A History of Public Health and Migration to Los Angeles (New Brunswick: Rutgers 
University Press, 2007).   
28 McCuaig, The Weariness, the Fever, and the Fret; Feldberg, Disease and Class; Bryder, Below the Magic 
Mountain. 
29 Diego Armus, “Disease in the Historiography of Modern Latin America,” in Disease in the History, 8. 
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advantage of new technological tools that made mass campaigns more affordable (i.e., mass 
miniature X-ray radiography, outpatient antibiotic therapy).30  
 The Cuban government’s earlier and sustained interest in tuberculosis does not fit this 
chronological narrative. Cuba was one of several countries in the 1930s, including Italy, Brazil, 
Argentina, and Spain, whose national governments began to substantially expand the reach of 
their anti-tuberculosis efforts.31 Although historians have not interrogated this phenomenon, all 
these cases shared the rise of centralized states and new political formations, based on populist 
rhetoric, class politics and popular mobilization. This dissertation, then, adds complexity to the 
broader historiography of tuberculosis, using Cuba as a case study to explore the interaction 
between tuberculosis and authoritarian populism. 
Cuban historiography offers few explanations for why the Cuban state pursued an early 
and aggressive anti-tuberculosis campaign. In decades past, scholars of Cuba produced an image 
of the republican state as weak: mediated by imperialism and infiltrated by corruption, its 
institutions and politicians were disinterested in or incapable of undertaking state-building 
endeavors. Scholars’ focus on U.S. imperialism, especially during the First Republic (1902–
1933), often obscured the decisions and projects of national actors. The revolution of 1959, 
which painted itself as the fulfillment of previous nationalist mobilizations (1898, 1933), has 
shaped an understanding of the entire republican period (1902–1958) “in terms of what did not 
                                                 
30 See, for example, Lynda Bryder, “‘We Shall Not Find Salvation in Inoculation’: BCG Vaccination in 
Scandinavia, Britain, and the USA, 1921–1960,” Social Science & Medicine 49 (1999): 1157–67; McCuaig, The 
Weariness, the Fever, and the Fret. 
31 Claudio Bertolli Filho, História Social da Tuberculose e do Tuberculoso: 1900–1950 (Rio de Janeiro: Editora 
Fiocruz, 2001); Armus, The Ailing City; Jorge Molera Mesa, “Enfermedad y previsión social en España durante el 
primer franquismo (1936–1951): El frustrado seguro obligatorio contra la tuberculosis,” Dynamis 14 (1994): 199–
225. I have found no secondary literature (in English) on tuberculosis in Italy, but Cubans in the 1930s referenced 
the tuberculosis insurance legislated by Mussolini in the late 1920s.  
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happen.”32 As several scholars of the early republican period write, “It is easy to see why the 
Cuban republic has become ‘el tiempo omitido’ (the ‘time that is left out’), as Marial Iglesias has 
put it.”33 They continue, “Seen this way, the entire republican experience prior to 1959 is merely 
the antithesis of the Cuban revolution. It is a fifty-seven-year period of U.S. proxy rule studded 
with villains and martyrs and punctuated by political upheavals that prefigure the historical 
absolution of 1959.”34  
Undergirded by an assumption of state incapacity, scholarship on health in the republican 
period has mirrored these trends. Even those studies that attempt to provide an historical analysis 
of the public health sector in republican Cuba often paint a static, monochromatic picture.35 As 
one anthropologist contends, “Between 1902 and 1959, the ‘state’ in Cuba was too contested, too 
parasitic, and too personalistic to coalesce into a viable authority that could enforce health codes 
and undertake crucial public works programs such as construction of water and sewer 
systems.”36 Those who do attempt to add historical complexity to the period generally break it 
into two subperiods: until Machado, the island enjoyed medical advances and good sanitation; 
after Machado, Cuba’s health system entered a “stage of decay,” in which there was “an absence 
                                                 
32 Palmer et al., “Introduction,” in State of Ambiguity, 6–7. An early exception is Jorge I. Domínguez, Cuba: Order 
and Revolution (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1978). Works that use the republican 
period to explain the revolution of 1959 include Samuel Farber, Revolution and Reaction in Cuba, 1930–60 
(Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press, 1976); Marifeli Pérez-Stable, The Cuban Revolution: Origins, 
Course, and Legacy, 2nd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999); Samuel Farber, The Origins of the Cuban 
Revolution Reconsidered (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2006). Louis A. Pérez, Jr.’s superb body 
of scholarship has emphasized US-Cuban relations. See, for example, Cuba: Between Reform and Revolution; Cuba 
under the Platt Amendment, 1902–1934 (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1986); On Becoming Cuban: 
Identity, Nationality and Culture (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1999); The War of 1898. 
33 Palmer et al., “Introduction,” in State of Ambiguity, 5. 
34 Ibid. 
35 One exception is Ross Danielson, Cuban Medicine (New Brunswick: Transaction Books, 1979).  
36 Katherine Hirschfeld, Health, Politics, and Revolution in Cuba since 1898 (New Brunswick: Transaction 
Publishers, 2008), 14.  
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of state policies for addressing health problems.”37 Other broad studies of health in Cuba simply 
omit the republican period, assuming the public health sector was unequivocally bad, which 
renders it as a nonissue for scholarly inquiry.38  
Over the last two decades, however, scholars of Cuba have begun to contend with the 
republican period on its own terms, analyzing the importance of the state and of domestic actors 
in shaping their own history (while still weighing the influence of outside actors, especially the 
U.S.).39 Instead of continuing in the tradition of Cuban exceptionalism, many of these scholars 
locate Cuba within a Latin American context, drawing parallels with the nineteenth-century 
period of liberal nation-making and the mid-twentieth-century processes of populism, state-
building, and class formation. 
This framework has opened up new paths for junior scholars of Cuba, who have made 
health and medicine in the republic central to their research.40 They are proving that there were 
efforts—however inadequate and flawed—to extend health services and improve national public 
                                                 
37 José Ramón Ruíz Hernández, La salud pública: Su desarrollo en el periodo revolucionario (1959–1980) (Havana: 
Instituto de Desarrollo de la Salud, Ministerio de Salud Pública, 1986), 30.  
38 For instance, in one study of Cuban medicine and public health from 1840 to 1958, the work inexplicably stops in 
1900; the section covering the twentieth century is an appendix of medical discoveries, conferences, and 
organizations, without any analysis. José A. Martínez-Fortún Foyo, Historia de la Medicina en Cuba (1840–1958), 
Cuadernos de Historia de La Salud Pública 98 (Havana: Publicación del Consejo Nacional de Sociedades 
Científicas, 2005). Health, then, joins race relations as a “nonissue” after the revolution. Alejandro de la Fuente, A 
Nation for All: Race, Inequality, and Politics in Twentieth-Century Cuba (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina 
Press, 2001), 3–4.  
39 De la Fuente, A Nation for All; Robert Whitney, State and Revolution in Cuba: Mass Mobilization and Political 
Change, 1920–1940 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001); Alejandra Bronfman, Measures of 
Equality: Social Science, Citizenship, and Race in Cuba, 1902–1940 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina 
Press, 2004); Rebecca J. Scott, Degrees of Freedom: Louisiana and Cuba after Slavery (Cambridge, MA: Belknap 
Press of Harvard University Press, 2005); Gillian McGillivray, Blazing Cane: Sugar Communities, Class, and State 
Formation in Cuba, 1868–1959 (Durham: Duke University Press, 2009). 
40 Mariola Espinosa’s Epidemic Invasions was particularly influential in showing that U.S.-based scholars could 
pursue health histories of the republican period. Reinaldo Funes Monzote also opened up exciting avenues for those 
interested in the environmental aspects of disease. See, for example, “Slaughterhouses and Milk Consumption in the 
‘Sick Republic’: Socio-Environmental Change and Sanitary Technology in Havana, 1890–1925,” in State of 
Ambiguity, 121–47. 
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health.41 This growing body of work also benefits from two scholarly communities. Under 
difficult conditions, historians in Cuba have done the painstaking work of writing institutional 
histories, medical biographies, and broad historical overviews of health and medicine in Cuba.42 
Second, a burgeoning historiography of health and medicine in Latin America produced over the 
last two decades has established the value of using disease as a tool of social, political, and 
cultural analysis.43 
The broader international panorama of historical scholarship on public health and 
medicine has tended towards a certain bifurcation. In the 1970s and 1980s, historians were 
concerned with how health policies, ecological disruptions, and the political economy resulted in 
epidemiological changes.44 They also sought to explain mortality transitions, sparking a debate 
over whether medical interventions or rising standards of living explained improvements in 
health indicators.45  
                                                 
41 Gutiérrez, “Disease, Empire, and Modernity in the Caribbean”; Daniel Rodríguez, “‘A Blessed Formula for 
Progress’: The Politics of Health, Medicine, and Welfare in Havana, (1897–1935)” (PhD diss., New York 
University, 2013); Jennifer Lambe, “Baptism by Fire: The Making and Remaking of Madness in Cuba, 1899–1980” 
(PhD diss., Yale University, 2014); Daniel A. Rodríguez, “‘To Fight These Powerful Trusts and Free the Medical 
Profession’: Medicine, Class Formation, and Revolution in Cuba, 1925–1935,” Hispanic American Historical 
Review 95, no. 4 (2015): 595–629. 
42 These scholars include César Rodríguez Expósito and Gregorio Delgado García, who have published prolifically 
in the Cuadernos de Historia de la Salud Pública. On the issue of tuberculosis, Enrique Beldarraín Chaple has 
produced excellent work. “Apuntes para la historia de la lucha antituberculosa en Cuba,” Revista Cubana de Salud 
Pública 24, no. 2 (1998): 97–105. 
43 For an overview of this literature, see Armus, “Disease in the Historiography,” 1–24. 
44 Thomas McKeown, The Role of Medicine: Dream, Mirage or Nemesis? (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1979); Díaz-Briquets, The Health Revolution in Cuba; James J. Horn, “The Mexican Revolution and Health Care, or 
the Health of the Mexican Revolution,” Latin American Perspectives 10, no. 4 (1983): 24–39; Meredith Turshen, 
The Political Ecology of Disease in Tanzania (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1984); Packard, White 
Plague, Black Labor; Gilberto Hochman, A era do saneamento: As bases da política de saúde pública no Brasil 
(São Paulo: Editora Hucitec/ANPOCS, 1998). 
45 See, for example, Thomas McKeown and R.G. Record, “Reasons for the Decline of Mortality in England and 
Wales during the Nineteenth Century,” Population Studies 16 (1962): 94–122; Thomas McKeown, The Modern Rise 
of Population (London: Edward Arnold, 1976); Leonard G. Wilson, “The Historical Decline of Tuberculosis in 
Europe and America: Its Causes and Significance,” Journal of the History of Medicine and Allied Sciences 45, no. 3 
(1990): 366–96; James Colgrove, “The McKeown Thesis: A Historical Controversy and Its Enduring Influence,” 
American Journal of Public Health 92, no. 5 (May 2002): 725–29.  
 13 
In response to the cultural/linguistic turn in the early 1990s, historians of medicine began 
to discard the quantitative tools of social history. This sociocultural approach instead utilized 
disease as a lens to explore broader topics, such as the growth of the welfare state, medical 
professionalization, and the construction of difference (e.g., race, gender). As historian Diego 
Armus notes, “This approach barely skims across the history of a given etiology; rarely is there 
any attempt to set up a dialogue between sociocultural history and the history of biomedical 
sciences.”46 Many scholars of this new wave turned to the discursive insights of Foucault, 
foregrounding how medicine and health interventions relate to imperialism and internal 
colonialism within a nation-state. This culturalist approach critically analyzes the normalizing 
effects of medical discourses and how the state exercised power through biopolitical projects.47 
This dissertation argues that it is most productive to merge these two approaches, paying 
attention to both empirical health outcomes and cultural constructions of disease. This method 
means that both state health efforts and grassroots definitions of medical success must be part of 
the research agenda. When health statistics and institutional results are not considered, it 
becomes difficult to understand how health was experienced by people on the ground. However, 
tracing epidemiological outcomes alone cannot explain how historical actors (both ordinary 
citizens and medical professionals) defined medical success, how they evaluated the state’s 
                                                 
46 Armus, “Disease in the Historiography,” 5.  
47 See, for example, Megan Vaughan, Curing Their Ills: Colonial Power and African Illness (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1991); David Arnold, Colonizing the Body: State Medicine and Epidemic Disease in 
Nineteenth-Century India (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993); Teresita Martínez-Vergne, Shaping the 
Discourse on Space: Charity and Its Wards in Nineteenth-Century San Juan, Puerto Rico (Austin: University of 
Texas Press, 1999); Nayan Shah, Contagious Divides: Epidemics and Race in San Francisco’s Chinatown 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002); Laura Briggs, Reproducing Empire: Race, Sex, Science, and U.S. 
Imperialism in Puerto Rico (Berkeley: University of California, 2002); Warwick Anderson, Colonial Pathologies: 
American Tropical Medicine, Race, and Hygiene in the Philippines (Durham: Duke University Press, 2006).   
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performance on those metrics, and what the political outcomes of those evaluations were.48 On 
the other hand, we will not be well-placed to interpret the frequently voluminous public 
discourse criticizing health projects and policies—sources generated by doctors, patients, and 
civic actors as they pushed the state for more resources to control diseases—unless we pair our 
reading of that critical discourse with attention to concrete trends in health outcomes. “The Sick 
Republic” thus advocates for adopting a “both-and” approach: paying attention to both empirical 
outcomes and the social construction of health and disease, from above and below.  
By taking this approach, this dissertation uncovers key findings that make it possible to 
reconcile a decades-old debate in Cuban historiography. Since 1959, scholars from two very 
different political camps have attempted to prove that health was either better or worse following 
the revolution. Demographic analyses have shown that while the revolutionary government did 
make advances in health, the most radical drops in mortality and increases in life expectancy 
happened before 1959. In fact, by 1958, Cuba possessed some of the best health indicators in the 
Latin American region.49 Another group of scholars have instead focused on the shortcomings of 
the republican administrations, primarily by emphasizing measures and issues other than national 
statistics (e.g., rural-urban disparities in doctor-to-patient ratios; absence of proper water 
sanitation; corruption).50 This literature argues that Cubans were deeply unhappy with the quality 
                                                 
48 As Flurin Condrau contends, “[U]nderstanding success as an objective rather than a historically shaped category 
appears ultimately to be an ahistoric notion.” “Urban Tuberculosis Patients and Sanatorium Treatment in the Early 
Twentieth Century,” in Medicine, Charity and Mutual Aid: The Consumption of Health and Welfare in Britain, c. 
1550–1950, eds. Anne Borsay and Peter Shapely (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2007): 187. 
49 Those that emphasize mortality trends include Díaz-Briquets, The Health Revolution in Cuba; Leví Marrero, Cuba 
en la década de 1950: Un país en desarrollo (Santo Domingo: Editora Corripio, 1987); James W. McGuire and 
Laura B. Frankel, “Mortality Decline in Cuba, 1900–1959: Patterns, Comparisons, and Causes,” Latin American 
Research Review 40, no. 2 (2005): 83–116; Roberto M. González, “Infant Mortality in Cuba: Myth and Reality,” 
Cuban Studies 43 (2015): 19–39. 
50 Those that emphasize corruption include Carmen Arocha Mariño, “La economía y la salud pública en Cuba en la 
década de 1940,” Revista Cubana de Salud Pública 24, no. 2 (2000): 128–33; Hirschfeld, Health, Politics, and 
Revolution in Cuba. Sergio Díaz-Briquets represents an exception to this division of analytical labor: in the 
introduction to his superb book, he includes both trends. Additionally, he was careful to note that quantitative 
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of their health care before 1959, in ways that the revolutionary regime that followed sought 
actively to address. 
This dissertation has proven that both sides in this debate are correct. On many counts, 
Cuba’s health care system proved to be well developed and more advanced than regional 
neighbors, as the Cuban state pursued serious health initiatives (e.g., the CNT, experimentation 
with modern health units, and tuberculosis sanatorium construction). This system also produced 
significant successes, evidenced by mortality declines and good health indicators by Latin 
American standards. However, it was plagued by politics, and this resulted in citizens being 
dissatisfied with their health sector. 
In tackling such questions, this dissertation also situates itself in a historiographical turn 
that offers a revisionist history of the Cuban revolution by questioning the assumption that 1959 
was a definitive historical rupture. Scholars who have begun to cross the “great divide” have 
examined the victories of a social revolution, while also tracing its limitations and continuities 
with the republican period (what Alejandro de la Fuente has referred to, respectively, as the “yet” 
and the “still” in the revolution’s discourse).51  
Finally, this dissertation contributes to the literature on state-building in Latin America. 
Sociologists, political scientists, and historians have created a robust body of work on this 
subject, primarily measuring state formation through education; taxation; infrastructural 
development (e.g., railroads); and military participation and war.52 Social and cultural histories 
                                                                                                                                                             
national health indicators in Cuba have masked regional, racial, and other social inequalities. The Health Revolution 
in Cuba, 4. 
51 “La Ventolera: Ruptures, Persistence and the Historiography of the Cuban Revolution,” (paper presented at the 
conference on “New Histories of the Cuban Revolution,” Yale University, October 3–4, 2014).  
52 See, for example, Hendrik Kraay, Race, State, and Armed Forces in Independence-Era Brazil: Bahia, 1790s–
1840s (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001); Miguel Angel Centeno, Blood and Debt: War and the Nation-
State in Latin America (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2002); Marcus J. Kurtz, Latin 
American State Building in Comparative Perspective: Social Foundations of Institutional Order (New York: 
 16 
of health and medicine in Latin America have flourished over the last two and a half decades;53 
however, few public health historians have explicitly considered the intersection of public health 
and state-building.54  I contend that healthcare services, a crucial component of social citizenship 
by the mid-twentieth century, should be included in analyses of state formation processes.55 
This dissertation, then, pursues three main lines of inquiry: What can explain the 
precocious state attention paid to tuberculosis in Cuba, especially the 1936 initiative? If the 
Cuban state made the disease central to its state-building endeavors and efforts, resulting in the 
steady growth of health institutions and infrastructure, why did citizens perceive this project as 
inadequate at best and fundamentally flawed at worst? How did the tuberculosis programs 
implemented by the revolutionary government connect with or deviate from previous ones? 
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Latin American and Caribbean Studies 35, no. 69 (2010): 34. A small, but growing, body of public health historians 
of Latin America has begun to address these issues. See, for example, Katherine Bliss, Compromised Positions: 
Prostitution, Public Health, and Gender Politics in Revolutionary Mexico City (University Park: Pennsylvania State 
University Press, 2001); Diana Obregón, “Building National Medicine: Leprosy and Power in Colombia, 1870–
1910,” Social History of Medicine 15, no. 1 (2002): 89–108; Steven Palmer, From Popular Medicine to Medical 
Populism: Doctors, Healers, and Public Power in Costa Rica, 1800–1940 (Durham: Duke University Press, 2003); 
Ann Zulawski, Unequal Cures: Public Health and Political Change in Bolivia, 1900–1950 (Durham: Duke 
University Press, 2007); Heather McCrea, Diseased Relations: Epidemics, Public Health, and State-Building in 
Yucatán Mexico, 1847–1924 (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2010); Nicole Pacino, “Prescription 
for a Nation: Public Health in Post-Revolutionary Bolivia, 1952–1965” (PhD diss., University of California, Santa 
Barbara, 2013). 
55 This dissertation will also contribute to medical historiography beyond Latin America. While political scientists 
and historians have generated an extensive body of work on citizenship, few medical historians have explored the 
intersection between health and citizenship, which has resulted in teleological narratives that have assumed that “the 
growing rapport between medicine and the state was both desirable and more or less foreordained.” Harry 
Oosterhuis and Frank Huisman, “The Politics of Health and Citizenship: Historical and Contemporary 
Perspectives,” in Health and Citizenship: Political Cultures of Health in Modern Europe, eds. Frank Huisman and 
Harry Oosterhuis (London: Pickering and Chatto Publishers, 2013), 5. 
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1.3 ARGUMENTS 
As national politics shifted in Cuba in the 1920s, so too did the politics of disease, shaped by 
nascent labor organizations, surging nationalism, and disquiet over what many considered to be 
Cuba’s sanitary decline. Tuberculosis had long plagued the clases populares, and their growing 
importance in Cuban politics propelled increased state attention to the disease. During the 
presidency of Gerardo Machado, his administration initiated a paternalistic and charity-based 
effort to expand tuberculosis services.  
Concurrently, public debates about tuberculosis invoked an explosive mix of claims 
regarding race and nation; poverty and inequality; exclusion and inclusion; nationalism and 
immigration; citizen entitlements and hygienic responsibilities. Black politicians and public 
figures critiqued the limited state campaign and articulated the idea of citizen’s right to health 
care. Physicians bolstered this call for an expanded state health care system, arguing that the 
Cuban government had the responsibility to scientifically fund and manage the campaign, 
replacing individuals active in anti-tuberculosis charities. In the following decades, other 
Cubans—including ordinary citizens, intellectuals, civic actors, and journalists—participated in 
defining the right to health and in demanding its implementation. I contend that it was these 
actors in the republican period, not the revolutionary government of 1959, who enshrined health 
as a cornerstone of state efficiency and citizenship.56 
When military strongman Fulgencio Batista launched a massive tuberculosis campaign in 
1936, to be carried out by the new Consejo Nacional de Tuberculosis (CNT), he was responding 
                                                 
56 Scholars of Cuba often say that the revolutionary government introduced the right to health care. It would be more 
appropriate to say that they came closer than any past government in fulfilling that right. Enrique Beldarraín Chaple, 
“La salud pública en Cuba y su experiencia internacional (1959–2005),” História, Ciências, Saúde-Manguinhos 13, 
no. 3 (July–September 2006): 710. 
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to the demands brought to the forefront by citizens themselves. The presidential hopeful’s 
decision to extend the campaign’s funding and scope promised high political dividends in a 
context of populist politics. Batista’s well-known desire to be the “architect of the Cuban state” 
relied heavily upon the construction of a new social welfare edifice, and he made the CNT a 
pillar of this state-building effort. From 1936 on, the Cuban state—first under Batista and then 
under his successors—pursued a project that steadily expanded the infrastructure of tuberculosis 
surveillance and treatment for its citizens.  
However, by the 1950s, while tuberculosis services had improved on many counts, 
citizens and physicians perceived the anti-tuberculosis campaign as an effort that had largely 
failed. The heightened visibility of tuberculosis, achieved in part by the claims-making of 
citizens, had channeled state attention towards a disease of the poor, but it had also distorted the 
design of health projects and policies, making them inefficient, openly political, and marred by 
corruption. Furthermore, over the previous three decades, in a number of spaces—from debates 
at international medical congresses held in far-away cities to agonizing experiences endured in 
the slums of Havana—citizens and medical professionals had formulated specific expectations of 
the public health sector. Despite the multiplication of dispensaries across the national territory 
and a declining mortality rate, the Cuban state had performed poorly on many of these issues. 
Cubans were concerned with the state’s failure to remove patronage from hospital admissions 
and health personnel appointments; the state’s inability to make available an adequate number of 
tuberculosis beds; the politicization of high profile projects; difficulties in accessing antibiotic 
therapy; and the absence of preventive health practices. These characteristics defined a “modern” 
public health sector, a distinction that Cubans felt could not be applied to their own nation. 
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On the eve of revolution, the gap between these expectations and the performance of 
republican administrations influenced the growing de-legitimation of the state, the overthrow of 
Batista’s government, and the new regime’s priorities in health policy. In their first years of 
governing, revolutionary health administrators deployed resources to respond to the 
shortcomings of the republican years. For instance, they carried out mass vaccination and sent 
trained personnel to peripheral areas that had never had access to medical care. For many 
Cubans, these campaigns signified a long-awaited wind of change sweeping through their tiny 
hamlets.  
Nonetheless, continuities existed across 1959, obscured by the official rhetoric of all-
consuming change. The new government relied upon what can be considered successes of the 
republican administrations, utilizing infrastructure, resources, and personnel developed before 
1959. Furthermore, as the state initially prioritized magic bullet technologies and medical 
interventions, many of the poor continued to fall through the cracks of the welfare state, as they 
waited on legislation that would attend to the deep social roots and economic consequences of 
their disease. 
1.4 CHAPTER OUTLINE 
Chapter 2 traces the contours of the public debates surrounding tuberculosis in the late 1920s and 
1930s. Medical professionals, volunteers in the tuberculosis campaign, and intellectuals all 
agreed that the state needed to do more to control tuberculosis, but questions of race, 
immigration, and social inequality created controversy. In this contested space, great tension 
existed between ideas of rights and responsibilities. Discourses of hygienic citizenship 
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emphasized that individual citizens should adhere to sanitary norms and behaviors to stem 
contagion. This language, which racialized the disease and depoliticized health inequalities, 
persisted as a durable language of blame throughout the Second Republic (1933–1958). 
Nonetheless, in the late 1920s, it also spurred black intellectuals and politicians to firmly 
articulate the idea of an individual’s right to health care on the basis of membership in the nation. 
This right had become firmly entrenched in the arsenal of citizenship demands by the mid-1930s 
(and codified in the 1940 Constitution), one that Cubans would draw from again and again 
throughout the republican period.  
In response to this grassroots articulation of the right to health, and in his attempts to 
strengthen the state, Fulgencio Batista launched a wide-reaching tuberculosis campaign when he 
founded the Consejo Nacional de Tuberculosis. Chapter 3 follows the infrastructural expansion 
of this institution from 1936 to 1958, while also examining the critiques of citizens who 
continually sought a more extensive and geographically equal network of treatment services. The 
chapter continues this line of investigation into the revolutionary period: while the new 
government attended to marginalized spaces, it never fully rectified the concentration of medical 
resources in Havana. Furthermore, it continued to rely on the private actions of citizens to assist 
where the state could not, continuing a problematic tradition of charity in health that had existed 
under the Machado (1925–1933) and Auténtico (1944–1952) administrations.  
The remaining chapters explore specific aspects of the tuberculosis campaign that 
illustrate the contradictions of a state-building project that was both expansive and widely 
maligned by citizens and medical professionals. At times, I expand the lens to consider issues 
that affected the public health sector at large. Chapter 4 analyzes the dense webs of patronage 
that permeated the Cuban public health system and public health officials’ attempts to replace 
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them with more technical and apolitical procedures. The first part of the chapter reconstructs the 
partnership of Cuba and the Rockefeller Foundation’s International Health Division (RF), which 
sought to reform and modernize local public health units. The presence of the RF—and its 
highly-publicized exit from the country after its efforts were frustrated—served to accentuate the 
deeply rooted problem of patronage, so that by the late 1940s, in a context of worsening 
government corruption, citizens and physicians became acerbic in their criticism of the CNT. 
They accused it of unfair hospital admission procedures and of staffing its dependencies with 
unqualified, yet politically well-connected, appointees. The controversy dissipated in the wake of 
Batista’s coup d’état in 1952, but the government never resolved the issue of patronage in the 
health sector. 
Chapter 5 recounts the saga of the Topes de Collantes National Sanatorium, the premiere 
project of the CNT and a symbol of health during the republic that animates Cubans to this day. 
Batista governed as an authoritarian populist: appeasing the popular classes guided his decision 
to prioritize tuberculosis (and the authoritarian nature of his rule allowed him to freely dedicate 
resources to the disease); in contrast, advocates struggled to gain state attention to fight 
tuberculosis in many other countries. However, authoritarianism also made it possible for Batista 
to exercise undue influence over the conception and implementation of the project.57 Guided by 
political objectives rather than technical advice, the project became a paragon of inefficiency and 
politicization. The poorly planned sanatorium cost millions and took seventeen years to open. 
Construction difficulties and political rivalries delayed its inauguration. Operating for less than 
five years, the sanatorium was quickly repurposed by the revolutionary government in 1959.  
                                                 
57 Other works have highlighted how different ideological traditions and political systems have affected national 
health. See Werner Troesken, The Pox of Liberty: How the Constitution Left Americans Rich, Free, and Prone to 
Infection (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2015). 
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Chapter 6 examines the arrival of streptomycin—a widely known “cure” for 
tuberculosis—on the island in the late 1940s. By 1953, tuberculosis mortality had plummeted, 
suggesting that enough people had gained sufficient access to the drug to prevent or delay death. 
However, in the same period, citizens’ denunciations of the CNT and the Cuban state had never 
been more excoriating. Frustrated by their difficulties in accessing the expensive drug, the sick 
began to articulate (along with physicians) the right of the poor to free or state-subsidized 
medicine. Officials responded sluggishly, and private charities returned to plug gaps in the 
welfare system and help poor Cubans obtain the drug.  
Chapter 7 turns to physicians’ demands for the protection of the healthy through 
preventive health measures, specifically the Bacillus Calmette-Guérin (BCG) vaccine.58 By the 
1950s, Cuba possessed a BCG Institute that produced (and exported) the vaccine, legislation that 
made vaccination obligatory, and significant funding to be used for mass vaccination. 
Nonetheless, the Institute continually fell far short of annual vaccination goals, due to an 
insufficient rural health network, lack of political will, and citizens’ resistance. When the 
revolutionary government came to power in 1959, they initiated a successful mass BCG 
vaccination campaign. The effort, however, owed part of its success to the vaccination 
infrastructure developed in the 1940s and 1950s.  
                                                 
58 The BCG vaccine is made from an attenuated strain of the bovine tuberculosis bacillus and was first developed in 
France in 1921. Although its efficacy was the subject of intense international debates, many scientists (including a 
large portion of the Cuban medical community) believed that a series of BCG vaccinations could provide immunity 
against the disease, especially if children were vaccinated as early as possible. Simona Luca and Traian Mihaescu, 
“History of BCG Vaccine,” Maedica (Buchar) 8, no. 1 (March 2013): 53–58. 
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1.5 CUBA’S MEDICAL ORGANIZATION AND TERMINOLOGY 
While this dissertation focuses almost exclusively on Cuba’s public health sector, a brief note on 
the broader health care system is necessary. In the period under study, there were four categories 
of medical care: the public sector; the private sector (made up of fee-for-service practices); and 
the contributory sector, which had two separate systems: (1) a large, growing number of 
cooperative pre-paid medical plans and (2) “a small number of very large pre-paid medical 
plans” offered by the Spanish ethnic mutual-aid societies.59 Overlap existed among these four 
categories: “The contributory sector served the middle classes, some organized workers, and 
many of the rich. The private sector, which was small by Latin American standards, served 
mainly the rich, although most people bought private medical services for some purposes. The 
purely public sector served mainly the poor, although many who were not poor used its services 
at one time or another.”60   
Any study of health must confront the surprisingly difficult task of defining the term 
“public health.” This category has changed over time and place and is “historically contingent 
and embedded in changing socio-political frames of thought, debate and practice, which not only 
reflect, but also shape their social realities.”61 One historian summarizes, “‘Public health’ has at 
times been ‘medical police,’ ‘state medicine, ‘public hygiene’ (hygiene publique), or, most 
comprehensively, ‘social medicine,’ in which our ‘public health’ was only one division.”62  
In Cuba during the mid-twentieth century, a subset of physicians sought to distinguish 
“public health” from clinical medicine, as a discipline and practice. For them, the former focused 
                                                 
59 Danielson, Cuban Medicine, 101.  
60 McGuire and Frankel, “Mortality Decline in Cuba,” 102. 
61 Oosterhuis and Huisman, “The Politics of Health and Citizenship,” 6. 
62 Christopher Hamlin, “Public Health,” in The Oxford Handbook of the History of Medicine, ed. Mark Jackson 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013): 412. 
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on the health of the collective, primarily through epidemiological surveillance and preventive 
health practices, and the latter was the purview of physicians focused on individuals and curing 
disease. They were supported by a growing corpus of public health officials in the Americas, 
who focused on preventive measures administered by local health units, considering medical 
care for the poor to be a separate issue to be administered by welfare departments.63 
However, other Cubans used the term “public health” broadly, referring to both state-
sponsored health services for the poor and techniques to prevent disease. Unless otherwise noted, 
my dissertation uses the terms “public health” and “public health sector” in this comprehensive 
sense. One significant exception is the chapter on the Rockefeller Foundation, in which I am 
careful to delineate “public health” from the “public health sector,” as the very definition of 
“public health” was being disputed.  
*** 
At the end of the twentieth century, tuberculosis “returned” with a vengeance throughout the 
world.64 Pockets of rising incidence of the disease—now in multi-drug resistant and extremely 
drug-resistant forms—line up with spaces where inequality is worsening. The WHO has recently 
announced a campaign to end the tuberculosis epidemic by 2035. Cuba, which has been selected 
as part of the initiative, has declared its own intent to be the first country to eliminate the 
disease.65 The goal is possible, the country insists, because of its drastic lowering of cases “over 
                                                 
63 James Colgrove, Epidemic City: The Politics of Public Health in New York (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 
2011), 6. In the United States, for example, clinical medicine remained dominant, and public health suffered as a 
result. Elizabeth Fee, “Designing Schools of Public Health for the United States,” in A History of Education in 
Public Health, eds. Elizabeth Fee and Roy M. Acheson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991): 155–94. 
64 Tuberculosis never left of course. Instead, it ceased to be a public health problem and receded into private spaces. 
With the explosive mix of homelessness, AIDS, and MDR-TB in the early 1990s, the disease returned to national 
and international visibility. Ott, Fevered Lives, 157.  
65 “OMS considera posible la eliminación de la tuberculosis en Cuba,” Granma, July 3, 2014, 
http://www.granma.cu/salud/2014-07-03/oms-considera-posible-la-eliminacion-de-la-tuberculosis-en-cuba, accessed 
March 30, 2016. 
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the past five decades, despite the U.S. blockade.”66 However, in 2006, a specialist at the National 
School of Public Health in Cuba recognized that prior to the revolution “more had been done in 
our country in the struggle against tuberculosis than against any other disease.”67 Understanding 
the path toward elimination demands an historical perspective, one that takes into account how a 
national disease was made: the process by which ordinary citizens, medical professionals, and 
health workers successfully pushed an unlikely disease to the forefront of national visibility. 
Considering the limitations and shortcomings of this endeavor is also crucial for offering lessons 
to those currently fighting for better health and “for better lives,” especially as debates about 
what constitutes “health” and the most effective way to achieve it are increasingly contentious in 
an age of neoliberalism.68  
                                                 
66 “Cuba Aims to Be 1st to Eliminate Tuberculosis in Latin America,” Telesur, March 26, 2016,   
http://www.telesurtv.net/english/news/Cuba-Aims-to-Be-1st-to-Eliminate-Tuberculosis-in-Latin-America-
20160326-0038.html, accessed March 30, 2016. 
67 Beldarraín Chaple, “Apuntes para la historia de la lucha antituberculosa en Cuba,” 104. 
68 Hamlin, “Public Health,” 412.  
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2.0  TUBERCULOSIS AND CITIZENSHIP: COMPETING VISIONS OF HYGIENE 
AND HEALTH, 1925–1940 
By the mid-1920s, physicians were vocally concerned about the changing panorama of national 
public health.69 For over two decades, Cuba had enjoyed a reputation as a salubrious island, 
whose sanitation practices put it “on a plane with advanced nations.”70 As economic conditions 
and political corruption worsened under the administration of Alfredo Zayas y Alfonso (1921–
1925), however, public health officials had a more difficult time maintaining sanitary 
standards.71 The motif of a “sick republic” spread throughout the medical and popular presses, a 
sharp divergence from previous assessments.72  
                                                 
69 Portions of this chapter were originally published as Kelly Urban, “The ‘Black Plague’ in a Racial Democracy: 
Tuberculosis, Race, and Citizenship in Cuba, 1925–1945,” Cuban Studies 45 (January 2017): 319–39. 
70 “Medical Education and Public Health in Cuba,” 1927–1928, 25, Folder 1, Box 1, Series 315, Record Group 1.1, 
International Health Division records, Rockefeller Foundation records, Rockefeller Archive Center. Hereafter, the 
following abbreviations will be used for citing sources from the Rockefeller Archive Center: Folder (F); Box (B); 
Series (S); Record Group (RG); Rockefeller Foundation records, Rockefeller Archive Center (RF-RAC). 
71 Alejandro de la Fuente, A Nation for All: Race, Inequality, and Politics in Twentieth-Century Cuba (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 2001), 91.  
72 Reinaldo Funes Monzote writes, “While the allegory of the polity as sick organism was common in the Latin 
American social essay and novel of the era, its appearance in Cuba was surprising, contrasting as it did with two 
decades of positive evaluations of the island’s progress in hygiene and public health starting with the first U.S. 
occupation…[I]n the 1920s new criticism emerged among scientists concerning the state of health and hygiene, and 
it became an important part of the enumeration of symptoms of republican decadence….From this perspective, the 
degeneration was a consequence as much of biological and social heritage or the influence of climate as it was of 
political corruption, bad public administration, and control over national resources by foreign interests.” 
“Slaughterhouses and Milk Consumption in the ‘Sick Republic’: Socio-Environmental Change and Sanitary 
Technology in Havana, 1890–1925,” in State of Ambiguity: Civic Life and Culture in Cuba’s First Republic, eds. 
Steven Palmer, José Antonio Piqueras, and Amparo Sánchez Cobos (Durham: Duke University Press, 2014), 121–
22. 
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Tuberculosis, “the great scourge of the capital,” loomed large in these evaluations of 
national health as one of the strongest indications of Havana’s sanitary decline.73 After years of 
steadily decreasing, the tuberculosis mortality rate began to increase in 1924.74 The persistence 
of the tuberculosis problem provided “a very painful contrast” to past sanitary achievements, as 
if the “conquests of modern hygiene and the renowned zeal of public health authorities shattered 
against it.”75  
While the situation was troubling for those concerned with Cuba’s reputation, it was felt 
most acutely by the poor struggling with the disease. The state-funded network of hospitals had 
expanded over the years, but not enough to keep “pace with the demands for care of the 
unfortunate.”76 Tuberculosis and poverty became motifs in the popular arts.77 In 1935, for 
example, both the prestigious Lyceum salon and popular news magazine Bohemia displayed the 
work of a new artist, Fidelio Ponce de León (1895–1949), whose work gained notoriety during 
this decade.78 His painting Tuberculosis (1934) not only presented a chilling portrait of the often-
fatal disease, but also critiqued Cuba’s social divisions and political economy through depictions 
of poverty and death.79 
                                                 
73 “Medical Education,” 18, F 1, B 1, S 315, RG 1.1, RF-RAC; Funes Monzote, “Slaughterhouses and Milk 
Consumption,” 128. 
74 It is unclear what caused this mortality increase, although it is possible that the economic crisis of the early 1920s, 
and a resultant decline in nutrition, played a role. Sergio Díaz-Briquets, The Health Revolution in Cuba (Austin: The 
University of Texas Press, 1983), 69–72. 
75 “Flagelo Social,” Carteles 14, no. 34 (August 25, 1929): 9.  
76 “Medical Education,” 36, F 1, B 1, S 315, RG 1.1, RF-RAC. 
77 See, for example, José Rico de Estasen, “La muerte de la tuberculosa,” Bohemia 19, no. 29 (July 17, 1927): 9.  
78 Bohemia 27, no. 48 (December 1, 1935): n.p.   
79 See Fidelio Ponce de León, Tuberculosis, 1934. Oil on canvas, 92cm X 122cm. Museo Nacional de Bellas Artes, 
Havana. For more on Ponce de León, see Juan Sánchez, Fidelio Ponce (Havana: Editorial Letras Cubanas, 1935), 
123. Fidelio Ponce de León, an alcoholic, may have already contracted tuberculosis by 1934. La Esperanza 
Sanatorium admitted him as a patient in 1946, and he died of the disease in 1949. 
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Diseases like yellow fever, which had captured official attention in past decades, had 
“ceased to be real dangers, almost becoming ghosts.”80 Instead, one public health official 
summarized, “Tuberculosis is the disease that causes the largest number of victims among us,” 
according it “an exceptional importance.”81 At the National Medical Congress in late 1927, one 
physician declared tuberculosis to be “the only health problem of momentous national 
importance, which is necessary to confront with decisiveness and energy.”82 The heightened 
visibility of tuberculosis across governmental and popular sectors reflected the growing 
nationalism and labor mobilization on the island.83 In response to these changing politics of 
disease, the health administration of President Gerardo Machado y Morales (1925–1933) created 
a new anti-tuberculosis board, staffed by public officials and charitable volunteers, to alleviate 
the tuberculosis problem and gain political legitimacy.  
Most medical professionals, volunteers in the tuberculosis campaign, and intellectuals 
agreed that the Machado administration had made significant progress in controlling the disease, 
but had also crafted a campaign with serious limitations. Physicians, overwhelmingly concerned 
with the health of the collective and epidemiological trends, petitioned the state to replace 
volunteers in charitable organizations with state-employed and scientifically-trained public 
health men. A number of public intellectuals, politicians, and civic groups also voiced criticisms, 
and their discussions generated influential debates about exactly how health and citizenship 
intersected.  
                                                 
80 Cuba, Secretaría de Sanidad y Beneficencia, 1926–1931: Cinco años de labor sanitaria y de beneficencia pública 
(Havana: Imprenta y Librería La Propagandista, 1931), 40. 
81 Ibid. 
82 Alberto Sánchez de Fuentes quoted in n.a., “Crónica del VII Congreso Médico Nacional (Habana, Diciembre, 
1927),” Revista Médica Cubana 39 (1928): 96. Emphasis mine.  
83 For more on mobilization in the period, see Robert Whitney, State and Revolution in Cuba: Mass Mobilization 
and Political Change, 1920–1940 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001).  
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Citizenship is a complex topic, with myriad competing theoretical definitions, but many 
scholars reference its dual nature: “equal rights to the enjoyment of collective goods provided by 
the political association” and “equal duties to promote and sustain them.”84 The medical 
historiography on citizenship has also paid attention to this tension, noting “two contradictory 
forms of medical citizenship.”85 Alex Nading writes, “In the first form, citizenship entails 
individual responsibilities, often of a hygienic nature.”86 A number of scholars of medicine have 
referred to this as “hygienic citizenship”87: around the turn of the century, various public health 
                                                 
84 Richard Bellamy, Citizenship: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 17. The 
scholarship on citizenship is vast. Important works include Charles Tilly, ed., Citizenship, Identity, and Social 
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Perspectives,” in Health and Citizenship: Political Cultures of Health in Modern Europe, eds. Frank Huisman and 
Harry Oosterhuis (London: Pickering & Chatto Publishers, 2013), 5. 
86 Nading, “‘Love Isn’t There,” 86. 
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health, in discourse and practice, has been integral to the operation of power and domination. They have argued that 
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administrations and civic associations undertook projects to ensure that individuals followed the 
precepts of hygienic science; over time, these social engineers began to shift their attention from 
epidemic control and the social environment to the individual and his or her behavior.88 These 
notions placed the blame for poor health on the individual, which often served to depoliticize 
these issues by decontextualizing social problems.89 
The second form of medical citizenship is guided by the idea of health as a civil right or 
as a central component of social citizenship, in which “citizenship entails the enumeration of 
health needs to which governments must respond.”90 From the end of the nineteenth century 
through the mid-twentieth century, as electorates expanded, states in the Western hemisphere 
increasingly provided or subsidized health care for their constituents.91 Nonetheless, even in this 
period of social-democratic citizenship, in which the idea and practice of health as a social right 
gained dominance, various actors continued to espouse notions of hygienic citizenship. 
In Cuba in the late 1920s, elite actors argued that tuberculosis’s presence among the poor 
grew out of their inability to adhere to sanitary norms and perform behaviors that would inhibit 
contagion. Afro-Cubans suffered from tuberculosis mortality rates that were higher than their 
white counterparts, and they also were overrepresented among the poor. Discourses of hygienic 
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citizenship, then, often became racialized and racist. In response, however, black politicians and 
intellectuals began to articulate a more radical and popular notion of health citizenship, in which 
Afro-Cubans, a crucial part of the national body, deserved the right to state-funded health care. 
They turned the tables on Machado’s limited and paternalistic tuberculosis endeavors, 
demanding the transformation and expansion of the state health care system. Their demands 
bolstered physicians’ call for an end to the public-private hybrid nature of the campaign. 
These dual discourses of rights and responsibilities continued to exist throughout the 
Second Republic. Elite actors and some medical professionals continued to blame the poor and 
Afro-Cubans, rather than discrimination and inequality in the health sector and larger society, for 
the persistent tuberculosis problem. Even more significant, however, were the assertions that 
access to health services constituted a critical ingredient of citizenship. By the end of the 1930s, 
this claim had become firmly entrenched in the arsenal of popular demands: delegates codified 
the idea of health as a right of citizenship in the influential and progressive 1940 Constitution. 
Furthermore, politicians serious about solidifying their legitimacy had to attend to the issue of 
health, especially tuberculosis. 
2.1 TUBERCULOSIS POLICY UNDER MACHADO 
Francisco María Fernández, Secretary of Sanitation under Machado, first intensified the state’s 
tuberculosis control efforts in late 1927, expanding the existing small Tuberculosis Division to 
become the Bureau of Inspection, Statistics, Propaganda and Information. Its primary mandate 
included disease surveillance and popular education campaigns. Even treatment facilities were 
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primarily focused on changing individual behavior and producing disciplined citizens.92 Civic 
partners in the tuberculosis campaign sponsored lectures in a variety of private establishments 
inside and outside of Havana to teach workers and other targeted populations how to prevent 
contagion. 
Despite this initial emphasis on popular education, the scope of the campaign gradually 
came to include the construction of hospitals and dispensaries. In 1928, Machado founded the 
National Anti-Tuberculosis Board (Patronato Nacional contra la Tuberculosis), which had the 
authority to tax luxury items to fund these projects. La Esperanza Sanatorium, on the outskirts of 
Havana, was Cuba’s sole public tuberculosis treatment facility. From sixty beds in 1925, 
Fernández grew its capacity to 150 beds, and then to 300. By 1930, the administration had 
initiated a more serious transformation: the small, traditional cottage-style sanatorium was to 
become a modern, orderly health complex with the construction of a new surgical center, the 
Francisco María Fernández Hospital, which would make available 400 more beds.93 Dispensary 
service increased marginally when the Board inaugurated the Elvira Machado de Machado 
Dispensary (named after the president’s wife) in the Jesús del Monte working class suburb and 
re-opened the Hartmann Dispensary in Santiago de Cuba.94 This extended state-funded 
outpatient therapy outside of Havana’s central core, where there was one public dispensary 
(Furbush) and one private dispensary (run by the Cuban Anti-Tuberculosis League). Treatment 
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and preventive services, however, remained overwhelmingly concentrated in Havana and failed 
to satisfy demand even in the capital. 
The state also relied upon individuals active in anti-tuberculosis charities and other 
private resources to carry out this expanded campaign. Several associations assisted with the 
campaign, such as the Cuban Anti-Tuberculosis League and the National League against 
Childhood Tuberculosis, the latter comprised of some of the most elite women of the island, 
including  “the noble daughters” of the President himself.95 Most important, however, were the 
elite Catholic women of the Damas Isabelinas, who served as official members of Machado’s 
National Anti-Tuberculosis Board.96 They were highly active in service provision, hospital 
construction, and fundraising.  
The Damas Isabelinas spearheaded numerous popular education activities, which formed 
the bulk of the projects undertaken by the National Anti-Tuberculosis Board. In interactions with 
the general population and with patients at dispensaries and sanatoriums, these women 
emphasized how proper hygienic behavior on the part of the individual could limit contagion. 
Medical professionals also participated in these interactions, clinically treating patients while 
also prescribing advice to them about how to prevent their disease from worsening or spreading.  
From the turn of the century through the 1930s, the language of tuberculosis educational 
efforts was heavily gendered and classed. Even though one of the most common refrains 
concerning the disease insisted that “[t]uberculosis is a transmissible, avoidable, and curable 
disease that does not respect sex, age, or race,” it continued with the commonly shared 
knowledge that tuberculosis “preferred to attack the weak, the licentious, and those that do not 
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observe hygienic practices.”97 As a result, tuberculosis specialists targeted those considered 
vulnerable, either from biology or behavior. They consistently organized their advice for disease 
prevention to three groups: children, women, and workers.98 
The burden of blame for high rates of disease often fell on women, for physicians 
believed their biological differences made them more susceptible to infection.99 Furthermore, 
physicians emphasized their responsibility to keep the home free of disease.100 The matriarch of 
every family was responsible for her own health, but more importantly, also that of her husband 
and her offspring (and thus, in a eugenic framework, the nation writ large). “Take care of your 
home as the best guarantee of the life of your child,” one pamphlet advised. “Make it 
comfortable, hygienic, happy.”101 Women were to prioritize childrearing before other activities, 
as the CNT warned, “Mothers who raise their children will ward off many illnesses.”102 
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Educational efforts were primarily directed at spaces where the clases populares labored, 
such as factories and workshops. The Damas Isabelinas and other medical professionals visited 
these locales frequently to offer lectures on practices to ward off tuberculosis infection.103 Public 
health workers were particularly adamant about convincing their audiences that tuberculosis was 
not hereditary, in order to dispel the belief that the disease was non-preventable. This belief may 
have been shared across individuals of all classes, but physicians directed their ire only at the 
poor. One dispensary director wrote, “How much we have to fight to uproot from the popular 
mentality the false idea of the heredity of tuberculosis!”104 
Paternalism, both in the form of Machado’s populist intentions and the elite’s charitable 
beneficence, undergirded this patchwork campaign.105 Health services were not extended on the 
basis of any “right”—whether codified or implied—to health or health care. Machado revealed 
the logic guiding his wider reform efforts: “The people and especially the campesinos felt that 
they were being supported, they discovered prospects which they had not known before, and this 
made them show solidarity with my regime throughout its course…My adversaries therefore 
found no response from a social class that for the first time felt that it was tended to and part of 
the nation.”106 The decision to place new tuberculosis facilities in poorer neighborhoods, 
supported by taxes on luxury goods, suggests the populist nature of the campaign, as Machado’s 
reference to “the people” makes clear. The administration publicized its “large-scale 
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amplification of existing organizations and the creation of new services.”107 Fernández 
emphasized that tuberculosis had “always been cause for concern for our illustrious 
President.”108 Anti-tuberculosis efforts were praised by the press and “applauded by public 
opinion.”109  
2.2 CONTENDING NOTIONS OF HEALTH 
By the late 1920s, then, the disease was becoming increasingly visible. Even though Machado 
had given more attention to tuberculosis than any previous Cuban president, his efforts made the 
campaign’s shortcomings more obvious and intensified demands for increased state intervention. 
Most Cubans agreed that the state needed to do more to counter the tuberculosis problem. 
However, in discussions about the campaign, physicians, elite charity workers, and more radical 
voices espoused differing visions of what good health entailed and who was primarily 
responsible for achieving it. 
Physicians thought in primarily public-health terms (i.e., about the “collective well-
being” to be achieved predominantly through preventive measures).110 Physicians’ concerns 
dovetailed with those of the state, for tuberculosis threatened the eugenic and economic 
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foundation of the country.111 Secretary of Sanitation Fernández explained that the revamped 
tuberculosis department within the sanitation branch aimed “to achieve the moral and material 
betterment of the people of Cuba,” for most tuberculosis-related deaths “occurred among those 
people in full manhood, when their arms could still do much for the economic aggrandizement of 
the Nation.”112 One medical editorial warned that 1,050 to 1,500 Cubans between the ages of 
nineteen and twenty-five died every year—a shame given the “efficiency of our current 
treatments” and the value of their lives to the social and economic future of the nation.113 
Medical practitioners expressed two principal criticisms of the anti-tuberculosis effort: its 
reliance on charity and its failure to tackle the wider social problems influencing the spread of 
tuberculosis. The medical community declared the public health sector’s reliance on religious 
and civic philanthropy to be unscientific, archaic, and undependable. The fight against 
tuberculosis “cannot be constituted exclusively by private groups inspired by piety (we want to 
declare that upon affirming this, we do not deny the value or the disinterested spirit that any 
support implies),” one doctor claimed, “but instead, given its fundamental importance, the cost 
of the prophylactic campaign, the high mortality figure, the loss of fit individuals…it must be an 
infection that the sanitary authorities prevent in the interest of public health.”114 A more radical 
doctor found himself frustrated with the Damas Isabelinas’ involvement at La Esperanza 
Sanatorium. So many resources had been dedicated to the aesthetics of the buildings and the 
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grounds—the “pride of the sanatorium”—while the facility lacked the most basic medical 
equipment for surgery.115 He believed their motives to be guided primarily by the desire for 
notoriety instead of scientific excellence, for ceremonies where the Sanatorium’s avenues were 
named after elite charitable women were “well advertised by the social columns.”116 
The second limitation of the campaign was its focus on epidemiological surveillance and 
the building of medical treatment centers. Physicians understood tuberculosis to be a 
quintessential social disease that required legislation to attend to its socioeconomic roots. 
Physicians believed this second weakness of the campaign to be intricately linked to their first 
criticism. Social problems undergirding high tuberculosis rates were so complex and far-reaching 
that they necessitated state legislation, stable resources, and scientifically-trained managers to 
attend to these problems; charitable institutions’ fundraising activities and educational lectures, 
while useful, could not attack the core of the tuberculosis problem.  
Two major issues clearly evidenced the need for reformist legislation and the limits of 
elite charity: housing and immigration. By the late 1920s, increased migration to the capital had 
overwhelmed the existing housing supply, resulting in overcrowding and an overtaxed sanitation 
infrastructure. In response to this situation ripe for the spread of disease, physicians demanded 
that the state needed to build hygienic housing for workers, enforce sanitary regulations already 
on the books, and raise the minimum wage.117  
Physicians and technocrats hoped to be employed by the state to create an orderly, 
salubrious urban environment. Havana’s suburbs and shantytowns were confirmation of an 
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unchecked and unregulated growth, which had not been guided by science but by necessity. For 
example, “the ugly barrio of Pogolotti, with narrow streets [and] little water,” was not to be 
emulated; “instead,” one publication advised, new neighborhoods should be “small cities with 
large parks, wide sidewalks, houses separated from adjoining ones, gardens and wide streets.”118 
The issue of parks and green spaces, especially for children, came up continually, as they were 
slowly being eroded in the processes of urban expansion.119 One physician decried that “there 
are large zones of Havana with only a modest park (Jesús María, for example) and all know the 
phrase that parks are the lungs of the city.”120 One physician favored the eradication of these 
“dens,” identifying them as “the seedbed of tuberculosis” and estimating that over 3,000 had the 
disease in Havana’s tenements (casas de vecindad) alone.121 These physicians argued that what 
the government was able to accomplish at the City of La Esperanza—the engineering and 
regulation of orderly spaces that adhered to the laws of sanitation and science—should be 
extended to the entire city of Havana. 
Whatever their humanitarian motives, individuals active in anti-tuberculosis charities 
were not equipped to do any of these things, and the resources they raised paled in comparison to 
what the state was expected to bring to the campaign. “Improving housing cannot appear as the 
fruit of an altruistic spirit or of piety,” one editorial insisted, “but rather as the formidable 
foundation of collective well-being, of public health.”122 Medical doctors recognized that many 
workers earned only “a few cents a day” and thus concluded, “It is not possible to request, 
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however many popular lectures are held, that they eat well or live in well-ventilated and cool 
places.”123 
On a second issue of even greater concern, physicians demanded state intervention in the 
immigration “crisis.” By the late 1920s, xenophobia ran rampant against black immigrants from 
Haiti and Jamaica, the braceros whose cheap labor was sought by a sugar industry that had been 
heavily Americanized following the U.S. occupation. In a context of broader debates about 
citizenship and economy security, medical professionals insisted that immigrants contributed to 
high tuberculosis rates.  
A variety of actors wielded medicalized language as tools of exclusion against 
immigrants. The medical community in particular buttressed stereotypes about diseased “black” 
and “yellow” immigrants. Since the early 1920s, foreign black laborers had been construed as 
malaria carriers and were subject to quarantine while white immigrants were not. This discursive 
connection between disease and black bodies was not supported by statistics and instead drew 
upon commonly held racist beliefs.124 As Marc McLeod asserts, “Cuban doctors and public 
health officials thus lent a seeming scientific authority, a medical imprimatur, to the notion—
shared by much of the Cuban public—that Antillean immigrants were a biological threat to the 
nation.”125 
By the late 1920s, tuberculosis specialists insisted that immigrants constituted dangerous 
sources of tubercular contagion, even though no direct evidence was provided to substantiate the 
claim that the disease was present in higher quantities among them or that their habits were less 
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hygienic.126 Instead these doctors called upon common “knowledge” about immigrants, which 
no doubt relied on any number of prejudices, and used vivid language to vilify them. For 
example, instead of citing data about what proportion of beds in state hospitals were occupied by 
immigrants, one physician claimed that these foreigners with tuberculosis drained the resources 
of the island’s health care system. He relied only on anecdotal or observational information to 
bolster his point, arguing, “[O]ur health clinics and hospitals have good proof of this.”127 One 
editorial linked housing and immigration, imploring the state to prohibit “promiscuity or 
overcrowding” in slums, which were especially characteristic of immigrant living conditions 
during the period of the sugar harvest. These braceros were accused of “bringing us all of their 
baggage of vices and diseases, among which tuberculosis stands out.”128 As the economic 
depression intensified, so did the xenophobic rhetoric. Haitians and Jamaicans were “landfills in 
our lands,” penned a physician, who then ascribed to them “barbarous customs, little hygiene, 
and multiple diseases.”129  
To help solve the problem of tuberculosis, physicians called on Congress to enact 
immigration quotas and to deport immigrants. “The prohibition of the Haitian exodus (without 
excluding the Jamaican) has been advised, on behalf of their poor conditions of hygiene, because 
they are individuals of a primitive economy and of a very inferior sense of life in relation to our 
campesinos.”130 Benjamin Muñoz Ginarte—the author of the statement that Afro-Cubans were 
“between two great evils: foreigners in the cities and foreigners in the countryside”—used 
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medical language and tuberculosis statistics to establish the economic perils of immigration and 
to call for the state to enact a scientific plan to manage immigration.131 As with malaria, 
physicians’ claims about tuberculosis were considered reliable and, at least according to doctors, 
influenced the prohibition of immigration from Haiti and Jamaica in the early 1930s.132 
Popular debates about migrants and tuberculosis inevitably brought up questions about 
health and citizenship, for they took place in a broader context of the re-formulation of the 
relationship between race and nation (cubanidad) in the late 1920s. Whitening through 
immigration had failed, so public figures began to revalorize blackness and to downplay 
biological racial inferiority in order to champion mestizaje (racial mixing) as the national racial 
ideology. Physicians had previously used high tuberculosis rates as evidence of the dangers of 
miscegenation, but now began to explain those statistics as the consequence of primarily social 
factors instead of biological ones.133 
It was widely known that tuberculosis more intensely attacked non-whites than whites in 
Cuba. In 1926, while the former made up 27% of the population, they accounted for 38% of 
tuberculosis deaths.134 Two decades later, these figures had changed little.135 The disease, one 
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black politician warned, was “a terrible threat that…was continuously growing” in the black 
race. “[I]n this case and in relation to the Cuban population of color,” he suggested, “the odious 
white plague…may well be titled the black plague.”136 
Afro-Cubans’ experience with tuberculosis, then, raised important questions. If the 
dominant (though contested) national ideology declared that all Cubans, regardless of race, were 
equal members of the nation, then blatant differences in health indicators demanded an 
explanation. And, if elite physicians and politicians could use health as a means to exclude non-
citizens, then citizens could urge the state to extend health services to them on the basis of this 
membership. Afro-Cubans began to articulate a different interpretation of health than that 
emphasized by physicians, insisting that they had rights as individual citizens to better access to 
health care.  In order to remedy the tuberculosis problem in the black race, they argued, the state 
needed to expand its campaign and white elites needed to share resources.  
At the same time and in contrast to this vision of health, a powerful counter-discourse 
operated. Motivated in part by the fear of material and discursive concessions to blacks, elites 
turned to the language of hygienic citizenship.137 They shifted the blame for high tuberculosis 
mortality onto individuals and specific social groups: sometimes to the poor, but more often to 
Afro-Cubans. Elites and some medical professionals insisted that poor blacks needed to live 
more hygienically in order to improve their own health; they also urged middle-class Afro-
Cubans to assist them in this effort.  
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In multiple medical and popular forums, these two competing ideas existed in tension 
with one another. With regards to tuberculosis, they were most clearly evidenced by a debate in 
Diario de la Marina, the nation’s most widely read newspaper, in 1929. The polemic began 
when a young, (white) radical tuberculosis specialist, Dr. Gustavo Aldereguía, gave a workplace 
lecture to a group of cigar rollers. He had recently returned from a tour of tuberculosis facilities 
in the United States. Like Cuba, in the U.S. there was a discrepancy in mortality rates between 
black and white citizens; unlike Cuba, however, the U.S. health sector was segregated. As a 
result, Aldereguía noted that numerous black associations and hospitals had sprung up. 
Subsequently, he proposed that Afro-Cubans follow the example of North Americans by 
organizing a Black Anti-Tuberculosis League to attend to the problems particular to Afro-
Cubans battling the disease. A committed communist, Aldereguía intended to critique the 
Machado administration’s handling of the tuberculosis campaign and encourage popular 
mobilization toward rectifying social and racial biases in the distribution of the country’s health 
resources. At a time of heightened racial anxiety, his proposal threw a spark into the powder keg, 
and soon Afro-Cuban and white intellectuals, legislators, physicians, economists, and private 
citizens joined the controversy, which quickly travelled from a local factory to the pages of 
Diario de la Marina.138 Although this debate began with Cubans disputing the appropriateness of 
segregating the tuberculosis campaign, the tension between hygienic citizenship and the right to 
health soon dominated the conversation.  
Everyone agreed that tuberculosis in the black race was a problem, but Aldereguía’s 
thesis led to more contentious questions: who should take responsibility for solving the high 
mortality rate among Afro-Cubans—the state, white society, or blacks themselves? Afro-Cubans 
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espoused a variety of opinions, but all agreed that they, and especially poor black citizens, should 
not be expected to deal with the problem alone. To justify this, writers continually emphasized 
the socioeconomic roots of the disease and the visible inequality among blacks and whites in 
Cuba, which deprived most blacks of the organizational and economic resources to fight the 
disease. One of the most prominent black activist-intellectuals, Gustavo E. Urrutia, journalist and 
editor of the “Ideales de Una Raza” and “Armonías” columns in Diario de la Marina, looked 
abroad and concluded that tuberculosis was “fundamentally socioeconomic—to such an extreme 
that the sanitary authorities in London spend more money in building hygienic housing for the 
poor and bettering their standard of living than in constructing…preventoriums and hospitals.”139 
These intellectuals concluded, then, that blacks could not and should not act alone; 
instead, the state and elite (white) society needed to take the lead. Primitivo Ramírez Ros, a 
member of the black political elite, anticipated objections that this strategy was proof of Afro-
Cuban helplessness and sloth. Afro-Cubans may have been at the bottom of the social order, but, 
he clarified, they were an active and vital force in building the nation.140 Both Urrutia and 
Ramírez Ros, while demanding further state action, were pleased with Machado’s recent 
“patriotic” endeavors to lower tuberculosis and infant mortality among blacks.141 They both 
emphasized that with whites holding the lion’s share of economic and social resources, the 
burden of action in the current moment lay with them. Urrutia and Ros also mobilized the 
concept of contagion to convince readers of the necessity for white intervention in the problem. 
Any efforts to end tuberculosis in the white race, a much easier task than tackling the disease in 
the black race, “would be completely sterile, because…the black bacillus would continue 
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floating around, infecting the atmosphere, relentlessly spreading to the white.”142 While fears of 
infection and contagion from black spaces had been used in Cuba to discriminate against citizens 
and foreigners of color, these Afro-Cuban activists used the concept for a different end: to insist 
that the health of the national body depended on the vigor of both black and white citizens. The 
health of whites was linked, through shared physical space, to the health of blacks.143  
Afro-Cuban activists did not think that white clubs should act alone, and they urged elite 
associations to create cross-racial initiatives. Due to limited health resources, success in 
stemming contagion in Havana required intervention in the slums—white groups, these activists 
argued, needed the assistance of black societies to accomplish this.144 While Ramírez 
acknowledged that the Damas Isabelinas treated those who came to them without racial bias, 
these women, he asserted, were “the cream of white Cuban society.” Therefore, they could 
“never know the true situation of tuberculosis in the black race,” for, unlike women of color, 
they could not “be led with efficacy…to the dens in which the black lives and where the white 
plague makes numerous victims.”145  
And black civic groups needed the assistance of white groups. Ramírez queried why the 
Damas Isabelinas had not collaborated with the sociedades de color, such as Club Atenas or La 
Union Fraternal, especially because the latter had a health dispensary.  Even if the membership 
of all these societies remained racially exclusive, black intellectuals opined that cooperative 
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efforts would be beneficial for fighting tuberculosis. Urrutia argued that cross-racial, elite 
leadership of the tuberculosis campaign, with legislation “for the indigent class, in which blacks 
are the majority,” harmonized “with Cuban ideology” and social formation much more than 
Aldereguía’s suggestion to form a separate black anti-tuberculosis league.146 These activists 
advocated a coalition of state and private elite mobilization, with legislation directed at raising 
both the poor white and black citizen out of wages of misery and tenements of filth.  
Afro-Cuban activists blamed the insufficient reach of the public-private campaign for 
high mortality, pegging the latter to the government’s neglect of poor Cubans’ standard of living 
and on white society’s refusal to dedicate sufficient resources to supporting the campaign. Not 
all Cubans agreed, however, that the state needed to extend more services to the island’s 
marginalized citizens, and they placed the onus of blame on poor individuals rather than on the 
state and the elite. Several white physicians and key figures in the state anti-tuberculosis 
campaign turned to the tropes of laziness, inaction, and culpability on the part of the poor and/or 
poor blacks to explain away the limitations and failures in the tuberculosis campaign. This group 
argued that the Secretariat of Sanitation had already increased the scope of tuberculosis control, 
and many elite civic groups had joined the crusade as well. These actors agreed that the 
obligation now lay with the poor. “Every citizen, from the place he occupies, should be an 
enthusiastic cooperator,” the head of the Damas Isabelinas opined, “from the First Magistrate of 
the Nation, who gives the example, to the humblest day worker.”147 This comment implied that it 
was now time for Cuba’s working classes and poor to take responsibility for their health and 
sanitary behavior.  
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This debate quickly provoked a shift in the classed vocabulary of hygienic citizenship: 
racialized understandings and racist assumptions about tuberculosis sprouted from the subsoil of 
private opinions into the open air of public debate. Writers argued that black mobilization was 
needed because Afro-Cubans had not taken appropriate action to fix their insalubrious 
circumstances; in essence, they were partially to blame. A number of white Cubans across the 
ideological spectrum, from radical mobilizers to representatives of the conservative elite, who 
vociferously disagreed on other political and economic tenets, embraced this view. Aldereguía 
suggested the creation of a Black Anti-Tuberculosis League that would be “capable of educating 
the masses, of popularizing the necessary knowledge, of creating a sanitary consciousness of the 
black race and in the black race” so they could contribute to “improving their conditions of life 
and health.”148 He suggested the black Cubans form a sort of “class solidarity” against 
tuberculosis, from which “a sense of collective responsibility” would evolve and “an unwavering 
decision would be founded: the right to live in health.”149 In short, citizen duty preceded citizen 
entitlement. 
Notions of culpability often came in implicit and euphemistic terms, such as “lacking a 
sanitary consciousness.” The respected economist José Antonio Taboadela contributed to the 
Diario de la Marina debate by enumerating two kinds of measures needed to combat 
tuberculosis: the first, for the benefit of the entire working class, required the state to legislate 
solutions; the second (and in Taboadela’s opinion, the more important) referenced only the black 
section of the working class, which needed to work to improve itself. He addressed himself “to 
the individual awareness of black Cubans, and above all, to the black Cuban women,” for “if 
they were to achieve the creation of an animating spirit…. much could be hoped for in the sense 
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of social and economic betterment for our black population in the near future.”150 While Urrutia 
disagreed with this second piece of advice and initially chose to suppress its publication, he 
eventually relented.151  
Consuelo Morillo de Govantes, a governing member of the Damas Isabelinas, supported 
Dr. Aldereguía’s original call for mobilization by blaming black complacency. She wrote, 
“Doctor Aldereguía is right to plant in the spirit of the black race what he calls, with his wise and 
persuasive word, a seed of inquietude.” The latter would hopefully push black Cubans to act in 
their own interest, for she believed that “the black race, painfully destroyed by tuberculosis, 
should and can mobilize itself.”152 These three public figures—Aldereguía, Taboadela, and 
Morillo—all espoused the opinion that legislation was needed for the working class and urban 
poor. At the same time, they argued that high tuberculosis mortality among poor blacks was due 
to individual or group deficits—whether of mobilization, a spirit of concern, or a correct 
understanding of the disease. 
The racist underpinnings of this “blame game” sometimes became more explicit, as 
evidenced in the passionate response of Consuelo Morillo de Govantes to the pointed 
commentary published by Primitivo Ramírez Ros. After Morillo emphatically insisted that the 
Damas Isabelinas administered care regardless of race or class—a point that Ramírez Ros did not 
dispute—she argued that it was time for blacks to act as well. The black race should “form 
mutual health societies, submit to the work of social education, and re-education when it is 
necessary. They should have their own health clinic.”153 Furthermore, Morillo classified residing 
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in dirty, unhealthy tenements as a choice, and, therefore, the poor black could be held 
responsible for the often-fatal consequences of living in these communities. “The black should 
leave the solar,” Morillo opined, “and take his offspring to the suburbs.”154  Such a statement 
exhibits the power that racism had in informing notions of civic responsibility and public health, 
distracting from the disease’s socioeconomic roots, even when they were constantly 
acknowledged in the same debate. Even more telling is that Morillo was well aware of the 
housing problem in Cuba, having campaigned actively for housing legislation that had been 
submitted to Congress, but had not yet been discussed by legislators. “It is painfully true that 
economic housing for the poor is still not a reality,” she admitted.155 Still, she claimed that 
blacks had the ability to move out of solares to the suburbs, where, she tellingly wrote, “there are 
some houses.”156 
Ramírez Ros responded to this article swiftly and forcefully. He chided Morillo for 
glossing over the cardinal issue. She had stated that the black race suffered tuberculosis at higher 
rates “for reasons we all know.” Ramírez called this a “pious euphemism” for the fact that blacks 
in Cuba were “economically impotent,” especially in comparison to whites. He rhetorically 
queried, “In what way are black Cubans going to build a health clinic, which white Cubans have 
failed to build for themselves?”157 He claimed that Morillo had distracted readers from the 
central issue of inequality, which constituted and perpetuated the cycle of disease, contagion, and 
impoverishment. Ramírez was incredulous at Morillo de Govantes’ exhortations for poor blacks 
to pull themselves up by their bootstraps: 
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Ay, Señora de Govantes! If the black can hardly survive in the solar, how is it possible 
that he leave with his offspring to live in the suburbs [repartos]? But, does Señora de 
Govantes know how our suburbs are? I refer not to the suburbs of luxury, like Miramar, 
Almendares, Mendoza, Country Club, Havana Biltmore, and other similar ones, but 
instead to the modest ones, to those of San José, Juanelo, Pan con Timba, Llega y Pon, 
Berenguer, and others of that kind. Does she not know? It is necessary to buy the land 
parcel, provide an advance, pay the remaining term, and then… build the house! Then 
comes the problem of transport to the capital, where the job site is, and all that, ‘for 
reasons we all know,’ the black proletariat cannot do.158 
 
Morillo had written that “some houses” existed in the suburbs of which blacks could take 
advantage. Ramírez Ros warned her not to advertise her knowledge of their location; otherwise, 
he sardonically predicted, she would have to call upon the reserve police to not see her “elegant 
residence…invaded by a true Court of Miracles, asking for some of those available houses.”159  
Participants in this debate also evaluated the state campaign’s sufficiency and 
effectiveness. Some, like Aldereguía, were trenchant in their criticism, while others excused the 
state’s limited interventions in public health problems and the housing crisis. In answer to 
Ramírez’s critiques of the program and demands for more legislation, Morillo urged him to 
remember that the government’s anti-tuberculosis campaign had only existed for one year—
construction of hospitals and other facilities was ongoing. “It is not possible,” she assured 
Ramírez, “to do more in less time.”160 Others disagreed, claiming that the state, not blacks, 
needed to act to correct these problems. 
As Morillo and other figures blamed blacks for high mortality and scant services, Afro-
Cubans began to articulate more stringent demands on the basis of citizenship. The black race 
was not “indolent,” Ramírez insisted, for “[i]ts vigorous muscles and resistance to the climate 
were indispensable” in building the colony and the nation. He emphasized, “[T]he sweat of its 
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forehead enriched the white Cuban patriciate.”161 Black participation in the wars of 
independence, a crucial experience for blacks demanding inclusion and suffrage in the early 
republic, continued to be a strong platform from which to make claims for state resources.162 
“The contribution of blood in war cannot be exempted,” Ramírez continued. “[I]f the conditions 
of [the black race’s] standard of living are socially and economically inferior to the Chinese, the 
Syrian and the Polish, requesting that something be done for that is not to ask for a privilege. It is 
a social justice that is owed to it.”163 Tuberculosis—and the wider context of inequality that 
allowed it to propagate—required state intervention, taken not on the basis of privileges and 
beneficence, but instead because its citizens were entitled to social equality. 
These sorts of claims continued past the 1929 debate, as Afro-Cuban societies throughout 
the 1930s demanded state-subsidized health services. In a 1937 editorial on “Black Health,” the 
Afro-Cuban periodical Adelante linked blacks’ current poverty to their historical experience of 
slavery, when their labor made others rich. They implored the state for more health centers, 
especially as non-whites were barred from many of the private clinics and regional Spanish 
mutual societies.164 And they expected a more efficient health sector. The editor urged, “Why 
don’t we demand with a unanimous voice…the careful attention that the hospitals, dispensaries, 
etc., require, every time that the State or the municipalities waver in service?”165 Afro-Cuban 
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writers also urged health institutions, and tuberculosis ones in particular, to tackle wider social 
issues—housing, hunger, and the minimum wage.166  
Despite the emergence of this rights discourse, the counter-discourse of hygienic 
citizenship continued to operate throughout the remainder of the Second Republic. Beliefs about 
racial difference, whether cultural or biological, were continually used to explain health 
differentials.167 The University of Havana’s medical curriculum in the 1930s and 40s instructed 
medical students that “[t]he ethnic factor acquires considerable value in tuberculosis. The black 
race exhibits great susceptibility to suffer this disease, and more than that, these individuals that 
suffer it catch a more severe form.” The text continued, “Besides racial grounds, this is due to the 
lack of previous contagion, to economic status, and to the manner of life among the black 
race.”168 The author of the text, Professor Suárez de Bustamante, abstained from explicating the 
exact mechanisms and significance of each of these variables, but students were left with an 
understanding that racialized cultural behaviors— “the manner of life among the black race”—
were partially to blame for higher mortality rates among blacks. 
Medical and popular texts also blamed women and the poor for contracting and spreading 
the disease through their lifestyle “choices.” For instance, Rosa Hilda Zell—the editor-in-chief of 
Ellas, union activist during the machadato, and recovered tuberculosis patient—castigated the 
non-elite for their unhygienic behavior. In one front-page essay in Bohemia in the 1940s, Zell 
disparaged a hypothetical guajiro family plagued by tuberculosis, who “lived poorly, not because 
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they were poor, because they were not, but because they were ignorant.”169 Zell described their 
income as sufficient, but focused her ire on those familial behaviors and “typical” guajiro 
cultural “life habits” and “customs” she considered to be a result of free will and not structural 
poverty. She complained that they chose to live in an unsanitary fashion, and she despaired that 
the mother and father “had not submitted themselves to a medical exam.” According to Zell, 
these people preferred the curandero (unlicensed healer) to the physician, resulting in a “Middle 
Ages” of “hygiene” for Cuba.170 Such a conceptualization of the struggle of the rural Cuban 
family to achieve good health turned a blind eye to their structural impediments to living a 
“sanitary life.”171 She also reprimanded poor mothers who chose to send their children to 
“escuelitas del barrio,” located in Havana’s solares, instead of to public schools. Outside the 
reach of formal state inspection, the teachers had “little culture” and conducted their classes in 
“anti-hygienic locales that were of doubtful health.”172  
Nonetheless, the idea of the right to health was an increasingly powerful one. By the 
1940s, activists, including those involved in the 1929 Diario de la Marina debate, had netted 
significant results.173 The progressive 1940 Constitution codified the right to health care for the 
poor. One of the five entitlements afforded to every Cuban citizen was the right “[t]o receive 
social assistance (asistencia social) and public benefits with, in the former case, prior affirmation 
of need.”174 Historically and institutionally in Cuba, “social assistance” included health 
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services.175 The Constitution also transformed the Secretariat of Sanitation and Charities 
(Secretaria de Sanidad y Beneficencia) into the new Ministry of Health and Social Assistance 
(Ministerio de Salubridad y Asistencia Social), in charge of public health measures and state 
hospitals. The switch from “charity” to “social assistance” (from “beneficencia” to “asistencia 
social”) represented more than a change in name; it revealed the desire of multiple groups to 
change the foundations of state health care on the island.176 One delegate to the Constitutional 
Convention summarized that the state was now “require[d]…to protect citizens against all risks 
of disease and at the same time—as it says in the new Constitution—to give the citizen the right 
to receive the benefits of Public Assistance, previously proving their condition of poverty.”177 
No longer conceptualized as charity from the government, the poor had a legally enshrined right 
to medical care.  
2.3 CONCLUSION 
By the late 1920s, the changing landscape of politics and health had pushed medical 
professionals, volunteers in the tuberculosis campaign, and intellectuals to assert that the state 
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needed to do more to control the disease. These claims provoked debates about exactly where 
individual responsibility ended and state responsibility began in solving the tuberculosis 
problem. Discourses of hygienic citizenship functioned in tension with grassroots demands for 
the state to recognize the right to health, although the latter steadily gained dominance.  
Nonetheless, by the early 1930s, tuberculosis services were in shambles. The nation was 
enduring a devastating economic depression, and the government was crumbling under the 
pressure of popular mobilization and revolution. Within several years, however, the disease 
gained even greater visibility under military strongman Fulgencio Batista, who wrested control 
from private physicians and elite charitable women, positioning himself as the architect of the 
state, the father of the Cuban poor, and the author of an expansive tuberculosis campaign. One 
public health official argued that Batista’s tuberculosis program represented the first “SOCIAL 
ASSISTANCE-based service” in Cuba, which was established in “recognition of the right that 
the poor sick have to receive the benefits of institutions created for their care.”178 It would be 
easy to misconstrue this grand health project as a top-down initiative, but Batista’s decision to 
launch the Consejo Nacional de Tuberculosis was undoubtedly pushed from below, as citizens 
continued to demand better access to health care.  
The right to health became firmly entrenched in the arsenal of citizenship demands by 
1940, a right that Cubans would continually reference throughout the rest of the Second 
Republic. However, the process of working out what this right would mean in practice remained 
contentious. The remaining chapters chronicle the efforts of ordinary citizens, government 
actors, and physicians to implement their often-competing visions of health and citizenship. 
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3.0  “A WIDE BATTLEFRONT AGAINST TUBERCULOSIS”: STATE-BUILDING 
AND HEALTH CARE, 1936–1965 
In the years leading up to and following the revolution of 1933, the island’s tuberculosis facilities 
fell into disrepair. Dedicated staff struggled to care for patients with constrained budgets and 
credits that never arrived, and physicians at La Esperanza Sanatorium frequently went on strike 
as part of their struggle for improving the hospital and their working conditions.179 On March 15, 
1936, however, the Cuban press reported promising stirrings of activity in the sanitation branch. 
One day earlier, the directors of the tuberculosis dispensaries had called a meeting, in order to 
effect an “urgent reorganization of the anti-tuberculosis services in the Republic” and to open up 
facilities shuttered during the machadato.180 Juan Castillo, director of the main Furbush 
dispensary, took the lead, reading a memo he had sent to the Secretary of Sanitation the year 
before concerning “our stunted anti-tuberculosis organization.”181 His frustration overflowed into 
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his writing, which was incredulous at the lack of concern shown by health authorities toward 
tuberculosis. Nevertheless, the directors decided to send the memo again to the Secretary of 
Sanitation.182  
Castillo must have been pleased and shocked when, a little more than a week later, 
Diario de la Marina announced the foundation of a new national institute, the Consejo Nacional 
de Tuberculosis (National Tuberculosis Council, CNT), dedicated solely to fighting the 
disease.183 It was not the Secretary of Sanitation who had finally decided to act, however. 
Instead, one official told the paper, “Colonel Fulgencio Batista, Head of the Constitutional 
Army, has had a great influence in the discussion of these problems … and has dedicated time 
and preferential attention to them, and there is no doubt that for this we contract one more debt 
of gratitude to this patriot.”184 Within a month of its founding, the CNT was deemed as “one of 
the most beautiful humanitarian projects advocated by the Constitutional Army and in particular 
by its maximum leader.”185  
The move piqued foreign observers’ interest as well. In 1938, TIME Magazine, puzzled 
over Batista’s increasing intervention in social issues, remarked, “Fatherly Batista has…secured 
a firm Army grip on orphan asylums, tuberculosis sanatoriums and charitable institutions, 
administered by a group of seven Army-controlled corporations.”186 In 1937, two Cornell 
physicians leading a group of medical students on an exchange program observed the activities 
of the CNT and praised its efforts: “Such an extensive program has never before been attempted, 
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and it represents an advance in a new direction in public health control of tuberculosis.”187 With 
few other exceptions, most nations across the globe did not prioritize tuberculosis control; 
Batista, Cuba’s military strongman, had not only dedicated a massive amount of funding to the 
disease, but also had explicitly declared its “eradication” as part of his policy platform.188  
The stakes were high for making such a claim—in 1936, no certain cure for tuberculosis 
existed—but perhaps Batista believed, like other populist leaders at the time, that “the enormous 
propaganda potential of the eradication campaign outweighed other political risks.”189 On a 
return visit, those same two Cornell physicians surmised as much, writing, “If Colonel Batista 
frees Cuba from tuberculosis, he can be regarded as the savior of his country.”190 Decades later, 
Batista himself recounted that his administration “[o]pened a wide battlefront against 
tuberculosis, because it was, and is, the social disease that threatens and decimates the poor the 
most.” 191  
Descriptions of the new tuberculosis program signaled that national politics—and the 
politics of disease—were changing yet again. The revolution of 1933 opened state agencies and 
officials to popular demands, and this chapter argues that the foundation of the CNT derived 
from and further cemented these political and social processes. As discussed in Chapter 2, during 
the 1920s Afro-Cuban activists had demanded that the state increase funding for tuberculosis 
services. This pressure, now emanating from a wider range of citizens and professionals, 
continued throughout the 1930s. In response, Fulgencio Batista made tuberculosis an important 
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part of his statecraft and state-building designs. Batista hoped to garner political capital from the 
new tuberculosis projects. Presidential elections loomed in the near future, and Batista 
desperately needed to build popular legitimacy and an electoral base. Batista also desired to 
strengthen the reach of the state through the CNT and other army social welfare organizations.  
Once institutionalized, the CNT constituted a significant arm of state formation, and it 
continued to function as such under succeeding administrations (1944–1952) and Batista’s 
dictatorship (1952–1958). Over the course of the Second Republic (1933–1958), the CNT 
oversaw the steady expansion of a tuberculosis treatment and diagnosis network across the 
island. As a result, by the 1950s, tuberculosis health indicators, access to tuberculosis services, 
and the number of tuberculosis beds had significantly improved from 1933. 
However, this approach to state-building made state legitimacy conditional on 
performance, a process that was dependent not only on state capacity to respond to concrete 
problems, but on popular perceptions of the reach and effectiveness of government services.192 
Since the late 1920s, tuberculosis specialists, health officials, and ordinary citizens had 
participated in a national dialogue about the appropriate form and scope of the tuberculosis 
campaign. By the time of Batista’s dictatorship, these expectations had crystallized, perhaps 
none more forcefully than the issues of an adequate number of hospital beds and citizens’ easy 
and fair access to them. Despite progress in the tuberculosis campaign, citizen complaints 
persisted, and they served not to highlight the achievements, but rather the shortcomings, of state 
efforts. On the eve of the revolution of 1959, the gap between popular expectations and the 
performance of public health under republican administrations influenced the growing de-
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legitimation of the state, the overthrow of Batista’s government, and the fledgling revolutionary 
regime’s priorities in health policy. 
The revolutionary government funneled resources to address the limits of the CNT’s 
decades-long campaign. The newly formed Tuberculosis Department within the Ministry of 
Public Health reported success in a number of areas, such as mass vaccination (the subject of 
Chapter 7) and mass X-ray examination. However, these early tuberculosis efforts (1959–1965) 
also reproduced some of the main features of republican programs. First, the government 
overstated its success in rectifying the shortage of beds dedicated to tuberculosis and their 
unequal geographic distribution. Second, in contrast to their rhetoric, health officials prioritized 
medical interventions over radical social legislation. As a result, those suffering from the disease 
continued to partially rely on the charitable activities of elite and middle class associations, a 
tradition in Cuban public health that physicians had adamantly denounced since the 
administration of Machado.  
3.1 THE REVOLUTION OF 1933 AND THE CONSEJO NACIONAL DE 
TUBERCULOSIS 
By September 1933, Machado fled the country, pushed out by mobilized sectors of the popular 
classes (clases populares), which included urban wage laborers, lower-rank soldiers, peasants, 
students, and middle-class professionals. The oligarchic state that had existed since 1902 was 
overthrown. Batista played a central, if complex, role in this process, rising through the ranks of 
the young sergeants revolting against their superiors. He originally threw his support behind 
Ramón Grau San Martín and other radical leaders, who abolished the Platt Amendment and 
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enacted a series of reformist laws during the “government of 100 days” (September 10, 1933–
January 15, 1934). However, Batista soon turned against Grau, orchestrating his removal from 
power in early 1934. He then proceeded to crush all forms of mobilization and opposition, 
violently suppressing the very groups he had originally supported.193 Among other measures, he 
declared all unions, including the Cuban Medical Federation, illegal and militarily occupied the 
University of Havana.194 Until the elections held in 1940, Batista was the de facto ruler, 
maintaining order and governing the country behind the scenes of a string of civilian leaders, 
most of who were puppet presidents.  
These processes of revolutionary mobilization and counter-revolutionary repression 
resulted in widespread violence, declining state legitimacy, and a breakdown of public services. 
By the end of 1935, however, the situation had stabilized, and Batista could turn to his long-term 
vision. Batista considered himself the leader of the 1933 revolution and the “architect of the 
Cuban state.”195 He knew Cuban politics had changed irrevocably following the revolution, as 
the mobilized popular classes had gained greater weight in the political arena. As a brilliant 
strategist, Batista dedicated his efforts to building political support among the people.196 
During the first months of 1936, a provisional president was in office and Congress was 
out of session, to return in early April.197 Cognizant of certain sectors’ discomfort with the 
increasing militarization of governmental services in Cuba, in the final days before Congress 
                                                 
193 For more on this sequence of events, see Robert Whitney, State and Revolution in Cuba: Mass Mobilization and 
Political Change, 1920–1940 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001). 
194 Rodríguez, “‘To Fight These Powerful Trusts’,” 625. 
195 Robert Whitney, “The Architect of the Cuban State: Fulgencio Batista and Populism in Cuba, 1937–1940,” 
Journal of Latin American Studies 32, no. 2 (May 2000): 435–59. 
196 Batista has been termed a “slippery populist,” for his ability to build alliances across ideological lines. Alan 
Knight, “Populism and Neo-Populism in Latin America, Especially Mexico,” Journal of Latin American Studies 30, 
no. 2 (May 1998): 231; Whitney, “The Architect,” 458–59. 
197 Frank Argote-Freyre, Fulgencio Batista: From Revolutionary to Strongman (New Brunswick: Rutgers University 
Press, 2006), 202. The Council of Secretaries, an advisory board to the President created in 1934, exercised 
legislative powers when Congress was not in session.  
 63 
returned, Batista pushed a new platform of social services through the Council of Secretaries.198 
In what Frank Argote-Freyre has identified as a “power grab,” Batista founded five new 
institutions, all of which were to be managed by the army through the newly formed Corporate 
Council on Education, Health and Welfare (Consejo Corporativo de Educación, Sanidad y 
Beneficencia, CCESB).199 While he created a general public health body (the Technical Institute 
of Public Health), he also founded a separate institute dedicated solely to tuberculosis control 
(CNT), institutionalizing the disease’s uniqueness and making it more important to domestic 
policy than ever before.200 
The law that founded the CNT dissolved Machado’s Anti-Tuberculosis Board and 
transferred to the new agency control of tuberculosis hospitals, dispensaries, and administrative 
bodies previously under the purview of the Secretariat of Sanitation and Charities. The Cuban 
Anti-Tuberculosis League, active in the country since 1901, ceased to exist as a separate entity 
and was incorporated, along with its dispensary, into the CNT. The CNT rejected the 
participation of charities in the campaign, stripping the Damas Isabelinas of their mission by 
omitting them from the new governing board. Institutionally and financially autonomous from 
the sanitation branch, the vast majority of the CNT’s income was to come from a small 
percentage of the proceeds from the National Lottery. 
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Batista’s decision to found the CNT was two-fold: he was hoping to expand the power 
and reach of the state, while responding to popular demands for more state health services. In the 
mid-1930s, Batista and other officials in the sanitation branch were aware of the growing 
politicization of the disease, as civilians and physicians made their critiques and complaints 
known. In the 1920s, Afro-Cuban figures had made the issue of tuberculosis visible to a national 
audience. After the fall of Machado, the push for reform continued, as middle-class and working-
class Cubans formed associations, such as the National Workers Tuberculosis Cooperative 
(Cooperativa Nacional Obrera Pro-Anti-Tuberculoso), to address the poor state of tuberculosis 
care.201 Newspapers featured the stories of ordinary citizens on “pilgrimage[s]” and “tragic 
odyssey[s]” to gain admittance to tuberculosis hospitals.202 
Physicians petitioned the state to act by pointing to statistical evidence of the disease’s 
import and the inadequacy of available funding. Specialists employed at public tuberculosis 
facilities and those in private practice proposed reforms in the medical press, published 
monographs for a broad readership, and wrote private correspondence to health officials. Juan 
Castillo, director of the Tuberculosis Section and the Furbush Dispensary, centrally located in 
Havana and overwhelmed with the needs of its district, sent off a string of memos to try to catch 
the attention of his superiors.203 In 1935, he declared tuberculosis to be Cuba’s “most grave” 
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disease and an “endemoepidemic problem,” bemoaning that the bases of the campaign had not 
been built on “technical knowledge.”204  
Batista’s formation of the CNT responded to this groundswell of public opinion. While 
most scholars date Batista’s transition from military dictator to authoritarian populist to his 
alliance with the Communist Party in 1937, his first populist gestures occurred in 1936, through 
the programs of the CCESB.205 The propaganda that followed the CNT’s founding suggests how 
compelling popular and professional demands were in his decision.  
Newspaper accounts and CNT materials painted a picture of a vibrant tuberculosis 
campaign, with Batista clearly identified as its patron. In his interactions with the press, Batista 
spoke frequently and energetically about his health projects, especially the CNT, which he 
referred to as “my anti-tuberculosis campaign.”206 He used tuberculosis as a bridge to connect 
with ordinary Cubans, many of whom knew the ravages of the disease firsthand. “I am very 
interested in tuberculosis,” he told one journalist, before revealing the story of his brother’s 
tragic death.207 Without giving firm numbers, barely a year after the CNT’s founding, Batista 
proclaimed in an interview, “I know that hundreds who would have died of tuberculosis five 
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years ago are now cured.”208 His administration distributed myriad photographs of Batista 
making publicized visits to hospital projects. The CNT touted a new children’s tuberculosis 
hospital as the initiative of Batista’s wife and routinely framed it as her gift to the Cuban people 
(see Figure 1).209 
 
Figure 1. The First Lady presides over the Ángel Arturo Aballí Children’s Anti-Tuberculosis Hospital.210 
 
 In preparation for the 1940 presidential election, Batista directly wove the 
accomplishments and goals of the CNT into his public speeches and campaign literature. He 
included the “eradication of tuberculosis” as one goal in his Three-Year Plan, the centerpiece of 
his platform.211 While campaigning, Batista promised to intensify the tuberculosis program and 
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construct more hospitals and dispensaries for the disease.212 “The crusade against tuberculosis is 
the exclusive work of Colonel Batista,” declared one campaign booklet, entitled “25 Reasons 
Why Batista Should be President.”213 Two of those twenty-five reasons were dedicated to 
tuberculosis explicitly: he was credited for the national sanatorium (under construction) and for 
lowering tuberculosis morbidity and mortality rates.214 Another brochure titled “The Eminently 
Constructive Inspired Work of President Batista” dedicated seven pages to photographs of 
Batista’s public works—three featured his tuberculosis projects.215  
 
Figure 2. Batista presides over the new Cuba under construction. Like other military propaganda, this image 
left no doubt as to who was to receive the glory for the social measures launched by the CCESB. The National 
Tuberculosis Council is pictured at bottom left.216 
                                                 
212 “Plataforma presidencial de F. Batista,” 30, leg. 5, no. 231, Fondo Partido Revolucionario Cubano (Auténtico) 
(PRC-A), ANC.  
213 “25 razones por que Batista será Presidente,” 57, leg. 5, no. 231, PRC-A, ANC. 
214 Ibid. Osvaldo Valdés de la Paz, La reconstrucción cubana realizada por Batista (Havana: Talleres de Editorial, 
Guerrero, 1940), 131.  
215 “Inspiración obra eminentemente constructiva de Batista Presidente,” 85, leg. 5, no. 231, PRC-A, ANC.  
216 Sosa de Quesada, El Consejo Corporativo, n.p. 
 68 
Batista also aimed to strengthen the Cuban state, which was to be accomplished initially 
by increasing the army’s power. The five organizations of the CCESB represented “a series of 
bold initiatives that transformed the armed forces into the largest social-service provider on the 
island” (see Figure 2).217 Batista stipulated that the CNT be an autonomous institution, removed 
from the oversight of the Secretariat of Sanitation. He and his supporters argued that this would 
protect the tuberculosis campaign from the corruption and politicking that plagued the sanitation 
branch. Some physicians agreed, like Luís P. Romaguera, a visiting physician at La Esperanza 
Sanatorium, who argued in 1935 that the nation needed a central tuberculosis board that “should 
be autonomous, untied from the partisan struggles of politics.”218 Romaguera had witnessed the 
influence of politics at work at the sanatorium and hoped the future of tuberculosis care might be 
depoliticized.219  
The CNT’s creation, then, represented an indictment of Cuban state institutions: frequent 
political changes and patronage resulted in persistent personnel turnover, unstable funding, 
policy shifts and an inability to deliver efficient health services. Others, however, distrusted 
Batista’s decision to make the CNT autonomous, fearing that it would allow him to have 
disproportionate influence over policy, further subjecting health programs to political objectives 
rather than medical ones.220 This controversy never went away, and the CNT remained 
autonomous throughout Batista’s presidency (1940–1944). Over the course of the next several 
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decades, tuberculosis programs became a key arm of state-building. The CNT, according to one 
insider, represented the first “SOCIAL ASSISTANCE-based service” in Cuba.221 
3.2 STATE GROWTH, STATE LIMITS 
Following the March 1936 decree, the CNT launched “a formidable crusade against the white 
plague.”222 Batista dedicated a sizable amount of funds to the disease by appropriating a 
percentage of the proceeds from the National Lottery. Citizens rarely knew the exact yearly 
budget of the CNT, with reports ranging from 1,200,000 to over 3,000,000 pesos, but the CNT 
reported that in seven and a half years (May 1936 to December 1943), they had expended 
10,643,634 pesos on tuberculosis, a substantial increase from the first three decades of the 
twentieth century.223 The CNT embarked on many new endeavors: it opened new dispensaries in 
Havana and each provincial capital; constructed several hospitals; carried out an epidemiological 
survey in the slums and public schools of Havana; published a quarterly scientific journal; and 
established a Section of Social Action that distributed posters, brochures, and educational films.  
The CNT prioritized the construction and expansion of treatment centers. It set about re-
opening facilities that had lain dormant for years, finishing projects from the Machado era. By 
August 1936, the CNT had inaugurated the Lebredo Hospital (the previously uncompleted 
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Francisco María Fernández Hospital begun in the late 1920s). Its opening more than doubled the 
capacity of the La Esperanza complex to just under 1,000 beds.  
Construction projects began in the late 1930s on three more hospital projects. A 
children’s tuberculosis hospital, A. A. Aballí, with 300 beds, was to be built next to the La 
Esperanza Sanatorium and Lebredo Hospital. Batista inaugurated the Aballí Sanatorium before 
leaving office in 1944. In Oriente, Cuba’s most populous province, the CNT commenced work 
on Ambrosio Grillo Sanatorium, with almost 400 beds. This medium-sized facility was located 
on the outskirts of Santiago de Cuba, near the famous Basílica del Cobre. The administration of 
Ramón Grau San Martín (1944–1948) finished and inaugurated the Ambrosio Grillo facility 
during his first year as president. Several years later, Grau inaugurated a small, 70-bed 
sanatorium in his home province of Pinar del Río and named it after his mother, Pilar San 
Martín.  
The massive Topes de Collantes National Sanatorium, located in the mountains of Las 
Villas Province, undoubtedly functioned as the CNT’s premiere project with a slated capacity of 
1,000 beds. Batista made this sanatorium (the subject of Chapter 5) a crucial part of his legacy 
and continually trumpeted it as one of his most important gifts to the Cuban people. Construction 
on the Topes de Collantes Sanatorium stalled during the Auténtico administrations (1944–1952), 
but Batista finally inaugurated the facility in late 1954. 
Despite any controversies and criticisms surrounding these projects, one can trace the 
steady expansion of beds dedicated to tuberculosis treatment across the years of the Second 
Republic (see Table 1). Even when population growth is taken into account, the ratio of 
tuberculosis beds to people increased over time: in the early 1930s, there were approximately 
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1.14 beds per 10,000 inhabitants; in 1944, this number had increased to 2.51; by the late 1950s, 
this ratio had jumped to 3.83–4.45 beds per 10,000 inhabitants (see Table 4).224  
Table 1. Bed Capacity of Tuberculosis Hospitals & Sanatoriums225 
Year 1927 1933 1944 1948 1958 
Number of TB Beds 150 450 1200 1630 2511–2911 
 
Dispensaries proved even more vital for state-building efforts in public health. These 
facilities were open to the public and provided diagnostic services free of charge. Some had 
visiting nurses, who fulfilled important surveillance, educational, and therapeutic functions, 
fanning out from the dispensary to check on cases already registered or to raise awareness among 
those who had not visited the facility. Although in theory all dispensaries were to have these 
nurses, it appears that only two or three in Havana provided this service. Also, dispensaries were 
supposed to only provide diagnostic and educational services; however, the bed shortage in Cuba 
meant that in practice these facilities often provided therapeutic services, either by visiting 
patients’ homes or by administering procedures inside the dispensary.  
Table 2.  Number of State Tuberculosis Dispensaries226 
Year 1930 1944 1948 1958 
Number of Dispensaries 3 10 28 28 
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The number of dispensaries increased over time (see Table 2). During the late 1930s, 
Havana’s four pre-existing dispensaries were refurbished and/or reopened. The CNT inaugurated 
a new one in a poor Havana neighborhood and five in the capital cities of the remaining five 
provinces, delivering services to many who had had to travel to Havana for diagnosis and 
treatment in the past.227 Under Grau’s presidency, the CNT turned its attention to increasing the 
geographic reach of these units. It added 18 dispensaries in a four-year period, paying particular 
attention to neglected regions (compare Figures 3 and 4). 
 
 
Figure 3. CNT Tuberculosis Dispensaries, 1940. Under Batista, there were five dispensaries in metropolitan 
Havana, and five in each remaining provincial capital. Map made by author. 
 
 
Figure 4. CNT Tuberculosis Dispensaries, 1948. To Batista’s ten dispensaries (represented by the triangle and 
squares), Grau opened eighteen new centers (represented by circles). Map made by author. 
                                                 
227 While the director of Furbush Dispensary from August 1933 through August 1935, Castillo reported that his staff 
had served over 6,000 individuals, from 16 municipalities in Havana Province and 33 other municipalities of the 
island. Juan J. Castillo, “Informe al Sr. Secretario de Sanidad, de los trabajos realizados en la Sección de 
Tuberculosis (Dispensario Furbush y Negociado de Estadística e Información) bajo la dirección del Dr. Juan J. 
Castillo, in Dos años, 21.  
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The dispensaries, staffed by tuberculosis specialists, undertook important epidemiological 
work. Dispensary directors and nurses kept track of active cases in their district or region and 
attempted to secure admission to sanatoriums for these cases or to provide outpatient treatment. 
They often became aware of healthy children living in contagious homes and arranged their 
residency in one of Cuba’s two preventoriums (both located on the outskirts of Havana, in 
Cojímar and Luyanó).  
The work of these CNT specialists intensified contacts between the state and its 
population, especially in marginalized areas. When one Havana dispensary opened its doors for a 
highly-publicized tuberculosis survey in July 1937, the staff was overwhelmed with the response. 
“Such was the influx of the public,” the Survey’s director reported, “as people flocked from the 
most remote places of the Capital, that it was decided to limit the services of the ‘Survey’” to one 
district in Central Havana.228 In nine months, the survey staff had accomplished impressive 
results. They administered 21,414 tuberculin tests, recorded 13,523 positive tests (which 
indicates infection, but not active disease), and then gave 7,000 X-ray examinations to determine 
those who had an active case of tuberculosis. From these efforts, 466 cases of tuberculosis were 
found, logged in the dispensary’s registry, and linked in to its network of surveillance and 
care.229  
Within the first years of its existence, the CNT interacted with large numbers of people, 
especially compared to the early 1930s.230 From 1931 to 1933, for example, the Furbush 
                                                 
228 Cuba, Consejo Nacional de Tuberculosis, Resumen general de los trabajos efectuados por el “Tuberculosis 
Survey de Cuba” (Havana: Ciudad Militar, 1938), 18; Juan R. Mencia, Morton C. Kahn, and Edgar Mayer, “The 
Cuban National Case-Finding Campaign,” The American Review of Tuberculosis 40 (July–December 1939): 523. 
229 Consejo Nacional de Tuberculosis, Resumen general, 43–44. 
230 People were tested primarily on a voluntary basis by visiting the dispensary during operating hours to be given a 
tuberculin test (and subsequent X-ray if necessary). However, visiting nurses also found cases by inspecting the 
homes of patients already registered and then convincing other family members to undergo testing. It is important to 
note that the CNT inherited the records of the dispensaries that were under the purview of the Secretariat of 
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Dispensary tested 4,126 individuals, of whom 1,326 were diagnosed with an active case of the 
disease.231 Numbers are not available for Havana’s other state dispensary, Jesús del Monte, but it 
is probable that they served a number equal to or lesser than Furbush Dispensary. In comparison, 
in 1937 alone, the CNT’s five dispensaries in Havana tested 13,825 individuals, identifying 
2,193 cases of active disease.232 The provincial dispensaries tested a total of 14,570 people in 
that year, from which 1,665 cases were diagnosed.233  
The total number of known cases increased over the course of the late 1930s, the 1940s, 
and the 1950s. In 1938, the CNT reported 15,352 registered cases; in 1942, 27,350 individuals 
with tuberculosis were on the dispensaries’ registries.234 In four years, then, the CNT had 
diagnosed approximately 12,000 new cases. Although exact numbers are not given, this figure 
suggests that an extraordinary number of people had been administered a tuberculin test for the 
disease. Due to the limited numbers of visiting nurses, it is highly probable that the majority of 
these individuals came in to the dispensaries to be tested, evidence not only of citizens’ concern 
for their health, but of the successful propaganda of the CNT campaign that heavily advertised its 
dispensaries’ locations, hours, and free services. Although data are sparser in the late 1940s and 
1950s, this trend appears to have continued. In 1956, 10 mobile units examined 12,439 people 
and dispensaries examined 49,854 people, amounting to 62,293 total people being tested.235 In 
                                                                                                                                                             
Sanitation and the Cuban Anti-Tuberculosis League before 1936, so the total cases known in 1936 include the cases 
diagnosed and registered by these dispensaries in 1935 in addition to new cases found in 1936. Furthermore, the 
total number of known cases downplays the larger number of individuals with whom the dispensaries were 
interacting, for it only reports those who had a positive reaction to the tuberculin skin test.  
231 Castillo, “Informe al Sr. Secretario de Sanidad,” 15–16. 
232 Consejo Nacional de Tuberculosis, Resumen general, 12. 
233 Ibid.  
234 Cuba, Dirección General del Censo, Informe general del censo de 1943 (Havana: P. Fernández y Cía, 1945), 
528–29.  
235 Consejo Nacional de Tuberculosis, Un año de trabajo, 3.   
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1952, two CNT doctors tested 70,598 persons in one campaign, in what can be considered the 
first national tuberculosis survey.236  
The CNT also reported serving an increasing percentage of known cases over time. In 
1938, the CNT claimed to have served 67.6% of the 15,352 cases known on the island. These 
percentages steadily increased in the years for which we have data: 72% (1939), 72.9% (1940), 
74.5% (1941), and 75.2% (1942).237 This particular measurement is significant because it refers 
to a more sustained encounter between the dispensary and its population. It is unclear what 
“served” meant exactly: it might have been as brief as one follow-up visit to obtain access to 
some sort of medication, or it might have included a surgical or therapeutic intervention, such as 
pneumothorax, which entailed multiple procedures. Either way, the increase in the proportion of 
those served signifies that the state not only improved its epidemiological knowledge of its 
population (through diagnosis and registration), but also extended its governance by providing 
some sort of therapy to its citizenry.  
Furthermore, the reach of the state, measured by the CNT’s interaction with citizens via 
its institutional network, was no longer limited to Havana. Absolute numbers of known cases 
also increased in the other provinces, from 6,850 in 1938 to 12,147 in 1942 (an increase of 
5,297).238 Forty-four percent of the new cases found between 1938 and 1942 were from outside 
Havana Province. The CNT labored to rectify provincial disparities. In 1938, the percentages of 
known cases served by the CNT varied greatly by province, from a shockingly low 48.4% in 
                                                 
236 Rafael Ballesteros Sierra and José M. Hernández Pérez, “Contribución al estudio de los índices de infección 
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Oriente Province to a high of 74.2% in Havana Province; by 1942, that range had decreased, 
with the CNT serving 65.1% of known cases in Oriente Province and 77.3% in Havana Province. 
Oriente and Matanzas Provinces reported the highest increases in percentages of known cases 
being served: 48.4% to 65.1% and 52.3% to 72%, respectively. Finally, in 1938, the number of 
cases not served (the gap between the number of known cases and the number of served cases) 
was much smaller in Havana Province than in other provinces. In 1938, the CNT had not 
attended to 2,196 cases in Havana Province; in the other provinces, the CNT had not served 
2,782 cases. By 1942, however, this gap between the number of cases not served in Havana and 
the rest of the provinces had closed, signifying an improvement in the number of cases served 
outside the capital (see Figure 5). 
 
Figure 5. Unserved tuberculosis cases in Havana and other provinces. The gap had closed by 1942.239 
 
Despite the improvements in the state tuberculosis campaign (e.g., cases served and the 
number of beds available), citizens continued to focus not on its progress but on its failures and 
shortcomings. The question of beds—their number and their geographical distribution—drew the 
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most energy, from citizens and medical professionals alike. By the mid-1930s, almost all 
physicians agreed that the state’s primary responsibility was to provide more beds.240 (They 
disagreed over how to provide these beds, however, which is the subject of Chapter 5). Several 
physicians who joined the CNT soon after its founding were already painfully aware of the 
inadequacy of services and vocally pushed for an extension of beds. In 1935, Castillo, still head 
of the Furbush Dispensary, calculated that around 16,000 Cubans with tuberculosis were poor 
enough to qualify for state assistance; La Esperanza Sanatorium’s 450 beds would not suffice.241 
Some tuberculosis specialists believed patients could be cured through residence in a sanatorium; 
others believed sanatoriums and hospitals served the dual purpose of isolating dangerous sources 
of contagion and improving the health of the patient. Physicians looked abroad and believed 
Cuba should emulate those “civilized” nations expending great sums of money on hospitals.242  
For physicians, then, providing sanatorium beds represented the linchpin of any effective 
tuberculosis control campaign.  
More specifically, tuberculosis specialists believed that the CNT should endeavor to 
reach the standard recommended by the American National Tuberculosis Association (NTA): at 
                                                 
240 There were a few physicians who sought an alternative route, questioning the cost-intensive hospital plan. In 
1935, Gustavo Aldereguía voiced concern that a hospitalization plan was not a sustainable project; however, due to 
the political climate of Batista’s Cuba, Aldereguía, a fierce opponent and participant in the March 1935 strike, was 
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journalists and foreign experts endorsed his plan. Wilson G. Smillie, M.D. and Professor of Public Health 
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Affairs (New York: Foreign Policy Association, 1935), 111; Antonio Penichet, “La tuberculosis y Dr. Aldereguía,” 
Bohemia 27, no. 3 (January 20, 1935): 66. For more on Gustavo Aldereguía, see Dr. Gregorio Delgado García, 
“Doctor Gustavo Aldereguía Lima: luchador e higienista social,” Revista Cubana de Salud Pública 38, no. 2 (April–
June 2012): 183–91. 
241 Juan J. Castillo, “Males y remedios,” 53.  
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a bare minimum, at least one bed (and preferably two) should exist for every annual death in the 
country. Luís Romaguera, for example, argued in 1937, “The urgent need of our country is to 
have a higher number of beds for the sick,” after which he cited the NTA standard of 4,000 beds 
for Cuba.243 This numerical goal of 4,000 beds, originally discussed in the medical press in the 
late 1930s, gathered broader consensus over the years, so that by the 1950s, it was also cited in 
the popular press.244 By the early 1950s, however, only 1600 beds were available. By the late 
1950s, this number had jumped to approximately 2,900 (or possibly 2,500) with the opening of 
two new facilities (one outside of Trinidad and another outside of Havana), but the state had 
fallen short of the 4,000-bed goal (see Table 1).  
The CNT’s constituents also expressed dissatisfaction with the geographic distribution of 
beds. Medical and health resources had long been concentrated in Havana, and the politicization 
of this unevenness grew over the course of the 1940s and 1950s. In 1935, Castillo penned, “The 
centralization of anti-tuberculosis services in the Capital of the Republic constitutes a fact of 
reprehensible magnitude.”245 He also argued that those with tuberculosis not only existed in all 
the corners of the island, but they also contributed to the national budget, and, therefore, “it is 
legal that they obtain and enjoy all the sanitary services” that had been centralized “arbitrarily” 
in Havana.246  
Two geographic disparities were particularly disparaged. The first was the long-standing 
neglect of Oriente Province, Cuba’s most populous region. Foreign observers and domestic 
                                                 
243 Luis P. Romaguera, “Sanatorio para tuberculosos: Un estudio sobre esta materia de tanta importancia en una 
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witnesses had recorded—and castigated—Santiago de Cuba’s “sanitary abandon” for decades.247 
The second issue addressed the concentration of services in urban areas, and the difficulty that 
poor rural campesinos and sugar workers faced in gaining access to health care. “[T]he [sugar] 
barracks are hells,” one journalist revealed, “where tuberculosis has an important role of 
annihilation and destruction.”248 He continued, “[T]he inhabitants of the countryside are found 
lacking all protection, living a life of misery and slovenliness, a sphere ripe for all infections and 
epidemics.”249 
While the CNT improved some regional disparities, as discussed above, citizens were 
never satisfied that they had adequately resolved either of these two geographic issues. In case-
finding efforts, Havana’s denizens benefitted from a robust network of dispensaries, tuberculin-
testing campaigns, and sanatoriums. In 1942, 55.6% of the total known cases came from Havana 
Province’s, even though only approximately 25% of the national population lived in Havana 
province.250 While Havana Province had the largest urban center on the island, it did not have the 
largest concentration of population. With 28% of the national population, only 11.4% of known 
tuberculosis cases came from Oriente.251 Access to tuberculosis facilities and services continued 
to vary by regional location. In 1942, those in Havana accounted for approximately 57.2% of 
                                                 
247 See, for example, American Consul to Secretary of State, “Sanitary Condition in Santiago de Cuba and Vicinity,” 
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total cases served; Oriente Province (again, with 28% of the population), only accounted for 
9.8% of cases served.  
These disparities affected the experience of individuals with the disease. Even though 
provincial dispensaries had been established in the late 1930s, for those living far from their 
provincial capital, these medical services might be out of reach. In 1941, one physician from a 
provincial dispensary reported that his patients, 95% of whom were economically unable to 
support themselves, needed centers closer to them.252 He told the story of one sick man who had 
to travel approximately seventy miles from Central Francisco to the dispensary. His journey 
consisted of a horse ride, then two car rides, and then a three-hour train. Six to seven hours after 
his departure, he would finally arrive at the dispensary for outpatient treatment.253  
Grau’s strategy of increasing provincial dispensaries ameliorated this situation by adding 
eighteen new dispensaries, and during the 1950s, ten mobile units were equipped to reach rural 
areas. These units carried out vaccination (including BCG), examined patients for parasites and 
tuberculosis, and administered some treatments.254 The Institute of Rural Health publicized 
Batista’s concern with and increased attention to the “health of the campesino family.”255 
Nonetheless, the gap between rhetoric and experience remained wide; the politicized nature of 
rural health in the first years of the revolution suggests that while changes in tuberculosis policy 
in the 1940s and 1950s might have reduced the urban-rural disparity, it never resolved it.  
Additionally, the provincial disparity in hospital beds was never resolved. Both medical 
professionals and citizens demanded a sanatorium in every province. One physician laboring in 
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 81 
Camagüey’s dispensary, well acquainted with his clients’ limited access to therapeutic services, 
recommended provincial sanatoriums to accommodate these citizens and more dispensaries to 
perform outpatient procedures for those who did not qualify or were wait-listed for the 
sanatorium.256 In 1937 a speaker at the Hermandad Ferroviaria of Camagüey praised the efforts 
of the CNT, thanking them for their dispensary, but then demanded a sanatorium. “In a town 
where 194–198 victims of tuberculosis die annually; in a town where in only two months 500 
individuals are tested and 125, or 25%, of them are found to have tuberculosis…a sanatorium is 
needed!”257  
Batista and the CNT, however, did not dedicate the majority of resources to providing 
small provincial sanatoriums. Instead, the CNT’s energies went to a massive national sanatorium 
project (the subject of Chapter 5). Under Grau’s presidency, a new CNT administration promised 
to add a sanatorium in those provinces that did not have one (Pinar del Río, Matanzas, Las 
Villas, and Camagüey), but they only built and opened one, a disappointingly small facility in 
Grau’s home province of Pinar del Río. In the late 1950s, the CNT finally began construction on 
a sanatorium in Camagüey (Amalia Simoni), one of Cuba’s largest cities. The project had come 
too late to satisfy Camagüey’s citizens, who had to wait until the first years of the revolution for 
the sanatorium to be inaugurated. By the late 1950s, inequality in the provincial distribution of 
beds had not been resolved (see Figure 6). Havana, with roughly 26% of the population, had 
48.1% of the island’s tuberculosis beds. Matanzas and Camagüey had no sanatorium. Oriente, 
with over 30% of the population, had only 15% of the beds.  
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Figure 6. By the end of the Second Republic, the CNT had not distributed tuberculosis beds in a way that 
matched the geographic distribution of the population.258 
 
Facing these inequalities and difficulties, Cubans sick with tuberculosis still tried to make 
their dreams for hospitalization become a reality. One strategy was writing to journalist Guido 
García Inclán, who published these letters in a weekly column in Bohemia, which provided a 
highly visible space for the poor to appeal for money or supplies for home treatment, plead for 
entrance into a medical facility, or to criticize the government’s provision of health services. 
Many of these requests and complaints centered on tuberculosis, and they did not diminish 
despite the reported drop in tuberculosis mortality. García Inclán reported that he daily received 
letters, telegrams, and visits from tubercular patients, many of whom simply asked for “a bed in 
which to die.”259 
One such petitioner, Juana Meyrele Torres, a 35-year-old mother of six, wrote in 
desperation in March 1954. Though she had been admitted to La Esperanza Sanatorium 
previously, she was discharged before fully healed, and now spent her days prostrate in bed, 
                                                 
258 These percentages are based on the count of 1,000 beds in Topes de Collantes Sanatorium. If, as some alleged, 
only 600 were available, Las Villas’ share of the beds would drop to 23.9% and Havana’s would increase to 39.8%. 
There is no provincial population data for the late 1950s, so I rely on the 1953 provincial distribution. Oficina 
Nacional de los Censos Demográfico y Electoral, Censo de población, 3.  
259 Guido García Inclán, “En la feria de la actualidad,” Bohemia 46 (November 14, 1954): 94. 
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unable to provide for her children, who were being “contaminated” by the disease. Health 
authorities advised her that there were not any available beds in the sanatorium, and hospitals 
would not admit tubercular patients. “I am dying, señor,” Meyrele declared, “and I leave my 
children with a similar ending as they are already infected. Please do whatever is in your reach to 
obtain entrance in a sanatorium for this mother who suffers and is dying.”260 
 During the same month, Pedro Luzardo Díaz wrote to García Inclán from Bejucal, 
outside of Havana. His son-in-law was afflicted with tuberculosis, and his daughter had passed 
away in a hospital, leaving the grandfather in charge of his nine grandchildren. On behalf of 
Luzardo, García Inclán begged for the children to be housed in a crèche, the father to be admitted 
to a sanatorium, and someone to give him a job—for the tubercular father was unable to provide 
income due to his weakened state. Luzardo despaired, “I do not know what I am going to do with 
all of these children…I am an old man, tired of struggling and working in the countryside…”261 
From these brief and often tragic letters, published weekly in García Inclán’s column, a portrait 
emerges in which the Cuban poor appeared to be desperate for more beds in sanatoriums. 
In 1954, the CNT promised, “A bed for every tubercular and every tubercular in his 
bed.”262 However, in citizens’ eyes, the CNT never provided enough beds nor made treatment 
easily and equally accessible to all.263  García Inclán opined that hospital service was “one of the 
most legitimate rights that a poor citizen has.”264  In Cuba, however, for an unknown reason, “the 
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human rights of citizens” were being limited.265  In 1957, he decried that “6,000 poor tuberculars 
swarm through these streets…without finding refuge in a sanatorium.”266  
Medical professionals agreed. In 1955, Castillo, then director of the CNT, visited the 
presidential palace to inform Batista that of the estimated 40,000 sick with tuberculosis in Cuba, 
only 12,000 were receiving hospital care.267 In 1956, the National Medical College’s Executive 
Committee demanded 4,000 more beds for tuberculosis patients.268 Later that year, they held a 
“National Forum on the Medical Crisis,” protesting the “anarchic distribution of beds” that 
negatively affected the health of the nation.269 By the late 1950s, then, a consensus had solidified 
among journalists, some health officials, and medical professionals that the state had improperly 
managed the public health sector and the tuberculosis campaign. 
The CNT undoubtedly had flaws, but it is worth pausing to consider the nation’s 
performance in an international context. In 1958, in terms of tuberculosis hospital beds available 
per 10,000 inhabitants, Cuba placed seventh in the Americas, providing essentially the same ratio 
of beds as the United States.270 The country possessed an active national tuberculosis control 
campaign, which not all nations could boast. Consider, by comparison, Bolivia, which also 
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organized a tuberculosis department in 1936, but soon “its activities…reached a standstill.”271 
The Bolivian campaign offered no health services outside the capital of each of its provinces. In 
1953, Bolivia had fewer than 600 beds available for treatment, a far cry from the Pan American 
Sanitary Bureau’s recommendation of 3,000 beds.272 (It is important to note, however, that Cuba 
would not have wanted to compare itself to Bolivia, one of the poorest nations in the hemisphere. 
Instead, Cuban tuberculosis experts frequently compared their anti-tuberculosis campaign to 
programs in Western Europe and North America).  
Cuba also performed well in the region on tuberculosis health indicators. Cuban 
physicians recognized their tuberculosis mortality rate was one of the best in the Americas. In the 
late 1940s, Castillo reported that Cuba had the third lowest tuberculosis mortality rate in the 
region. The U.S. and Canada reported, respectively, 46 deaths and 38 deaths per 100,000 people; 
Cuba reported 70. The next lowest mortality rate was Uruguay, with 110 deaths per 100,000 
people.273 By comparison, Brazil reported over 300 deaths per 100,000 people. While Cuban 
physicians were aware that the national tuberculosis mortality rate was dropping, very few linked 
the declining trend to state intervention.274 In fact, they seemed only peripherally concerned with 
the mortality rate, worried more about the incidence of disease and the limited state network of 
facilities to isolate and cure those who were highly contagious.  
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September 1953): 164–65. One exception is a group of physicians who linked dropping mortality to the CNT’s 
interventions. Dr. Rafael Mañas et al., “Aspectos anatomopatologicos de la tuberculosis en Cuba,” Revista Cubana 
de Tuberculosis 17, no. 4 (October–December 1953): 380–81.  
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The very strength of the Cuban medical system seems to have made its weaknesses and 
shortcomings with respect to tuberculosis even more visible. Cuba’s medical community was 
large, organized, and politically active. In 1957, Cuba had 10 doctors per 10,000 inhabitants (in 
the Americas, only Argentina, Canada, the United States, and Uruguay had a higher ratio).275 
Some nations, like Bolivia, most of Central America, and Peru had fewer than 4 doctors per 
10,000 people. Cuban physicians were highly mobilized as a labor group.276 They penned 
frequent critiques and recommendations for changes in the state health care sector in a large 
number of medical publications (as well as popular ones).277 Finally, some scholars have 
recently suggested that Cuba’s excellent performance (relative to other Latin American nations) 
in health indicators by 1959 was partially due to the “relatively easy access to fairly high quality 
health care for an unusually large share of the population (by then-current Latin American 
standards).”278 In short, it is necessary to consider that Cuba’s highly vocal and organized 
medical community—who had high standards for their state health care sector—made the picture 
of health care in the historical record seem more bleak than it was.  
For those living in Cuba in the 1950s, their primary frame of reference does not seem to 
have been their performance in comparison with other Latin American countries.279 Medical 
practitioners and ordinary citizens had specific expectations of the CNT, influenced by local 
dialogue and international scientific tenets. These criteria were many (the subjects of Chapters 4–
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279 Alternately, Louis Pérez argues that Cuban expectations and national identity were influenced by American 
middle-class material and cultural norms. On Becoming Cuban: Identity, Nationality, and Culture (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 1999). 
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7), but the inadequacy of hospital care was of crucial importance and became an issue of broad 
national political significance in the 1940s and 1950s. In one of his many calls for change on the 
island, in 1944 Guido García Inclán published a plea from Rosalina Marisy García, a poor 
woman living in Santiago de Cuba. Her letter testifies to the intersection of medicine, health and 
politics in republican Cuba. Suffering from tuberculosis, she could not “understand why in her 
country it is so difficult to find a [hospital] bed,” the columnist transcribed. She had written to 
functionaries in the previous government, but had “not received the consolation of even a few 
lines.” The consequence of the state’s failure to provide what was perceived as an adequate 
number of sanatorium beds was forcefully spelled out by García Inclán: “She wants to blame the 
rulers of her country for her fate.”280 
In 1953, when Fidel Castro delivered his famous “History Will Absolve Me” legal 
defense, he identified health as one of the six problems plaguing Cuba: “Only death can liberate 
one from so much misery. In this respect, however, the state is most helpful—in providing early 
death for the people…Society is moved to compassion when it hears of the kidnapping or murder 
of one child, but it is criminally indifferent to the mass murder of so many thousands of children 
who die every year from lack of facilities, agonizing with pain.”281 When the revolutionary 
guerrillas arrived triumphant in Havana in 1959, their new government declared the politicized 
issue of hospital beds as one of its most imperative priorities.282   
                                                 
280 García Inclán, “En la feria de la actualidad,” Bohemia 36, no. 45 (November 5, 1944): 42. 
281 Fidel Castro, “History Will Absolve Me,” in The Cuba Reader: History, Culture, Politics, eds. Aviva Chomsky, 
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282 In a 1959 national survey entitled, “Is there something that the Government still has not done that it should do as 
soon as possible?”, those line items categorized under “economic matters” reigned at 64.45%. Nonetheless, when 
looking at specific line item issues, 4.18% chose “creating hospitals, making them honest, sanitation, doctors, 
pharmacies.” This was the 10th most popular answer. Raúl Gutiérrez Serrano, “Survey nacional: El pueblo opina 
sobre el Gobierno de la Revolución,” Bohemia 51, no. 8 (February 22, 1959): 80. 
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3.3 REVOLUTION 
In the weeks immediately following the revolution’s triumph on New Year’s Day, a handful of 
insiders of the new regime turned their attention to tuberculosis. The government appointed 
Gustavo Aldereguía as Director-General of the Anti-Tuberculosis Campaign. He had been active 
as a committed communist and tuberculosis expert since the 1920s and had vociferously 
criticized Batista’s CNT as an expression of “tropical-fascism” since its inception.283 By 1960, 
the autonomous CNT had been dissolved, in favor of a Department of Tuberculosis within the 
new Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud Pública, MINSAP). With the exception of a 
brief period in the early 1960s, when he served in a diplomatic post, Aldereguía directed the 
campaign until his death in 1970.284  
In the early stages of the revolution’s tuberculosis program (1959–1965), public health 
officials tried to balance international standards of tuberculosis control with citizen demands and 
expectations. For the former, they dedicated extensive resources to mass testing and mass 
vaccination, finally wielding technologies on a national level, which physicians had long hoped 
the CNT would do. According to calculations made by the Batista regime, the average number of 
annual X-rays in the 1950s was 37,368.285 In 1956, however, the CNT reported only 17,745 X-
rays.286 Opponents of Batista reported that from mid-1957 through the end of 1958, public health 
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officials had only given 9,700 X-ray exams.287 After 1959, the revolutionary government made 
X-ray testing a priority. By 1965, MINSAP reported that it had reached its goal of a minimum of 
1 million annual X-rays (see Table 3).  
Table 3. X-ray Totals288 
Year Number of X-rays 
1959 180,463 
1960 274,785 
1961 199,146 
1962 170,508 
1963 200,021 
1964 548,695 
1965 1,032,351 
 
The government also claimed that the issue of beds was one of its highest priorities, and 
the evidence suggests that citizen expectations must have played a role in this decision.289 
Beginning in the mid-1950s, sanatoriums around the world had begun to close down. Antibiotic 
therapy made outpatient treatment a possibility, which lessened the justification for running 
expensive tuberculosis hospitals.290 Since the 1930s, Gustavo Aldereguía had pushed for the 
state to pursue a project that rejected specialized tuberculosis hospitals. He hoped care could be 
                                                 
287 Cuba, Ministerio de Salud Pública, Subdesarrollo económico, principal enemigo de la salud: Como combate la 
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administered by visiting nurses in the homes of patients and by physicians in small tuberculosis 
wards in general hospitals.291  
However, throughout the 1960s, MINSAP claimed to be pursuing an expansive hospital 
building project.292 In 1961, it reported to have already increased beds by 30% (to 3,219) and 
listed among its top priorities the creation of 1,200 more.293 Some tuberculosis specialists 
employed at MINSAP wanted to increase the national bed count to 6,000 total beds. One 
physician, who had lambasted the CNT in 1953 for not providing a bed count equivalent to the 
number of annual tuberculosis deaths, wrote in 1963 that 6,750 beds (25% of the active cases of 
tuberculosis in the nation) were needed “for carrying out an effective tuberculosis campaign.”294 
In a sharp reversal of his past recommendation, Aldereguía estimated that 6,000 beds were 
“indispensable for successfully carrying out the anti-tuberculosis campaign.”295 Citizens, who 
had politicized the issue of hospitals, probably pushed the issue of hospital beds onto MINSAP’s 
agenda. 
In order to demonstrate progress towards this goal, MINSAP distorted the data, claiming 
that only 2,196 tuberculosis beds had existed in 1958.296 In the early 1960s, much of the reported 
increase in beds literally built off of past republican projects: MINSAP finished and expanded 
sanatoriums begun under republican leaders, such as the Amalia Simoni Sanatorium in 
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Camagüey and the Pilar San Martín hospital in Pinar del Río. By the mid-1960s, however, the 
government had added new facilities, increasing the national tuberculosis bed total to 4,080 in 
1965 before contracting it to 3,473 in 1968 (from an estimated 2,911 in 1958, which represents a 
40% and 19% increase, respectively).297 As of 1965, the revolutionary government had increased 
the bed to population ratio, to 5.35 from 3.84–4.45 in 1958 (see Table 4). By 1968, this 
proportion had declined to 4.38, comparable to the 1958 ratio. At no point in the 1960s did the 
government come close to providing the 6,000 beds originally envisioned by tuberculosis policy 
makers in the early 1960s.  
Table 4. Beds & Population, 1931–1968298 
  1931 1944 1958 1965 1968 
Beds 450 1200 2511–2911 4080 3473 
Population 3,962,344 4,778,583 6,548,300 7,630,700 7,937,200 
Ratio (Beds per 10,000 population)   1.14 2.51 3.84–4.45 5.35 4.38 
 
Rectifying the regional distribution of beds was important in the rhetoric of MINSAP 
(and the broader revolution), but the ministry achieved only partial success.299 By 1968, in Pinar 
del Río, Camagüey, and Matanzas, the government came close to providing a proportion of beds 
that matched the province’s representation in the national population (see Figure 7). However, 
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Havana’s proportion of the nation’s tuberculosis beds remained virtually unchanged from 1958. 
The province still had almost half of all beds, with only roughly a quarter of the total population. 
In fact, one of the first tuberculosis hospitals built by the government was a new surgical center 
(Julio Trigo Hospital) on the grounds of the La Esperanza-Lebredo complex.300 Finally, 
Oriente’s access to tuberculosis services improved (from 15% to 21.8%), but still did not match 
its share of the national population (35%). With a dearth of popular sources in the period, it is 
unclear how Cubans, inside and outside of the medical community, reacted to these 
shortcomings regarding beds. 
 
Figure 7. By 1968, MINSAP had rectified some provincial disparities in the tuberculosis bed count, but not 
all, especially in Oriente.301 
 
In 1963, the state announced a new Program of Tuberculosis Control, which aimed “to 
eliminate TB as a public health problem.”302 To accomplish this, the Program prioritized a 
prevalence survey; mass BCG vaccination; chemoprophylaxis; mass X-ray examination; and 
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curative and prophylactic treatment with tuberculostatic drugs.303 All of these goals were 
medical in nature and did not attempt to deal with the social ramifications of the disease, yet 
another limitation of the tuberculosis programs of the early- to mid-1960s. The official rhetoric 
of the tuberculosis campaign mirrored that of broader politics. One MINSAP official insisted, 
“The labor of [the National Tuberculosis Council] did not remotely respond, neither in its 
conceptualizations or methods…to the profound social root of this disease.”304 Despite this 
critique, the program of the early 1960s did not pursue radical social or economic policies for 
tuberculosis sufferers.  
Cubans with the disease could call on some new welfare agencies, however. In the early 
1960s, the government formed a new Ministry of Social Welfare (Ministerio de Bienestar 
Social), which offered state resources to the “needy.”305 The ministry put tuberculars and 
“disabled” individuals (impedidos) under the Division of Social Work.306 Data are limited, but in 
one nine-month period, this Division registered 307 individuals who had tuberculosis or were 
disabled, which suggests that the Ministry did not have enough resources to deal with the 
thousands of Cubans infected with the disease.307  
To answer this need, Gustavo Aldereguía hoped that the tuberculosis campaign might be 
one “from below,” involving local grassroots organizations, similar to the Committees for the 
Defense of the Revolution. These local tuberculosis leagues could influence policy, help identify 
cases, and care for sick neighbors.308 He organized these communities in a handful of towns, but 
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during his absence as ambassador to Yugoslavia, his successors dropped the initiative.309 Instead, 
the state and the sick relied on a more traditional form of social assistance: that of middle-class 
and elite charities.310 
The Lyceum and Lawn Tennis Club of Havana was one such organization. The Club 
listed social assistance cases in their monthly bulletins, requesting that readers send in funds to 
help. For instance, in August 1959, the Club featured Gisela and Sergio as their “case of the 
month.” Both had been interned at a sanatorium, but had been recently discharged. Even though 
they were cured, Sergio could not return to his former job ironing clothes for fear that he would 
relapse. While the Ministry of Social Welfare was helping, it was not enough, and the couple 
requested $100 to “restart their lives” and begin a new business.311 It is likely that the couple 
never received enough money, as the Club did not identify them in their published list of 
received donations. 
In May of 1961, the Club featured the case of Esther and Luis, a family “well integrated” 
into the revolution.312 Luis still had tuberculosis, even though he was released from a sanatorium 
at the beginning of the year. Esther now found herself with tuberculosis in her kidney and needed 
to be on bed rest for three months while receiving a round of antibiotic therapy. Luis’ income 
could not cover the cost of rent, food, and medical treatment. In a situation that paralleled the 
case of the republican period, the hospital could not provide medicine, and the readers of the 
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bulletin sent in enough funds for Esther to be able to purchase these drugs.313 Her medical 
treatment was secured, but it is unclear if the Club had received enough money to pay for the 
family’s other basic necessities. As late as 1965, supplicants with tuberculosis requested money 
to pay rent and supplement their income; sewing machines to take in business; and extra beds so 
infected family members could sleep separately from those who were healthy.314 In short, in the 
early 1960s, Cubans suffering the physical, financial, and emotional burdens of the disease 
continued to fall through cracks in the welfare state.   
Machado’s early tuberculosis program had also depended on elite, predominantly female, 
charitable associations to deliver health care services where the state could not, much to the 
chagrin of physicians who demanded scientific management of disease campaigns. Batista had 
originally shut charitable actors out of his new program, but civic associations had returned to 
aid the CNT in the late 1940s and 1950s.315 The scarcity of data for the early 1960s makes it hard 
to find out what physician and citizens thought of the hybrid (public-private) nature of the early 
revolutionary campaign. Nonetheless, these programs suggest that early anti tuberculosis efforts 
under the revolution reproduced some of the main features of republican programs.  
In 1968, perhaps as part of Fidel Castro’s Revolutionary Offensive that nationalized 
remaining private small businesses, the government shut down the Lyceum and Lawn Tennis 
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Club.316 In the late 1960s, the state opened a new chapter of tuberculosis care by passing a law in 
1969 that guaranteed patients 100% of their salaries while under treatment.317 The government 
legislated this measure to guarantee that the sick complete all treatment regimens in full.318 The 
late 1960s and early 1970s, then, represent a new stage in the policy and experience of state 
tuberculosis health care, one for which more research is needed to understand how programs, 
such as outpatient drug therapy, played out on the ground.    
3.4 CONCLUSION 
In the 1920s and 1930s, citizens and medical professionals made tuberculosis more visible to 
government leaders and pushed the idea of the right to health care onto the state agenda. In 
response, Batista founded the National Tuberculosis Council in 1936, which initiated an 
expansive state-building project throughout the republican period. It made great strides in 
increasing contacts with citizens, identifying previously undiagnosed cases, and providing 
medical treatment. By the 1950s, however, Cubans expressed great frustration with the CNT, 
most notably for its inability to provide an adequate number of beds and to make provincial 
sanatoriums a reality. On the eve of revolution, the gap between these expectations and the 
performance of republican administrations fed into the processes of political de-legitimation.  
                                                 
316 Lillian Guerra, Visions of Power in Cuba: Revolution, Redemption, and Resistance, 1959–1971 (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 2012), 13. On the Club’s closure, see “The Lyceum and Lawn Tennis Club 
Collection,” University of Miami Libraries’ Digital Collections, accessed October 3, 2016,  
http://merrick.library.miami.edu/cubanHeritage/chc0124/.  
317 Beldarraín Chaple, “La lucha antituberculosa,” 211.  
318 Ibid. In 1971, the government initiated directly observed treatment, and, in 1982, they implemented DOTS 
(directly observed treatment, short course). E. González, L. Armas, M.J. Llanes, “Progress towards Tuberculosis 
Elimination in Cuba,” International Journal of Tuberculosis and Lung Disease 11, no. 4 (2007): 405.  
 97 
Whatever its rhetoric of radical change, the early stage of the revolution’s tuberculosis 
program both connected with and deviated from the past campaign. In areas like mass X-ray 
testing, health officials made great strides. On the other hand, on the issue of hospital beds and 
reliance on charity, MINSAP’s early tuberculosis programs did not depart significantly from the 
CNT’s efforts.  
Thus, instead of conceptualizing Cuba’s tuberculosis programs as a series of distinct 
campaigns, this chapter suggests that they can be understood as part of one state-building project, 
beginning with Machado, intensifying under Batista, and being further developed during the 
early years of the revolution. Nonetheless, citizens and medical professionals roundly criticized 
the CNT, and the remaining chapters explore other aspects of the republican tuberculosis 
campaign to explain how and why this expansive effort failed to satisfy a large swath of the 
Cuban population.  
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4.0  “A SQUARE PEG IN A ROUND HOLE”: PATRONAGE, RIGHTS, AND 
REFORM IN THE HEALTH SECTOR 
In the early 1930s, a number of transgressions took place behind the shuttered gates of La 
Esperanza Sanatorium, a microcosm of the broader public health sector.319 When Gustavo 
Aldereguía took over as the facility’s director following the collapse of Machado’s government, 
he was dismayed by how poorly the sanatorium had been run. Beyond being unqualified for the 
job, the previous director had admitted patients who had brought him “the required letter” from a 
patron;320 that is, many of those who had gained access to treatment at the sanatorium had done 
so through political connections. Once interned, they were given preferential treatment based on 
“privileges that the Señor Director designated in order to satisfy his friends.”321 The hospital 
lacked the most basic medical equipment and patients’ reclining chairs—central to the rest 
cure—had fallen into disrepair, while the director used La Esperanza’s carpenter to attend to his 
own private residence.322 In short, the sanatorium did not operate as “a responsible and scientific 
organization, efficient and capable of setting standards.”323 La Esperanza was not an anomaly, 
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however. Under Machado, the sanitation branch had earned a reputation—both at home and 
abroad—of being “one of the most corrupt in the government.”324 
The political ruptures of this period disrupted medical care at state facilities, but they also 
opened up a window for change, one that a cadre of Cuban physicians seized. They hoped to 
depoliticize the public health sector, making it technical and “modern.”325 In the mid-1930s, 
observing the energy for health reform in Cuba, one international agency proclaimed, “We 
believe that a real renaissance in public health work…is taking place in Cuba.”326 However, by 
the 1950s, these winds of change had stalled. In 1953, for example, Fidel Castro lambasted the 
pervasive interference of politics in the state health sector: “Public hospitals, which are always 
full, accept only patients recommended by some powerful politician who, in turn, demands the 
electoral votes of the unfortunate one and his family.”327 The push for a modern, technical health 
sector had collided with a more traditional logic of power: patronage. 
Defined as “granting protection, official positions, and other favors in exchange for 
political and personal loyalty,” patronage was widespread on the island.328 Alejandro de la 
Fuente has summarized: 
Access to public employment depended on political connections. Victorious political 
parties and candidates distributed jobs and appointments through a complex system of 
patronage that started in the neighborhood and ended up in the presidential palace. 
                                                 
324 Raymond L. Buell to E.E. Day, July 23, 1934, Folder 788, Box 100, Series 315, Record Group 2, Rockefeller 
Foundation records, Rockefeller Archive Center. Hereafter, the following abbreviations will be used for citing 
sources from the Rockefeller Archive Center: Folder (F); Box (B); Series (S); Record Group (RG); Rockefeller 
Foundation records, Rockefeller Archive Center (RF-RAC). One historian suggests that the bombing of the archive 
of the Secretary of Sanitation in 1933 might have occurred because it was “infamous as an institution of corruption 
and graft.” Daniel Rodríguez, “‘A Blessed Formula for Progress’: The Politics of Health, Medicine, and Welfare in 
Havana, (1897–1935)” (PhD diss., New York University, 2013), 18n26.  
325 Cubans themselves employed the term “modern,” especially when referring to staffing state health posts with 
men who would be trained in public health methods and work full time. 
326 “Comision de Malaria de Cuba: Annual Report,” 1935, 14, F 1639, B 139, S 315I, RG 5.3, RF-RAC. 
327 Fidel Castro, “History Will Absolve Me,” in The Cuba Reader: History, Culture, Politics, eds. Aviva Chomsky, 
Barry Carr, and Pamela Maria Smorkaloff (Durham: Duke University Press, 2003), 311. 
328 Richard Graham, Patronage and Politics in Nineteenth-Century Brazil (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
1990), 1.  
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Although no specific study has analyzed the operation of the system, the endless 
denunciations of favoritism and partisanship in the distribution of appointments permit at 
least a broad characterization of this process.329  
 
Scholars of Cuba, however, have predominantly studied patronage in the early republic, at the 
national level, and/or its racial dynamics.330 Gillian McGillivray has argued that in the 1920s and 
1930s “class-based mobilizations…pushed Cuban presidents to replace the client-based 
patronage politics with class-based populist politics.”331 In weaving together the national and 
local dynamics of patronage, this chapter complicates that narrative, arguing for the deep-rooted 
nature of patronage during the Second Republic. It illuminates how patronage worked on the 
ground, the inefficiencies that it created in the state health sector, and the ways in which power 
was distributed within state structures.  
Patronage shaped the public health sector in four important ways. First, health personnel 
were political appointees, which meant that national and regional political changes resulted in 
persistent turnover of national health officials (and, consequently, frequent shifts in health 
policy). For example, over the course of one eleven-year period, twenty-one different men served 
as the head of the national health ministry (see Appendix A). Second, these changes in personnel 
also took place at the local level, including the post of chief sanitary officer and the entire 
subordinate staff at municipal sanitation departments. Third, in a system of patronage, political 
                                                 
329 Alejandro de la Fuente, A Nation for All: Race, Inequality, and Politics in Twentieth-Century Cuba (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 2001), 129.  
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needs and pressures trumped meritocratic qualification; as political appointees, health officials 
were frequently technically incompetent. Fourth, patronage connections influenced who was 
admitted to public health facilities and hospitals. 
Public health reformers intended to combat these flaws of the patronage-ridden public 
health system, targeting not just national institutions such as the Ministry of Health but also local 
ones.332 Particularly important were the local sanitation departments (jefaturas de sanidad), the 
government health structure with which ordinary Cubans interacted most directly (and, thus, 
Cubans were more aware of its shortcomings). From 1935 to 1942, the Rockefeller Foundation’s 
International Health Division (RF) partnered with a group of Cuban health officials to modernize 
these local health departments and train a new body of public health men to manage them. The 
mechanics of patronage, however, complicated this reform effort. Parties and political bosses, 
key actors in patronage networks, controlled these local health posts; therefore, they opposed this 
project, for it challenged their authority. Frustrated by this seemingly insuperable resistance, the 
RF left Cuba in 1942.  
After the RF’s exit, Cuban physicians continued to press for reform, both of local health 
administration and hospital admittance procedures. They were driven by shared ideas of “best” 
health practices and the Constitution of 1940, which stipulated that a technical health sector 
should guarantee equal rights in accessing state health care.333 However, as they attempted to 
                                                 
332 A brief note explaining the structure of Cuba’s health organization: One Secretary, a physician appointed by the 
President and serving on his cabinet, ran the Secretariat of Sanitation and Charities. In addition, the Secretary 
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sanitation department (jefatura de sanidad), headed by a chief sanitary officer (jefe de sanidad). 
333 Delegates to the Constitutional Convention of 1939 specifically stated in Article 160 of the Constitution that the 
newly reorganized Ministry of Health and Social Assistance “shall act exclusively as [a] technical organizatio[n].” 
See Article 160 of Andrés Lazcano y Mazón, Constitución de Cuba (con los debates sobre su articulado y 
transitorias, en la Convención constituyente), vol. 3 (Havana: Cultural, S.A., 1941), 104.  
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untether the health sector from webs of patronage and favors, reformers faced resistance and 
achieved limited institutional results. In short, even though public health had become a 
privileged site for state-building efforts, it fell victim to patronage, which underpinned the 
functioning of the Cuban political system. 
These thwarted projects heightened the visibility of patronage as a national problem. This 
led citizens to denounce the CNT, especially in a context of worsening governmental corruption 
under the Auténtico regimes (1942–1955). The National Tuberculosis Council was accused of 
staffing its dependencies with unqualified, yet politically well-connected, appointees and of 
using hospital admission as favors. While many of these public controversies receded in the 
wake of Batista’s coup d’état in 1952, physicians and citizens never were content with the 
political nature of the national health sector. Patronage and corruption, then, can help explain the 
disjuncture (discussed in chapter 3) between declining tuberculosis morbidity rates and 
worsening public perceptions of the CNT and the broader public health sector.  
4.1 THE RF IN CUBA, 1935–1942 
Discussions of international health in Latin America in the early- to mid-twentieth century 
invariably invoke the Rockefeller Foundation’s International Health Division (RF), for it was 
“arguably the most significant organization in public health in the international arena, with a 
special interest in Latin America.”334 Rapidly expanding from its national roots as the 
Rockefeller Sanitary Commission in the southern United States, the RF made its mandate 
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international in 1913 when it launched a series of cooperative projects in Central America and 
the Caribbean. The RF soon expanded from the Caribbean basin to the farthest reaches of the 
globe—to Paris, to Tokyo, to São Paulo—with its belief in the progressive impetus of modern 
medicine and public health as its driving force.335  
In 1935, after years of negotiations, the Cuban government invited the RF to the island to 
lead a number of health initiatives. Cuba’s Finlay Institute (FI), which had been founded in 1927 
to carry out “communicable disease control, epidemiological investigation, and public health 
laboratory service, both diagnostic and research,” served as the RF’s institutional partner.336 
When the Director of Scientific Research at the FI, Domingo Ramos, was appointed as Director 
of the National Department of Health in 1935, he successfully brokered the bilateral arrangement 
and then became one of the RF’s primary liaisons.337  
In May 1935, RF field officer Henry P. Carr arrived on the island and promptly formed a 
Malaria Commission to carry out a malaria survey and demonstration of control techniques. In 
1936, the RF and the Cuban government decided to begin a second and more intense project, 
launching a new local public health unit to be headed by a physician trained in the science of 
public health. The Cubans and the RF agreed to place the health unit in Marianao, a municipality 
of Havana six miles southwest of the city’s core and home to a diverse mix of residents; it 
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included dilapidated public housing, rural areas, a military base, and more tony neighborhoods. 
The health center was to be a physical and highly visible demonstration (to both popular 
audiences and state officials) of the value of this type of modern local health institution. In time, 
the RF and its Cuban partners hoped to substantively overhaul existing local sanitation 
departments (jefaturas de sanidad) along the lines of the modern local health unit (unidad 
sanitaria) in Marianao.  
 
Figure 8. The Marianao Health Unit began service in 1937 (courtesy of the Rockefeller Archive Center).338 
 
In 1937, the Marianao Health Unit (MHU) opened its doors (Figure 8). Carr directed this 
project, and the RF provided training fellowships for his main Cuban assistants. Dr. Pedro 
Nogueira, for instance, who had served on the Malaria Commission, was selected to complete a 
three-month fellowship in Tennessee and Mexico and returned to serve as the assistant director 
of the MHU. By 1940, Carr and Nogueira were assisted by a local team of four public health 
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nurses, six sanitary inspectors, one laboratory technician, one office clerk, several laborers, a 
janitor and two chauffeurs.339  
The MHU’s services were wide in scope, including public health popular education; 
maternal and school hygiene; control of tuberculosis, malaria, and other communicable diseases; 
immunization; and supervision of mid-wives, night-soil disposal, water supply and home 
sanitation. The unit interacted with the community frequently, through a well-utilized 
playground, nighttime showings of motion pictures, visiting nurses that fanned out to local 
homes, and physician outings to a large number of public schools in the area. From 1937 through 
1941, the MHU distributed over 650,000 popular health education bulletins (Salud y Sanidad), 
which were distributed to Marianao’s schools and other educational facilities throughout the 
island.340 
This model health unit was based on four principles, which the RF considered “best 
practices” and essential to its success: (1) its personnel had to be selected on the basis of their 
technical merit and “suitability to post,” not political factors; (2) those personnel had to work 
full-time; (3) the area of the unit had to be large enough to achieve economies of scale, but small 
enough for the personnel to “know intimately all the health problems present”; (4) and the unit 
had to devote its limited time and resources to the “principal health problems” of the locale and 
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“avoi[d] as much as possible over-specialization in the program.”341 The RF emphasized 
preventive medicine over curative services.  
This local health unit (unidad sanitaria), then, was to operate very differently from 
Cuba’s pre-existing local sanitation departments (jefaturas de sanidad), one of which operated in 
each of the island’s 128 municipalities.342 Municipal authorities chose the chief sanitary officer 
of each sanitation department, which “resulted in the sanitary services being improperly 
performed or entirely omitted…. Not infrequently the offender [of a health code] is a municipal 
official and the sanitary officers are unwilling to bring him to account for fear of losing their 
places, or if they undertake to secure proper punishment, the local police and judiciary are 
indifferent or ineffective.”343 Local health officials received little to no training and worked only 
part-time (usually weekday mornings, 8 a.m.-12 p.m.). American observers were surprised to 
find that the majority of the departments’ appropriations went to street cleaning and garbage 
removal, functions that had already been moved to departments of public works in the United 
States, as they were understood to bear little direct relation to health. In short, these sanitation 
departments were antiquated and inefficient, although performance was uneven from one 
municipality to another. (Havana, for example, possessed a specialized and active municipal 
health department.)344  
                                                 
341 Malaria Commission of Cuba, “Annual Report, 1937,” 2–5, 27, F 1643, B 139, S 315I, RG 5.3, RF-RAC.  
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The Marianao Health Unit also provided a different kind of tuberculosis service than that 
offered by the CNT. Instead of a plan based around large hospital construction projects, the RF 
sought to institutionalize “pure” public health work, with major emphasis on case-finding, 
surveillance, education, and prevention.345 After the CNT adopted a bed-intensive strategy, 
members of the RF privately critiqued their approach. When writing to the RF Director in New 
York, Benjamin Washburn, a health officer in the Caribbean, reported “that the tuberculosis 
situation here in Cuba is hopeless as far as any cooperation on our part is concerned. The public 
health aspect of the disease is not realised and nothing worthwhile is being done to control it, 
while great sums are being spent in the provision of hospital beds as a method of treatment.”346  
A small group of Cuban physicians had voiced this concern previously, none more vocal 
than Gustavo Aldereguía when he was director of La Esperanza Sanatorium.347 Aldereguía 
believed hospitalization to be cost-prohibitive and wanted to pursue outpatient therapy through 
trained public health nurses employed by the local sanitation department.348 Even though the 
CNT did not adhere to Aldereguía’s scheme and even though they operated in a different 
institutional network than that of the municipal sanitation departments, the RF’s broader goal of 
reforming these local health units throughout the island offered the possibility of synergies 
developing between the CNT’s dispensaries and local tuberculosis control efforts.349 If the RF 
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were successful, a strong preventive health network might emerge, one that complemented the 
curative emphasis of the CNT’s hospital projects. Before attempting to launch other local health 
centers, however, the RF had to first convince Cubans that the Marianao Health Unit was an 
effective and efficient form of local health care and disease control. 
From the MHU’s opening, local, national and international audiences considered it a 
resounding success and a model to emulate. Within four years of its inauguration, the MHU had 
been interwoven into the social fabric of Marianao. The Marianao paper praised the “zeal and 
perseverance” and the “magnificent labor” of the MHU.350 In 1942, after attending a Rotary Club 
luncheon celebrating the RF, its regional director boldly surmised, “The Marianao health unit 
continues to be the most popular activity in Cuba.”351 Physicians who had refused in 1937 to 
send in vital statistical information to Dr. Carr and Dr. Nogueira were doing so by 1939.352 
Throughout the RF’s tenure in Cuba, its representatives reported that multiple Cuban 
municipalities pressed the national government to launch renovated local health units, and 
several of these requests explicitly referenced the MHU as a guide or model.353 Internationally 
the unit was well regarded, and the RF used it as a showcase and training site, for, as one official 
noted, “[N]eutral observers have declared it is the best in the Americas.”354  
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In response, Cuban and RF officials tried to leverage the MHU’s success into two further 
reform and institution-building efforts. The first endeavor was spearheaded by the Finlay 
Institute and other Cuban health authorities, who sought to modernize the existing sanitation 
departments by training their chief sanitary officers. The RF initiated the second project, a 
proposal to establish a second model health unit in Guantánamo. Both, however, encountered 
significant opposition from those involved in patronage networks.  
When the Finlay Institute was created in the late 1920s, it was entrusted with forming a 
National Sanitary School to instruct the workers of the Department of Health in a number of 
practical and theoretical matters. Acknowledging that the study and practice of clinical medicine 
was not enough to adequately perform public health duties, medical students who took courses 
through the FI’s training program at the University of Havana were to receive, in addition to 
their medical degree, the “certificate of Sanitary Doctor.”355 Despite this original mandate, by the 
mid-1930s the Finlay Institute had survived economic and political chaos but its training 
program had not.  
In the late 1930s, with unofficial and peripheral RF involvement (i.e., advice and very 
limited aid), Cuban officials led the drive to revitalize the FI’s National Sanitary School. Part of 
the school’s mission would be to train chief sanitary officers, with the broader goal of 
transforming existing sanitation departments into modern health units. In the spring of 1937, Dr. 
Ramos and a new Director of the Department of Health initiated a pilot training program, 
housing a small group of these local health officials from outside Havana at the FI. They 
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attended courses on laboratory techniques, such as performing blood smears and staining them to 
diagnose for malaria. They also observed the RF and RF-trained Cuban personnel at the MHU to 
gain field experience in public health and preventive medicine.356 When the trained health 
workers returned to their posts, the goal was to begin the transition from part-time to full-time 
work. Then, another group would be selected for the program, and so on, until the entire corps of 
128 chief sanitary officers had been professionalized.  
The RF viewed this initiative very positively. Carr noted that this was “the first time 
employees have been given special training before being sent to do field work” in Cuba.357 
Benjamin E. Washburn, the regional director of the RF’s Caribbean program, praised this effort: 
“Such a centre for training the subordinate personnel of the health department is the thing I 
should love very much to see in each of the countries of the Caribbean Region.” He continued, 
“The Training School for Health Officers, already organized by Dr. Ramos, has every prospect 
of succeeding since the budget of the Finlay Institute contains items providing for the board and 
lodging at the Institute of 10 students throughout the year.”358 The RF officials soon learned, 
however, that in Cuba the problem for state institutions was often not a shortage of money, and 
the National Sanitary School soon ran into more serious problems, despite Washburn’s cheerful 
forecast.  
By the next summer, Washburn reported that the training program had been 
“discontinued” as of April 1938, after only two groups had graduated.359 When the trainees 
returned home, armed with an arsenal of new epidemiological techniques and administrative 
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 111 
guidelines, several found that their positions had been given away to other appointees. Even 
though the National Sanitary School, an arm of the national government, had invited these 
officers to come for public health training, and even though they were only absent for a few 
months, the FI found itself unable to extend its sphere of influence beyond Havana to the 
municipal outposts in other provinces to ensure that these public health officers would have a 
position when they returned.360 “In at least two instances,” Washburn summarized, “these health 
officers completed their training and returned home to find that their jobs had been given to 
political appointees.”361 The ramifications were disastrous for the program’s appeal: “Needless 
to say, other health officers cannot be induced to take the course of training.”362 Municipal 
authority and local patronage needs had trumped national designs.  
The government’s ability to ensure a certain level of job security, that is, the prospect for 
a career in public health, was absolutely crucial for any future efforts to form a body of public 
health experts. Potential public health trainees were often loath to pursue the opportunities for 
professional advancement offered to them by the RF and the FI. For example, one potential RF 
fellowship recipient, the General Nursing Supervisor of the Health Department, demanded that a 
presidential decree be passed to ensure her position and salary upon her return from the United 
States.363 The Director of Health found this request unnecessary (and impossible), and the RF 
thus rescinded the fellowship offer. However far-fetched her request may have seemed, it 
persuasively illustrates how keenly Cubans in public posts experienced job insecurity. In reaction 
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to these developments, Washburn sensed that a tide was turning, but unfortunately in the 
direction opposite of what he and the RF had desired. “The conditions under which we are 
working at present are entirely different from those which existed three years ago when our 
cooperation began,” he bemoaned, “and, more and more, political conditions are affecting all the 
projects with which we are connected.”364 
In the ensuing years, the Finlay Institute continued to make promises to the RF that they 
were serious about reopening the school, and government officials communicated their intentions 
to ensure the career prospects of those trained by the RF and the FI. In 1939 a competent and 
reform-minded Secretary of Sanitation, Dr. Juan de Moya, reopened the school, and the RF 
continued to support the small groups-in-training by offering malariology courses at the FI and 
practical fieldwork at the MHU.365 In 1939, de Moya arranged for six local health officers to be 
trained at the FI. He hoped to create six provincial health departments and to have the trainees 
direct these provincial units, which would “adopt the methods in use in Marianao.”366 
Despite Ramos’ and others’ attempts to interest the RF in officially turning the National 
Sanitary School into a cooperative project, with resources and professors provided by the RF, 
Washburn was reluctant to participate. Dr. Ramos believed the RF’s institutional support would 
solve the problem of local authorities replacing trainees while on leave, perhaps because the RF 
possessed some kind of authority beyond what the national government did. The RF concurred 
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that ensuring meritocratic and not political appointment was crucial for Cuba’s public health 
future; however, as long as health officials only vaguely promised to remove politics from local 
health, the RF remained skeptical of any long-term change and declined to participate in the 
effort. The RF’s doubts were confirmed when de Moya was removed from his post following the 
1940 presidential election. The RF instead placed its hopes for permanent institutional change in 
launching a second local health unit. When this effort met the same obstacles as those 
encountered by the training program, RF officers began to understand even more clearly how 
Cuba’s profoundly embedded political practices and institutional arrangements impeded efforts 
to reform public health institutions.  
Within a few years of the MHU’s operation, the RF determined that it had been 
successful enough that they could begin to broach the topic of establishing a second health unit. 
In 1939, the new regional director of the Caribbean, Porter J. Crawford, had met with a coterie of 
health authorities and reported, “The idea that the ‘jefaturas’ de sanidad (municipal health 
departments) could be gradually replaced by full-time health units with trained personnel, seems 
to be gaining ground in the minds of several important people.”367 Washburn agreed that “such a 
programme is indispensable in the reorganization of public health work in Cuba…it is 
recognized that many of the municipal departments should be placed upon a more efficient basis 
in order to utilise modern methods of disease control.”368 
Both the Cubans and the RF turned their eyes eastward to Oriente, which in the RF’s 
estimation was “the most important province of Cuba” in terms of size, population, and 
wealth.369 The RF presented a proposal for a second health unit in early 1941 when they believed 
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that a new window of opportunity for reform had opened. The resumption of democratic national 
elections and the new constitution promised substantial and positive public health reforms on the 
island. Batista, for example, planned to rationalize the civilian and military health services into 
one new technical and modern health branch, baptized as the Ministry of Health and Social 
Assistance. The new director of health showed great interest in the idea of extending health units 
throughout the island.370 The RF hoped that after a brief and potentially unstable period of 
institutional reorganization, the government might successfully restructure the Health Ministry. 
The RF requested a continuation of funding for cooperative projects for two years from both the 
Cuban government and the RF board, which was granted.371 The RF and their Cuban partners 
hoped their continued presence would ensure that as services were reorganized, the idea of 
extending health units and replacing sanitation departments would not be pushed to the back 
burner.  
The RF urged that a second health unit be set up in Guantánamo, but the timing of the 
proposal was problematic.372 First, treaty negotiations were underway between the U.S. Navy 
and the Cuban government to expand the size of the base at Guantánamo.373 Because its 
enlargement was prohibited under the Cuban Constitution, the American ambassador was 
reluctant to present the health unit project to the President while these negotiations were being 
worked out.  
                                                 
370 Much like the previous structure of the Secretariat of Sanitation and Charities, the Ministry of Health and Social 
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More problematic, however, was the relationship between the RF and the new Health 
Minister. The RF had grown accustomed to the top health officials of the country frequently 
changing. In the course of eleven years, there were twenty-one secretaries of sanitation/ministers 
of health. (This, in itself, is evidence of the dysfunctional health system; see Appendix A.) In 
1940, Batista appointed Colonel Demetrio Despaigne as the new Minister of Health; Despaigne 
had been the director of the CNT and continued in that position until 1944. Even though the 
Director of Health (Dr. Recio) supported the project, the RF soon learned that due to his close 
military connection to Batista, Despaigne held the power, and he soon began to put obstacles in 
the RF’s path. Relations between Despaigne and the RF went back to at least December 1938, 
when Despaigne asked Washburn for a grant of money for the CNT’s hospital building program. 
The RF did not believe in funding projects that in their view encouraged dependency, so 
Washburn told him that all RF budgets for the year had already been set, and that appropriations 
for tuberculosis control had been distributed to other Latin American countries. Washburn 
reported, “He was not satisfied with this reply.”374  
Now, as Minister of Health, Despaigne continued to try to assume control of the financial 
streams of the RF projects in order to redirect them to his ends. Carr had to seek an audience 
with Batista in early 1941 to stop Despaigne from taking over the Cuban government’s 
appropriation to the Malaria Commission and the MHU. After talking to Carr, Andrew J. 
Warren, Assistant Director of the RF, reported, “Dr. Despaigne’s only argument against the 
project was that with the money involved he would be able to provide an additional 200 political 
jobs.”375 Furthermore, Despaigne was not the trained public health professional the RF would 
have preferred, and he often did not agree with the practices emphasized by the RF. In early 
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1941, Carr reported that Despaigne wanted to reassign the malaria funds to use them “for his 
own methods and personnel who would control malaria chiefly by the use of flame throwers. 
Doctor Carr has been unsuccessful in convincing the minister that the proved methods now in 
use should continue. He feels that further conferences would give negative results.”376 Warren 
was less tactful in his assessment of Despaigne, acerbically commenting, “[I]t is a good 
illustration of the intelligence and public health ideas of the present Minister of Health.”377  
After the proposal for the Guantánamo unit had been sitting on the desks of Cuban 
officials for months, Warren finally took the issue to President Batista in April 1941 to see if he 
could push it forward. While Batista expressed interest, he said he needed to discuss it with his 
advisors because of the naval base negotiations underway.378 Two months later, in late June 
1941, with no action taken on the part of the Cubans, the RF withdrew their proposal for the 
health unit. 
At first, the RF interpreted authorities’ inaction as a lack of enthusiasm or desire for the 
project—that is, as a problem of attitude or knowledge. Crawford had “hope[d] that such a 
development would come from a desire of Government to extend the health unit idea.”379 The 
RF Director had cancelled the proposal because “the Cuban Government had shown little 
enthusiasm and had delayed acceptance.”380 However, after a few months’ deliberation, the RF 
began to realize that the root of the problem was political and not about a lack of appreciation for 
health reform. The proposal for a second health unit failed primarily because of Cuba’s existing 
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patronage system, in which the distribution of health posts functioned as valuable currency, both 
for national politicians like Despaigne and local political bosses.  
In the summer of 1941, a new RF representative arrived to replace Carr. Rolla B. Hill 
brought new eyes to the situation. After making a brief tour throughout the island to meet 
multiple health officials, he emphasized the political nature of Cuba’s challenges. Hill explicitly 
observed that the root of the problem was not lack of money. Carr would have agreed. Speaking 
of Santiago in 1939, he opined, “There is no lack of funds for health work in places like that 
city.”381 He continued: 
There are few municipalities in the Island where, on account of being sparsely settled and 
for other reasons, good health work cannot be carried on for a per capita cost of $0.75 to 
$1.00 and in the majority of them a per capita of $0.50 would be sufficient even to 
include some permanent engineering work…Such figures, applied on an island-wide 
basis will be seen, when compared with the national health department budget, to leave 
ample funds for central administration.382  
 
Based on his past experience in Latin America, Carr agued, “This is rather an unusual 
situation.”383 Cuban officials—both local officers and national ministers alike—often 
complained that they needed more money and credits from the government. It is probable that 
such complaints were used to distract from mismanagement of funds. Carr concluded that what 
was needed was not more funding but an “adjustment of program and personnel for increase in 
effectiveness.”384  
Hill argued that the patronage system in Cuba constituted the most important obstacle to 
reform. Cubans participating in regional and local political networks distributed jobs, including 
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the chief sanitary officers of local sanitation departments. Carr had begun to understand this in 
late 1940, summarizing that “the greatest difficulty, and one which can hardly be overcome even 
by the highest officials, is the political type of local directors of health who on the whole aren’t 
suitable as directors of health units but are essential to the political (party) organization.”385 Hill 
echoed this in a report to Crawford within several months of arriving in Cuba: “Since the health 
officers are or may be changed with every political change, and the appointment of them and 
their subordinate employees is a fat political plum which local chiefs, that is senators, and others, 
consider natural perquisites, there will be a great deal to contend with.”386 Although the exact 
mechanics of job distribution remained unclear, RF men were convinced from their first-hand 
experience and second-hand reporting from Cuban interlocutors that a system of patronage 
stretched across different levels of government and appointments were made directly by 
municipal authorities and party figures, who were connected through patron-client ties to 
senators and national representatives. In terms of health reform, the most negative consequence 
of patronage was that it “discourage[d] the career of public health to physicians.”387 Any 
authority that came from training could not compete with the power of patron-client ties.  
In short, the “best practices” espoused by RF representatives in Cuba, who 
(unrealistically) hoped to operate in complete independence from politics, butted up against 
entrenched local political networks.388 To launch a second health unit and then subsequent ones, 
the pre-existing sanitation department would have to be eliminated or combined with the new 
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organization. This threatened those who were distributing the health jobs, as well as those 
already employed in these positions. Those Cubans who understood the system suggested other 
tactics. In late 1941, for instance, Ramos proposed to Crawford that the RF accept and train fifty 
or sixty fellows, who then would be put to work in cooperative projects. He reasoned that after 
training “these men would demand full-time public health service and there would be much more 
progress.”389 Crawford balked at this suggestion, sticking to the RF’s established procedures, 
informing Ramos, “[F]ellowships are given at the request of Government to assist in plans 
involving development of public health…naturally fellowships cannot be just given in order to 
have numbers and hope that they will find positions later.”390  
RF officials believed that the national government shouldered responsibility for making a 
career in public health possible. Carr wrote, “[F]ull-time work can only be secured when the 
Government is willing to give reasonable guarantees to the employee, who must not be removed 
from his position for political or other reasons not related to his capacity adequately to fulfill the 
duties of his post.”391 The Spanish translation of this text (published by the Ministry of Health) 
removed the words “the government,” stating in passive voice that this “kind of work….can only 
be obtained when the employee is offered sufficient guarantees.”392 One foreign health expert 
had observed in 1935 that there needed to be some mechanism to pull physicians, over-
concentrated and underemployed in Havana, into rural areas: “Distribution of physicians in 
Cuba, as in many other countries, is not in accordance with the actual needs of the people, but in 
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accordance with opportunities for the professional, social and financial advancement of the 
physician…A young, able physician must have a strong inducement to draw him to the 
interior.”393 The RF was convinced that if the Cuban government could ensure employment, 
physicians would take up public health posts throughout the island; Congress, however, never 
passed or enforced laws to make health work full-time; to take appointment power away from 
municipalities; to provide training to its sanitary workers; or to regulate qualifications for the 
job.394  
Outside of Havana, local officials were especially powerful, and unlike Marianao where 
the local health officer had been unable to block the inauguration of the MHU, the health officers 
in Oriente would prove to be powerful foes. In this province, Hill summarized, “[t]he doctors are 
emphatic in saying that unless the Director of the Unit be given official authority, that is made 
Jefe Local de Sanidad, it will be nigh impossible to do effective work. In Guantanamo, even 
more than in Marianao, where much difficulty has been experienced in getting cooperation of the 
Jefe Local, the local officials can make or mar the work.”395  
In light of all of these difficulties, the RF decided to turn over cooperative projects to the 
Cubans in 1942 and to pursue no new initiatives. The news of the RF’s departure sparked worry 
and outrage, providing one more indictment of the state and showcasing the vulnerability of the 
institutions started by the RF. Ramos, now Minister of Health, promised to pass a law 
reorganizing local health units, while insisting that he needed the backing of the RF to push this 
through. He told Crawford that the RF representative was “quite essential for holding together 
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advances in public health in Cuba.”396 Ramos highlighted that, unlike other countries in the 
region, the central public health problem of Cuba was not disease prevention, but one of 
institutions and administration. Crawford reported that Ramos “believes that as Colombia needs 
yellow fever work or Trinidad malaria studies, so does Cuba need most of all the stabilizing 
influence of the Rockefeller Foundation.”397  
Unlike Hill, however, Crawford had grown immune to the promises of health change on 
the horizon. When Hill relayed the guarantees that Ramos had made, Crawford tiredly wrote that 
he had heard all of this before, “but nothing would please him more than that some of them 
would come true.”398 Crawford wrote to RF Director Sawyer, contending that two serious 
political issues would undermine any future efforts: the existing patronage system and 
Congress’s failure to pass a national budget for years. He recommended that projects be turned 
over in March 1942. Crawford identified the disjuncture in Cuba between those who desired 
public health reform and those who held power (over legislation, purse strings and/or 
appointments). Sawyer began to wonder if even the President had a strong grasp on what course 
of action Congress would take in passing reform laws.399 Crawford summarized, “[A]ll of those 
who wish to carry out a definite public health program so far do not have the laws, budget, and 
lack of political interference in order to accomplish their wishes.”400  
The RF’s exit sparked protests and focused public ire on the shortcomings of the 
government. In the beginning of 1942, news that the RF was planning to turn over the Malaria 
Commission and the MHU to the FI leaked to the press. Crawford reported, “Articles and 
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editorials have now begun to appear every day saying that the RF intends to pull out, that we 
should not be allowed to leave, that something must be done about it.”401 There was intense press 
coverage, and many (correctly) assumed that this meant that the RF was planning to no longer 
pursue cooperative work on the island.402 
The outcry in Marianao reached a fever pitch, especially when citizens heard rumors that 
the MHU would be merged with the Marianao Sanitation Department.403 They had long 
benefitted from the MHU, and they feared what would happen if the RF relinquished control. On 
April 15th, Hill recorded the progression of events in his diary: 
Last night there was another mass meeting in Marianao, with the Army represented, who 
offered to take a delegation to see the President. Present also was a Lyceum student with 
several hundred signatures of protest, thus united with the public school teachers. The 
merchants also in a signed statement, offered to close their stores for half a day in protest, 
or to unite with meeting in front of the Presidency. The Marianao paper came out 2 days 
ago with the whole front and back pages devoted to the question, with a picture of Dr. 
Ramos addressing the Marianao Rotary Club two months ago, in which he promised that 
the Health Unit would continue in Marianao to serve as an example to the whole 
country.404 
 
This sort of unity across social class and professional sector seemed unusual to the Cuban press. 
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“The Havana papers, including the weekly illustrated magazines,” Hill summarized, “continue to 
discuss the question, and some of them have stated that seldom if ever has such a unanimous 
protest, or conversely, such a demonstration of solidarity been shown for any cause.”405 
The Cuban press alleged that the RF had become dissatisfied because the Cuban 
government had not paid for its share of the cooperative project.406 Even though the RF made 
concerted efforts to dispel this myth, this narrative prevailed in the public sphere. Privately, the 
RF tried to convince authorities that political problems prompted them to leave. Meeting with 
Wilfredo Albanés, a senator from Oriente, Hill “took occasion to point out that the Ministry of 
Health is still political, and that the employees work part-time and that under these conditions 
health work never will be satisfactory.” The senator told Hill that “now would be an extremely 
unfortunate time for the RF to pull out of Cuba, when the Government has a great many difficult 
problems confronting it, and when health work should be intensified rather than lessened.”407 
Albanés continued to publicly malign the national government, which did not use the RF’s 
projects “as a guideline for application in other parts of the country.”408 Other health officials 
tried to calm public opinion by passing decrees promising more money for the sanitation 
departments.409   
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Professionals employed in RF projects feared for their individual and institutional 
stability once the RF left. The Cuban staff of the cooperative projects read the press reports with 
dismay and told Hill that they would be “at the mercy of politicians.”410 Several were so 
pessimistic that they planned to leave to find work in the U.S. Although the RF managed to get 
promises from three lead Cuban men to wait until the year finished to leave the work, Crawford 
was also cynical about their future: “There is no governmental full-time work in Cuba or the 
Finlay Institute and such a procedure is a very nice square peg, but it is in a very round hole.”411 
Corroboration of these fears came when the press released a story in which the Marianao 
Sanitation Department had put forward a candidate for a job at the Malaria Commission, who 
stated, “I know nothing about malaria, but I can get 300 votes.”412 In the RF’s last months with 
the cooperative projects, “some higher ups” attempted to do what the RF and other Cubans had 
feared: taking over the MHU to redistribute valuable resources and jobs. These unnamed 
officials tried to incorporate the MHU into the Marianao Sanitation Department “for the purpose 
of securing more money to hire type [sic] of employees which assist party politics.”413 
In the face of these issues, Crawford and Hill remained committed to withdrawing from 
the island. They also laid out specific things the government could do to interest the RF in future 
work. Generally, health work needed to be technical, full-time, and not political. For instance, if 
they maintained the current health minister across the next presidential administration transition 
in 1944, it would be a good faith sign of moving toward a depoliticized bureaucracy. As one of 
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his final communications with the Health Ministry, Hill penned a “strong” letter, advising that 
the government must evince a “sincere desire to raise the Health Dept. out of the mire.” He 
signed off with the admonition that cooperative aid might not be the answer to Cuba’s problems: 
“Any aid by a private organization can only be relatively small. In the final analysis, it is the 
people, their government and the technical men who must have the responsibility for their own 
health and their own institutions.”414 In August 1942, Hill packed his belongings and left the 
island.  
4.2 THE NATIONAL PUSH FOR REFORM 
Throughout the 1940s, domestic actors initiated other reform efforts. Unsurprisingly, many 
physicians were concerned with restructuring local health administration and saw the MHU as a 
model to replicate. Félix García Rodríguez, who had been a delegate to the constitutional 
assembly, hoped that as the Health Ministry was restructured along the lines that the Constitution 
demanded, local sanitation departments would be replaced with health units.415 The “archetype,” 
he contended, was the RF’s unit in Marianao.416 After years of disappointment following the 
ratification of the 1940 Constitution, Cuban reformers saw another moment of possible change 
when President Grau prepared to assume office in 1944. Through the medical journals, popular 
press, and private letters, physicians submitted proposals for institutional change. They 
recommended a variety of administrative reforms and disease prevention or control programs, 
                                                 
414 RBH diary entry in PJC diary, July 1, 1942, 264, F 2, B 1, S 420, RG 1.1, RF-RAC. 
415 The Constitution did not mention local health units, but Article 160 stipulated that the new Ministry of Health 
and Social Assistance “shall act exclusively as [a] technical organizatio[n].” Lazcano y Mazón, Constitución de 
Cuba, vol. 3, 104.  
416 Félix García Rodríguez, Problemas de Salubridad (Havana: Imprenta Librería Nueva, 1940), 24. 
 126 
but all expressed two concerns: the Health Ministry needed to be modernized (i.e., made 
technical) and local health units in the style of the MHU needed to replace sanitation 
departments. 
The physicians shared an understanding that the linchpin of health work, the local 
sanitation departments, were in disarray. José Chelala Aguilera, a well-known obstetrician and 
eugenicist, who published voluminously in the popular press and reached a large audience 
through a daily radio show in the 1940s, took the lead in pushing for this reform, publicizing his 
opinion pieces in Bohemia and a variety of professional journals.417 Chelala recommended the 
“radical transformation” of the public health apparatus, noting that with the amount of money at 
the disposal of past ministers, Cuba should have had “a perfect sanitary state.”418  
He pinpointed the same central roadblock that the RF emphasized: the “sanitation 
departments dependent on political caudillos and unable to execute the most basic sanitary 
methods.”419 Chelala maligned the system that made the chief sanitary officer a subordinate of 
the municipal mayor, which “ma[de] fragile all the means of public health.”420 Instead, Chelala 
advised the Minister of Health to establish public health as a career and call a conference with all 
Health Officers to determine who were “the…parasites of the Ministry” and who were “the true 
soldiers of the health policy that the country needs.”421 Chelala was confident that the 
                                                 
417 Sarah R. Arvey, “Sex and the Ordinary Cuban: Cuban Physicians, Eugenics, and Marital Sexuality, 1933–1958,” 
Journal of the History of Sexuality 21, no. 1 (January 2012): 100–1. 
418 José Chelala Aguilera, “Conmoción sanitaria y acción,” La Revolución en Marcha, November 5, 1944, 3, Fondo 
de José Chelala Aguilera (JCA), Museo Histórico de las Ciencias “Carlos J. Finlay” (MHC). 
419 José Chelala Aguilera, “Hacia una política sanitaria,” Prótesis Clínica 5, no. 10 (October 1944): n.p., JCA, MHC. 
420 José Chelala Aguilera, “Grau tendrá que iniciar la sanidad,” Prótesis Clínica 5, no. 9 (September 1944): n.p., 
JCA, MHC. 
421 Ibid. 
 127 
reformation of the local health organization would have a cascading effect, ending a number of 
structural problems: rural migration, social diseases, and shantytowns.422  
Chelala also contradicted claims about inadequate funding: while specific local sanitary 
departments might have required more credits from the central government, the Ministry of 
Health and Social Assistance had more than enough money to adequately run the public health 
sector.423 He had long lamented how party leaders and health officials had reduced the problems 
in the sector “to simple statements about lack of funds.”424 As citizens became increasingly 
frustrated with local health in the mid-1940s, Chelala queried, “With this awakening of the 
citizenry—slow but progressive—do they think they can indefinitely continue repeating the same 
excuse of ‘lack of credits’…?”425 
Physicians appealed to the president-elect directly. Two doctors sent in lengthy reports 
that suggested how best to reform the health department. Both petitioned for sanitation 
departments to be replaced by health units and explicitly mentioned the Marianao Health Unit as 
a model. One of these reports outlined a gradual process, in which the “deficient current Local 
Services” would be transformed into “modern Units, constituting the most remarkable work of 
Public Health that could be carried out in Cuba. Only the incomparable work of Finlay and the 
American Commission against yellow fever could be considered as a superior work of national 
sanitation.”426 Through these structural changes, public health practices would finally reach the 
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rural countryside.427 In his message to Congress in 1944, Grau appeared to have adopted the 
reformers’ goals. He argued, “The modernization (tecnificación) of the Ministry of Health and 
Social Assistance should begin with the transformation of the Local Sanitation Departments into 
true health units or centers.”428 
Despite these physicians’ valiant efforts and Grau’s promise to make the health ministry 
technical, little substantive reform occurred. Grau strategically deployed the name “unidad 
sanitaria” when, at the urging of the Ministry of Agriculture, he established nine rural health 
units in 1946 (at Guane, Bauta, Cardenas, Colón, Sagua la Grande, Sancti Spíritus, Ciego de 
Ávila, Holguín, and Guantánamo).429 A new Health Minister in 1947 promised to “modernize” 
the local sanitation departments, but it appears that any changes made, even into the 1950s, 
represented a transformation in name only (to “unidad sanitaria”).430 From afar, the RF 
continued to lament that the health unit idea “did not seem to catch on in Cuba and that full-time 
health units were not expanded to other areas.”431 The net result was to exacerbate municipal 
unevenness. Chelala, for example, reported on the catastrophic state of the local sanitation 
department in Bayamo, while praising Havana’s municipal sanitation department as resembling 
the ideal “modern Local Health Unit.”432  
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Hospital admissions constituted a second subject that rankled physicians and citizens and 
catalyzed reform efforts. Patronage had long influenced the process of gaining access to free 
medical care at state hospitals. During the early republic, a lucky minority who had connections 
(through employers, for example) could ask their patrons to write letters to their cronies who ran 
hospitals and government health offices.433 For example, from 1935 to 1938, the Chief of Staff 
of the Presidency, Cristóbal Muñoz, penned letters from his official post to directors of various 
hospitals, requesting admittance for sick people that he knew directly or that friends had asked 
him to recommend. In June 1935, Muñoz wrote to Dr. Rufino Moreno, Director of La Esperanza 
Sanatorium, to request that he admit Vicente Falgueiras, the servant of Señor Rafael Pinetta (a 
friend of Muñoz). Pinetta could no longer allow the contagious Falgueiras to remain in his home. 
Later in the same month, Muñoz wrote again to Moreno to ask that he admit Teresa Ravelo y 
Machín to “oblige a good friend.”434 In several cases, there is archival evidence that Muñoz was 
successful, for he occasionally composed letters of appreciation to the hospital directors for their 
help.  
Those without access to contacts in high places took to the hot, dusty streets, spending 
days in the crowded waiting rooms and chaotic halls of hospitals, going from one to another to 
beg for a bed. This was a “tragic odyssey,” an often-fruitless “pilgrimage” for many.435 After 
weeks and months of repeating the ritual, the only answer was to wait for the telegram that a 
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coveted spot had opened up at a state facility. The RF complained about this situation in the late 
1930s, commenting, “Although Havana is well equipped with Tuberculosis Hospitals, it has not 
been possible to get any of these cases into an institution…[I]t seems necessary to have a 
recommendation from some official or influential political citizen to have a patient admitted.”436 
The RF soon learned how to play the game, however. Although it had originally rejected the 
CNT’s request for nursing fellowships (probably because the request came from a military, not 
civilian, institution), in April 1939 Washburn reported that the MHU’s head nurse was training 
several nurses from the CNT in the tenets and practices of public health nursing.437 Not 
coincidentally, Washburn noted, “[P]atients referred by Dr. Nogueira to the Esperanza Hospital 
are now admitted.”438 In 1939, a total of 19 cases from the MHU were admitted to sanatorium. In 
the future, the MHU hoped to have a reserved two or three beds available to them monthly. By 
1942, this “special arrangement” had been solidified, and the MHU had grafted itself into the 
CNT’s system of distributing sanatorium beds as favors.439 Rather than operating independently 
of politics, the RF ultimately succumbed to patronage practices.  
The CNT had promised, however, that admissions would operate fairly, and specified the 
procedure for doing so.440 The CNT required a sick individual to visit a dispensary to be 
diagnosed, classified, and given a prognosis of whether the sanatorium cure was appropriate. 
Then the individual was to go to the headquarters of the CNT with paperwork from the 
dispensary to be put on a waiting list. The CNT alleged that no other factors, even severity of the 
case, would be considered. After obtaining the proper certification at the dispensary, the system 
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operated on a strict first-come, first-serve basis.441 In practice, however, an informal system of 
bed distribution existed, in which decisions were less technical. In 1941, at a meeting of CNT-
employed tuberculosis specialists, a physician in the audience commented that one of the most 
pressing problems for dispensaries was that “private action” interfered in the process of 
sanatorium admission.442  
Juan Castillo, a CNT insider, envisioned a different system, one in which medical 
classification would reign.  As a dispensary director, he pushed for admissions procedures to be 
transferred from the CNT central administration to a committee composed of CNT dispensary 
and hospital directors. The former distributed beds with little regard for patients’ clinical history; 
therefore, patients in an advanced state of the disease, for whom surgery and medical treatments 
could do little good, overran facilities.443 Castillo estimated that approximately 75% of patients 
in CNT institutions presented such advanced cases of the disease that they were essentially 
incurable. He noted that some had been admitted without ever having been diagnosed at a state 
dispensary, and he suspected many of them suffered from something other than tuberculosis.444 
In articles in the Revista Cubana de Tuberculosis, he insisted that the social and clinical history 
of each patient, determined locally at the dispensary, should determine admission; no other 
factors should intervene. Castillo argued that this approach was “[s]o logical” and “so 
evident…that it is not contested or supplanted in any anti-tuberculosis organization in the world, 
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except in Cuba.”445 Castillo also confirmed the “traditionalism” of “political interference” in the 
admissions process.446 
On a surprise investigative visit to La Esperanza Sanatorium in 1948, José Chelala 
Aguilera asked Director Francisco Núñez Llanes if he, the directors of dispensaries, or any other 
physicians played a role in admitting patients to the hospital. Núñez Llanes answered that he 
only communicated to the CNT the number of vacancies at the hospital and then the latter 
“ordered admittances.”447 Chelala then asked Núñez Llanes to comment upon the common 
understanding that in most public hospitals political influence was necessary for admittance; he 
followed this question with a particular rumor about La Esperanza:  
The issue I want to investigate is even more serious. Based on the information that I have, the 
beds of the Sanatorium are divided into three parts: one part is at the disposal of the Ministry 
of Health and Social Assistance, another part is at the disposition of the First Lady of the 
Republic, Sra. Paulina Alsina…and a third part is at the disposition of the Consejo Nacional. 
And only these people can authorize an entry or not.448 
 
Surely aware of his coveted public post, Núñez Llanes diplomatically repeated his answer to the 
previous question, perhaps feigning ignorance of the mechanics of admission. In his published 
report, Chelala confirmed the existence at the sanatorium of two supervisors who “did nothing 
more than fulfill the orders of the people from above who control the beds of La Esperanza 
Sanatorium.”449 Other reports corroborated the existence of these two functionaries.450 
One former patient and activist reported on the influence of patronage at the hospital. 
Rosa Hilda Zell penned, “Remember that whoever obtains a bed in the Sanatorium proves, with 
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this fact alone, to be a person with influencias.” She continued, “When a patient is set to have a 
thoracoplasty, and he does not desire to submit to the operation, he goes to his influencias so 
that, in place of an operation, he is injected with gold salts, or they leave him in absolute rest.”451 
Based on the science of the time, serious cases that required surgery or intensive treatment were 
to be sent to a hospital, such as Lebredo, while those who had less grave cases and required less 
intensive therapy such as the rest cure were to be sent to the more comfortable and private 
cottages of La Esperanza Sanatorium. Nonetheless, connections, not medical diagnosis, dictated 
the categorization and placement of patients. Zell observed, “Those who have influencias are in 
the casetas….those who do not have, or have fewer, influences, although they come ‘almost’ 
healthy, go to the rooms of Lebredo.”452 
A new form of patronage had developed by the mid-1940s, one that reflected the populist 
politics at the time. In columns in Bohemia and Prensa Libre, journalist Guido García Inclán 
provided a medium to link the masses who did not have political connections to potential patrons 
in the government. For example, in April 1944, a woman from Chaparra wrote to García Inclán 
about her two young daughters. They were unable to walk, with a vaguely identified 
“sickness…in the spine.” The woman begged “the First Lady of the Republic, Sra. Elisa Godínez 
de Batista, [to] please admit her two children to the Children’s Tuberculosis Hospital.” García 
Inclán seemed optimistic because he knew that the President of the Republic “regularly rea[d] 
this section” and hopefully would “pass on this plea to his wife.”453 In 1945, another woman 
wrote from her bed in a rickety shack in remote Calimete, asking to be admitted to La Esperanza. 
She had already written a letter to the First Lady of the Republic (Grau’s sister-in-law), who had 
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“offered to let [her] know when there was a vacant bed.”454 The woman had become desperate, 
writing to García Inclán: “Remote hope! The days pass….and I am dying!”455 
For certain cases, this strategy worked. In May 1946, García Inclán reported that CNT 
Director Bartolomé Selva León had read his column about a sick man and arranged his entrance 
to La Esperanza, for he “strives to please the poor.”456 Health officials seemed to respond to the 
more heart-wrenching cases. In September 1946, Selva León responded again, this time for a 
young child who needed to be admitted to Aballí Sanatorium.457 The columnist penned, “Our 
profound thanks to Dr. Selva León…who…fulfill[s] each need, without political influence 
mattering.”458 In 1949, the director of the CNT under President Prío, Santiago Rodríguez, heard 
about two stories published in Bohemia. He sent “two urgent telegrams” to the paper, advising 
them that he had admitted “the little girl” to Aballí and another individual to La Esperanza.459 
García Inclán summarized, “When the rulers are attentive to the beat of the fourth estate [the 
press], the citizen feels more protected.”460 However, for many others letter writers, officials 
high in the government never responded to them or García Inclán did not publish their pleas. 
This was not an ideal or efficient way to secure hospital admission. García Inclán himself 
admitted as much, writing, “They do not know what to do! Without political influence, without 
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leverage…the poor, they turn to me, as a last resort.”461 This process satisfied neither the sick 
nor physicians.462  
Citizen discontent over patronage in the CNT only worsened in the late 1940s, 
exacerbated by the increase in corruption under the Auténticos. Beyond hospital admissions 
problems, one major theme in denunciations of the CNT centered on the issue of incompetent or 
“dirty” administrators. Their internecine battles served as entertaining fodder for political 
magazines, but they were also worrying signs of the time.463 CNT Director Selva León stood at 
the center of a maelstrom of highly public struggles over credits and jobs. From the beginning of 
his tenure, critics were quick to point out that he was not a tuberculosis specialist, but instead 
was a political appointee. Newspapers alleged that he increased his own personal fortune by 
accumulating surpluses that were supposed to go to personnel who were fired or resigned and by 
charging a 20% commission to suppliers, which he then skimmed off the top. He also stood 
accused of placing a variety of people from his kinship network into positions in the CNT.464 
The latter resulted in a ministerial resolution cancelling these commissions in 1948.465  
Exposés about botelleros—physicians who were paid full salaries to occupy a post for 
which they never did any work—were particularly inflammatory, and the public’s awareness of 
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botellas increased under the Auténticos. Selva León leveraged the pejorative nature of the term 
to allege that one legitimately employed scientist had been a botellero of the CNT under Batista. 
He then revoked his funding and created a new allergy department within the CNT.466 At the 
Pilar San Martín Sanatorium in Pinar del Río, regional papers published observations of 
malfeasance at the facility. A local paper reported that even before tubercular patients were 
housed at the facilities, one hundred people were on the payroll. Six months after new patients 
had been transferred from other hospitals, only forty of those one hundred employees actually 
worked at the facility.467 This was not simply mismanagement but a “cruel deceit.”468  
Following Batista’s coup and the overthrow of the Auténticos, these issues receded from 
the public spotlight, but they continued to simmer beneath the surface. Citizens were well aware 
that patronage and corruption were widespread in the health sector. Whether hand delivered to a 
sanatorium director or published for a national audience, the practice of using letters and political 
connections to enter a hospital carried on through the end of the republican period.469 Decades 
later, citizens would remember the politics of admittance as a key characteristic of the late 
republic. “Of course it’s true,” one woman recalled, “that…during Batista’s rule, there were not 
hospital beds available, and my father had to talk with a politician he’d voted for before he could 
get my brother into the Calixto García Hospital.”470 
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Health units in the structure and style of the Marianao Health Unit also remained an 
unrealized goal. By the late 1950s, physicians were still calling for the modernization of 
sanitation departments.471 Pedro Nogueira, who had been promoted to Director of Health under 
Grau, reflected years later that although “there was an attempt to reproduce this type of unit in all 
the country…the circumstances that prevailed in health care at the time relegated it to a utopian 
plane.”472 Many Cubans continued to live in what medical anthropologist Paul Farmer has 
termed “public health deserts”; the presence of the Marianao Health Unit only served to heighten 
that fact.473 
4.3 CONCLUSION 
By the 1930s, patronage had come to undergird the operation of the health sector, the CNT, and 
the admissions offices of hospitals. Unsatisfied with this, Cubans pushed for a constitutional 
provision to make the health sector technical; they also spearheaded domestic initiatives and 
partnered with international agencies to make this law a reality. Despite the efforts of this 
dedicated and diverse group of physicians and civic actors, by the end of the 1950s, the health 
sector had not been modernized. Merit and training often did not determine health posts, nor did 
medical diagnosis or a waiting list transparently govern admission to state hospitals. The 
publicized tenure and exit of the RF had national importance, not primarily for its disease control 
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efforts but because it highlighted the politicized nature of the Cuban public health sector, 
especially its deeply rooted problem of patronage. By the end of Batista’s dictatorship, this had 
become one more issue on which the government had failed in citizens’ eyes.  
The vision of a modern health sector and the importance of reforming local health 
departments informed the health policy of the revolutionary government. In 1960, the Ministry 
of Public Health integrated multiple municipal health organizations (like the casas de socorro, 
sanitation departments, and various dispensaries) into one local health unit, called unidades 
sanitarias (like the Marianao Health Unit).474 MINSAP called these bodies “the cornerstone of 
the public health work of the Cuban Revolution.”475 While governmental administrators might 
have been ignorant of the fact that what they called “perhaps the most characteristic innovation” 
in public health had already been tried at the MHU (an American-Cuban partnership), Nogueira 
boldly asserted decades later that the Marianao Health Unit “had been the first center in which 
the problems of the health of the community had been analyzed.”476  
During the Second Republic, the influence of politics in state health care, a lightning rod 
of national debate, was not limited to the issue of patronage. Chapter 5 examines the story of the 
Topes de Collantes National Sanatorium, one of Batista’s most important health projects and a 
cogent example of how the prioritization of political objectives hindered the achievement of 
public health goals.  
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5.0  “A TEMPLE OF HEALTH”: THE TOPES DE COLLANTES NATIONAL 
SANATORIUM PROJECT, 1936–1964 
In January 1937, high in the mountains of central Cuba, a delegation of military and civilian 
authorities gathered.477 After being greeted at the train station by “a large audience, in which all 
the social classes were represented,” Fulgencio Batista and other Cuban officials inspected the 
site he had recently chosen for the construction of Cuba’s first modern, high-altitude tuberculosis 
sanatorium. As cool breezes flowed through the pine and eucalyptus trees, he declared to a 
reporter that in “these rugged mountains…the best Sanatorium in the Americas will rise.”478 
Almost twenty years later, in 1955, Washington Post columnist Drew Pearson arrived at 
the sanatorium, after making the steep and winding drive through the mountain range. As he 
climbed out of the car, he was struck by the grandiosity of the edifice, which Batista had recently 
inaugurated. After a tour, he concluded, “The sanitarium was modern and beautiful. It had the 
latest American equipment, from operating rooms to laundries.”479 One of Batista’s most 
publicized projects, the Topes de Collantes Sanatorium was described as “the miracle on the 
mountain” by its admirers.480 Its pleasing aesthetics and “unexcelled construction,” however, 
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were not the hospital’s most salient characteristics.481 As Pearson noted: “Its significance was the 
part it played in Cuban politics.”482 Labeled by detractors as the “whim of a dictator,” the 
contested history of the sanatorium illustrates how tuberculosis control operated in republican 
Cuba, a parable of health care under authoritarian populism.483 
From its conceptualization in 1936 to its closing and repurposing in the early 1960s, the 
Topes de Collantes Sanatorium revealed a contradiction of how politics and health concerns 
intersected in Cuba. Batista governed as an authoritarian populist: appeasing the popular classes 
guided his decision to prioritize tuberculosis (and the authoritarian nature of his rule allowed him 
to freely dedicate resources to the disease); in contrast, advocates struggled to gain state attention 
to fight tuberculosis in many other countries. However, authoritarianism also made it possible for 
Batista to exercise undue influence over the conception and implementation of the project. 
Batista had filled the CNT’s governing board with appointees, many of who were military men, 
deferential to his opinions. To the dismay of a number of technocrats who proffered scientific 
advice, the CNT followed a political and propagandistic logic in designing the hospital project. 
As a result, the sanatorium was inefficient, plagued by logistical setbacks, and especially 
vulnerable to changes in political leadership. As Frank Snowden has argued for Mussolini, 
fascism, and malaria in Italy, Batista was able to “pursu[e] political objectives,” which “led to 
heavy costs in the field of public health.”484 In short, even though tuberculosis was taken 
seriously in Cuba, politics undermined efforts to control the disease.  
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The Topes de Collantes Sanatorium represented another major public health endeavor of 
the republican period; however, similar to the RF’s effort to remove patronage from the public 
health sector and reform local health units, the sanatorium fell victim to politics and became a 
highly visible marker of the failures of the republican state, most notably its inefficiency and 
corruption. In the late 1930s, the public widely approved of the sanatorium. By the 1950s, 
however, after years of watching a string of governmental administrations mismanage the 
project, citizens reacted to its inauguration in late 1954 with mixed opinions. After 1959, the 
revolutionary government repurposed the facility, but its salience in national politics (and also, 
by this point, in the politics of the exile community) endured, as opposed political factions 
continued to wield the sanatorium as a symbol of health care in the republic.  
5.1 CONTESTED CONSTRUCTION 
From its founding in 1936, the CNT made the Topes de Collantes Sanatorium its premiere 
project. One of the provisions of the law that created the CNT stipulated that the “first funds that 
the National Tuberculosis Council collects will be dedicated to the construction of a sanatorium 
in the hills of Trinidad.”485 It occupied the largest line item in the organization’s budget, it filled 
the pages of popular and state publications, and it held a central place in Batista’s presidential 
campaign literature. One military publication identified the sanatorium as “the most definitive 
step in eradicating the deadly white plague from Cuba.”486 Batista envisioned that the sanatorium 
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would be concrete evidence of his state-building project and of his concern for the health of the 
poor.  
Popular demands and physician recommendations shaped Batista’s decision to make the 
sanatorium a cornerstone of the anti-tuberculosis campaign. In a context of populism, the 
expectations of the masses could not be ignored. Editorial after editorial in the mid- to late-1930s 
called for more beds, specifically in sanatoriums.487 One article in Bohemia described “the 
pilgrimage of tuberculosis sufferers, who do not have sanatoriums in which they are received.”488 
El País featured the “sad odyssey of a women crushed by the ‘illness of Koch’.” She pursued a 
“tragic pilgrimage from hospital to hospital without resources, with no relief from the terrible 
disease.”489 The repeated use of the word “pilgrimage” by journalists to describe the plight of 
those with the disease in Cuba suggested that the search for a bed was a ritual shared by many, 
recurring over the course of many days, months, and even years. 
Physicians also influenced Batista to prioritize the construction of sanatoriums over other 
disease-control methods. Although a minority of medical professionals supported other models 
of disease control (such as prevention and home care), the majority of Cuban physicians, and 
especially those employed in the state health bureaucracy, endorsed a tuberculosis program that 
centered on isolation and/or cure through sanatorium beds.490 As discussed in Chapter 3, Cuban 
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tuberculosis specialists declared that the CNT needed to dedicate 4,000 beds to tuberculosis 
treatment. 
Batista and his appointees on the CNT Board of Governors (Consejo Superior de 
Tuberculosis) determined the specific manner in which tuberculosis beds would be provided. 
This Board acted as an authoritarian, top-down policy-making apparatus, impervious to pressures 
from technocrats. The concentration of policy-making power in this board was intentional: as 
seen in Chapter 3, Batista pushed through the legislation of the CNT, which determined the 
governing board’s composition, during an interim period of government. It was a moment when 
the militarization of social services faced no serious opposition as Congress was not in session 
and civilian leadership was in transition.491 The Board was composed not of tuberculosis experts, 
but of individuals that Batista had approved. The eight members were the Public Prosecutor of 
the Supreme Court, a senior official of the Army, a professor at the University of Havana, the 
Director of Public Health, and one representative from the College of Architects, the National 
Red Cross, the Economic Society of Friends of the Country, and the Medical Services of the 
National Police.492 
Medical professionals expressed concern about the CNT’s failure to include a sufficient 
number of tuberculosis specialists on its governing board. The initial composition of the CNT 
administration was telling: the police and military were overrepresented and the University of 
Havana representative did not have to be a specialist on tuberculosis. Even though the university 
appointee was Dr. Oscar Jaime, a long-standing member of the Cuban Anti-Tuberculosis League 
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and director of its dispensary, the medical community did not believe this to be sufficient. The 
editors of the underground journal of the recently outlawed Cuban Medical Federation wrote, 
“[I]t would have been just and of great utility to have formed this Council with physicians 
trained in tuberculosis and directors or officers of the diverse sanatoriums and anti-tuberculosis 
dispensaries since they are the ones who through their scientific and technical capacity and 
through their experience with the problems that the organization is going to tackle…can rapidly 
support and contribute…to the quickest organization of this center that is so necessary in our 
country.”493 Although more tuberculosis specialists were added to a technical subcommittee of 
the CNT after a few months, the structure of the governing board (whose president was 
appointed by Batista) facilitated loyalty and deference to Batista’s public health plans.  
Professional groups had been writing extensively about the ideal size, architecture and 
geographical distribution of sanatoriums in the years preceding the foundation of the CNT, and 
they continued to do so after March 1936. Following a global trend, Cuban medical professionals 
insisted that what was of paramount importance was providing as many beds as possible as 
quickly as possible, which determined the particular specifications of sanatoriums and hospitals. 
For these facilities, the architecture needed to be simple and their physical size small (200 to 400 
beds) to allow for rapid construction and inauguration. Also, they needed to be located close to 
centers of population, so as to make movement of construction materials, access to medical 
professionals, and the travel of patients—many of whom were poor—as convenient as 
possible.494 In sum, the majority of Cuban physicians urged the following schema: a small, 
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simple sanatorium near every provincial capital (or, alternatively, specialized tuberculosis wards 
in existing provincial hospitals).495  
The Board of Governors, however, ignored this corpus of knowledge produced by 
medical professionals and pursued a project diametrically opposed to these treatises. In short, 
they were guided by political objectives that often were executed against technical, scientific, or 
medical advice.496 Batista mandated that the CNT’s first project respond to the public rhetoric of 
a bed shortage: a massive facility for 1,000 patients, equipped with the best surgical equipment, 
displaying the most modern architecture, nestled in Cuba’s Sierra del Escambray mountain 
range. Thus, when Batista’s plans for a new national sanatorium became public knowledge, 
physicians began to write numerous editorials, published mainly in the medical press, in an 
attempt to critique and re-orient the fundamental bases of the project.  
While the therapeutic effectiveness of the local climate at Topes de Collantes was not a 
subject of debate, its location in terms of topography and proximity to a large population center 
raised considerable concern. Topes de Collantes was closest to the municipality of Trinidad, but 
Cienfuegos, Sancti Spíritus, or Santa Clara, all with double or triple the population of Trinidad, 
would have been more appropriate. Furthermore, there was no highway or railway in the 
mountains to connect to the existing transportation system. Luís Romaguera argued in 1937 that 
the most important factor for any sanatorium was its accessibility to a population center, so that 
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patients, their families and medical personnel could easily access the facilities.497 He advised that 
the CNT consider building sanatoriums that were in the plains (sanatorio de llanura) instead of 
mountains (sanatorio de altura) since all population centers in Cuba were located in the 
former.498 The professor occupying the University of Havana’s Tuberculosis Chair, arguably one 
of the most relevant figures with whom the state should have consulted, Dr. Alfredo Antonetti, 
found himself shut out of the CNT’s original deliberations because of the estrangement between 
Batista and the university. Nonetheless, he publicly opposed the project, concurring with the call 
for sanatoriums on the outskirts of each provincial capital.499 
Doctors also expressed serious concern about the size and grandiosity of the sanatorium 
design. One physician estimated that the anti-tuberculosis campaign, if effectively carried out, 
would last at most twenty or twenty-five years; therefore, the sanatoriums and hospitals 
constructed for tuberculosis treatment should be cheap and plentiful, not made to last longer than 
that period.500 These physicians based their recommendations on programs in other countries that 
were not economically wealthy and that championed a decentralized network of sanatoriums 
instead of large centralized institutions.501 “We will start by saying as has been said before that 
we are enemies of large sanatoriums with capacities for hundreds of sick,” Romaguera opined, 
“logical near N.Y. or Chicago, where the land is expensive, but incomprehensible in Cuba where 
the land is not valuable and there are small centers of population.”502 After visiting several mid-
western American states to tour their facilities, Romaguera concluded, “[W]e understand that in 
Cuba they should not return to building establishments similar to La Esperanza Sanatorium with 
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a capacity for 1,000 patients, whose difficulties of government, etc., are all known, but instead, 
on the contrary, they should be small sanatorium units of 100, 200 or 300 beds, as the Americans 
have done in Puerto Rico.”503   
The CNT also disregarded the advice of architects, the other technocratic group involved 
in the initial planning process. The CNT announced a national design competition for the 
sanatorium to the College of Architects in Havana in 1936. As the deadline for turning in drafts 
and blueprints drew near, the members of the College met to discuss their concerns, where they 
decided it was necessary to send a letter to the president of the CNT’s Board of Governors, Dr. 
Maximiliano Smith, to request modification of the building design requirements (set by the 
CNT) that they found most worrisome. Echoing the doctors’ concerns, they proffered two central 
recommendations: (1) that the sanatorium be built at a lower altitude; and (2) that the 
sanatorium’s size be capped at 400 patients.  
The first recommendation would allow the sanatorium to be constructed along a pre-
existing highway between Trinidad and the mountains. As it stood, before the supplies for the 
sanatorium could even reach the construction site, a twenty-three-kilometer highway would have 
to be laid through the mountainous terrain of Las Villas province, a difficult task in and of itself. 
The second recommendation would ensure the sanatorium’s “efficient and economic service,” 
based on “what was advised in the whole world by specialists.”504 Using the standards of the 
American National Tuberculosis Association (which quantified factors such as accessibility, ease 
of construction, the psychological value of scenery, and protection from the north wind), the 
College of Architects gave the existing sanatorium plan a 40% acceptance mark and cautioned 
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that a new site with a value above 75% should be found in order to avoid future complications 
and criticism.505 The CNT Board, however, denied the College’s request to modify the 
stipulations of the sanatorium design.506 
 Even those professionals who were insiders at the CNT and formally represented in the 
sub-committee that was tasked with evaluating the technical bases of projects found their voices 
marginalized when they expressed worries or doubts about the specifications of the sanatorium. 
Within the first year of the CNT’s existence, Juan J. Castillo had been drafted into the CNT’s 
Technical-Administrative Board as the lead technical advisor (and one of three medical experts 
responsible for advising the Board of Governors).507 When he was called upon to enumerate the 
advantages and disadvantages of the Topes de Collantes project, he emphasized its high cost, the 
necessity of a new highway, the engineering difficulty of leveling the peak to pour the 
foundation, and its distance from population centers. These factors did not seem to sway Batista 
or his appointees on the CNT board, who disregarded the advice of their own lead expert. 
Castillo recalled that despite his counsel, the CNT proceeded to build the sanatorium, arguing 
that the law that founded the CNT also required that a sanatorium be built in Trinidad.  
 Castillo, who had risen to be an integral player in Batista’s anti-tuberculosis campaign, 
was then given “the honor of drafting the medical bases of the sanatorium.”508 Only a few 
months earlier, when he outlined his plan for national tuberculosis policy to the Secretary of 
Sanitation, Castillo explicitly rejected the appropriateness of large sanatoriums for the country. 
Considering Cuba’s scant financial resources and the danger posed to society by the large 
number of contagious poor who were not hospitalized, Castillo believed that even small 
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provincial sanatoriums would be too costly and take too long to inaugurate, so he recommended 
specialized tuberculosis wings within existing hospitals.509 In 1936, however, he abruptly 
changed his position on large sanatoriums from less than a year earlier and published an article in 
the medical press that extolled the “fundamental medical bases” of the new sanatorium. He 
focused exclusively on the climatic justifications of the sanatorium, which were not disputed by 
medical professionals, without mentioning the drawbacks of its location and size.510  
One of the other physicians on the technical board, Dr. Joaquin Martos, also published his 
praise of the project, declaring it to be a “technical work.”511 Two months prior to his 
appointment to the board, he had been named as director of La Esperanza Sanatorium, replacing 
a politically ostracized administrator. Dr. Oscar Jaime, the university representative on the CNT 
and the third member of the technical committee, also did not criticize the plan, even though a 
year earlier he had told members of the Anti-Tuberculosis League that “[s]cience and charity do 
not need palaces nor expensive equipment.”512 All of these professionals held positions within 
the CNT bureaucracy in a period when physicians were politically repressed and experienced 
difficulty in securing jobs, and they probably had little freedom to express a dissenting view 
without professional repercussions. 
That the CNT Board of Governors heeded none of the technocrats’ advice illustrates the 
top-down, inflexible nature of the campaign, which was undergirded by political imperatives 
over scientific tenets. While the technocrats were attuned to the consensus about “best practices” 
in their international communities of expertise, national and local politics followed another logic. 
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Batista was hoping to gain political capital through the CNT’s endeavors, and nowhere was that 
more clear than in this hospital project: a monumental facility that served the masses, among 
which there existed strong demand for beds and a cure.  
The CNT designed the sanatorium to inspire awe. The sanatorium was grandiose in its 
conceptualization and promised to be breathtaking in its implementation: constructed at a height 
of 800 meters above sea level, the structure was set to have eight floors and a basement. Each 
floor was to have a dining area, an artificial pneumothorax room, and dormitories. The 
sanatorium would boast a modern operating room; departments for dentistry, cardiology, and 
gastroenterology; offices for administration, management, and accounting; a complex heating 
system; a solarium on the roof; an X-ray department; and a library.513  
Political imperatives also influenced the region chosen for the sanatorium, for Batista 
picked a site that was popularly regarded as therapeutic for those suffering tuberculosis. As early 
as the 1890s, a renowned Cuban tuberculosis physician, applying global medical science that 
extolled the high-altitude cure, recommended the construction of a sanatorium in the Topes de 
Collantes region.514 While doctors had come to believe by the 1930s that each climate type 
benefitted different types of tuberculosis, popular knowledge continued to insist that a high-
altitude climate (which Topes de Collantes could provide) was unparalleled in its effectiveness in 
curing all forms of the disease.515 Tellingly, Cuban companies often tried to sell tuberculosis 
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tonics by using pictures of sanatoriums in the snowy Alps.516 Erecting the sanatorium in a 
popularly esteemed location would secure public approval. Indeed, while doctors and architects 
criticized the project, it was initially well received in the press, as journalists detailed the curative 
properties of the mountain climate.517 While nothing had been done in past years to exploit the 
region’s climatic advantages, one reporter rejoiced that due to the “praiseworthy initiative of 
Colonel Batista,” the government was finally doing so for the good of the Cuban nation.518 The 
CNT’s Director testified, “The construction of a tuberculosis sanatorium in Trinidad was always 
a national desire.”519  
The CNT heavily publicized the selection of the particular site for the sanatorium, and it 
served as a performance of Batista’s centrality to the project. In 1937, followed by a retinue of 
military men and his medical advisors, Batista trekked through the mountains on horseback to 
personally choose the land on which the hospital would be erected (see Figure 9). Photographs 
were taken of the journey and distributed to the press, along with stories of sensationalized 
danger and divine intervention as Batista pointed to the mountain peak upon which the 
sanatorium would be built.520 
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Figure 9. Batista (left) on horseback with his retinue of military and medical men, crossing a river in the 
Escambray Mountains, on their 1937 journey to select a site for Topes de Collantes Sanatorium.521 
 
The CNT also advertised the sanatorium’s progress, recognizing its value as propaganda. 
One military publication included articles on Topes de Collantes in almost every monthly 
issue.522 Images, stories, and poems emphasized Batista’s beneficence in providing medical 
interventions for many Cubans sick with the disease. Batista declared that this project was going 
to bring the “procedures of modern medical science” to the Cuban people, in a hospital that 
could rival the “most notable sanatoriums in Europe.”523 One pamphlet from Batista’s 
presidential campaign even went as far as to say that the hospital offered a “guarantee for the 
cure of tuberculosis.”524 Part and parcel of Batista’s plan to use the military to construct a new 
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Cuba, the sanatorium being built in the “rugged mountains” represented an effort “to locate 
civilization among the virgin countryside.”525   
Discussions about the sanatorium often became a forum for political contention. Topes de 
Collantes featured centrally in Batista’s 1940 bid for the presidency.526 When his opponent, 
Ramón Grau San Martín, accused Batista of building schools and hospitals for personal 
enrichment on the campaign trail, Batista retorted that Grau, who allegedly suffered from 
tuberculosis, travelled to Saranac, New York, for medical treatment. Batista maligned Grau’s 
action—seeking treatment in a foreign “millionaire’s clinic”—as an option only available to a 
select few.527 One journalist defended Batista’s hospital program, sardonically reporting that it 
seemed that “Dr. Grau believes that he [Batista] should have made tents for tuberculars” 
instead.528 
In spite of warnings from bureaucratic insiders and outsiders, construction of the 
monumental structure—one journalist baptized it “the skyscraper of health”—proceeded when 
Batista symbolically laid the first brick on November 14, 1937.529 The CNT estimated that 
construction would last less than three years and that the sanatorium could be inaugurated in 
September 1940, with an approximate budget of one and a half million pesos.530 However, 
despite Batista’s support, the hospital’s construction moved sluggishly and easily passed the 
inauguration deadline. Foreign correspondents reported as early as 1939 that a “[l]ack of money 
has bogged down Batista’s three-year plan.” Only with “grim determination” was Batista 
“driving” the two projects most precious to him: rural education and the anti-tuberculosis 
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campaign, specifically, the “huge ultra-modern plant in the Trinidad mountains.”531 Wartime 
economic contraction, which affected the movement and cost of construction materials in the 
western hemisphere, slowed the hospital’s progress.532 Undoubtedly, this situation was made 
more difficult by the inaccessibility of the construction site in Cuba. Although historical evidence 
concerning the sanatorium in the early 1940s is sparse, it seems that the very factors that medical 
professionals predicted would cause construction difficulties and increase financial outlays did 
complicate the project’s progress. 
 Determining the status of the project in 1944, when a new presidential administration 
came to power, remains difficult, but photographic evidence and published reports point to the 
project being nearer to completion than the incoming administration tried to argue. According to 
Batista, the building was almost ready for inauguration in 1944, with even the “kitchen utensils” 
in place.533 Batista was possibly exaggerating the hospitals’ readiness, for his own CNT director 
reported in 1944 that 1,650,000 pesos had already been spent and that expenditures would reach 
three million pesos by the time the hospital was equipped and furnished.534 Photographs of the 
exterior of the sanatorium show a structure close to completion, so perhaps only the internal 
appliances and medical apparatuses had not yet been purchased (see Figure 10). Batista futilely 
rushed to finish the sanatorium in the month preceding Ramón Grau San Martín’s 
inauguration.535 Nonetheless, seven years after the first stone was laid on the facility and as a 
new ruling party came to power, the future of the Topes de Collantes Sanatorium remained far 
from certain. 
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Figure 10. By the early to mid-1940s, the exterior of the Topes de Collantes Sanatorium was close to 
completion.536 
 
5.2 ABANDONMENT OF THE PROJECT 
During the new administration’s first months, Grau appointed Dr. Bartolomé Selva León as CNT 
Director and reoriented the national anti-tuberculosis campaign. The CNT announced it would 
build more dispensaries in smaller cities, and in lieu of “luxury” sanatoriums, it promised a 
small, simple tuberculosis sanatorium to every province. By the end of 1945, the CNT governing 
board had decided to stop construction on Topes de Collantes and was attempting to interest 
private companies in its purchase.537  
The newly formulated strategy—more dispensaries and smaller provincial sanatoriums—
had been the approach originally advocated by medical and technical advisers less than a decade 
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before. Furthermore, many international and national experts continued to recommend that 
countries should build sanatoriums according to their national economic resources. Writing for a 
Cuban audience and drawing upon his experience with the large Santa María sanatorium in his 
own country, one highly respected Argentinian tuberculosis specialist summarized, “It is an error, 
then, in countries such as ours, in which there is not one-tenth of the beds for tuberculosis 
patients that would be necessary, to constantly demand…more expensive sanatoriums in the 
mountains.”538 This expert and others argued that financial considerations were more important 
than the therapeutic value of certain climates.  
Despite the new strategy’s congruence with international standards, political objectives 
primarily influenced President Grau and Selva León’s decision to not finish the national 
sanatorium. The hospital was, after all, and without question, a Batista project, and Grau had 
been involved in bitter political battles with Batista since the early 1930s. The structure of the 
CNT, highly dependent on presidential approval and appointment, continued to allow the 
executive to exercise considerable influence over tuberculosis policy and to disregard public 
health advice. Medical professionals hired by the new administration who had expressed certain 
views under the Batista regime now changed their opinion to fall in line with the national 
executive’s strategy. Most strikingly, Selva León had once supported the Topes de Collantes 
project based on its climatological properties, exuberantly proclaiming that the sanatorium 
promised to be “one of the best in the Americas.”539 However, after Grau appointed Selva León 
as CNT Director, his support for the national sanatorium put him into conflict with other pro-
                                                 
538 Gumersindo Sayago quoted in Gregorio Aráoz Alfaro, “El clima de las montañas está lejos de ser indispensable,” 
Boletín de lucha antituberculosa 1, no. 2 (July–August 1945): 9.   
539 Antonio Penichet, “Cuba es una fábrica de tuberculosis,” Bohemia 37, no. 26 (July 1, 1945): 50.  
 157 
Grau physicians.540 In the end, the pro-Grau faction overrode Selva León, claiming that the high 
altitude cure was not paramount and that with the amount of money it would take to finish the 
sanatorium, five other provincial sanatoriums could be constructed.541  
Divergent financial estimates across administrations also point to the influence of politics 
in the evaluation of health projects. While the previous administration had published much 
smaller figures, Selva León argued that an extraordinary 4.5 million pesos had already gone into 
the project (in comparison to Despaigne’s 1.5 million estimate), and 2 million more would need 
to be expended before its opening.542 According to Selva León, the sanatorium’s price per bed 
had reached an “excessive amount of $4,000”; in no other country had the “cost of 
construction…reached this amount per bed.”543 
The Grau administration finished other tuberculosis projects begun under Batista that had 
not been as heavily publicized and were not as closely associated with his rule. For instance, 
within a year of taking office, Grau’s administration approved another 500,000-peso credit to 
complete the Ambrosio Grillo Sanatorium, a facility on the eastern side of the island. Batista had 
initiated its construction, but the facility was not as tightly linked to his name in the national 
imaginary.  
In response to the news that construction on the Topes de Collantes project had stalled, 
the national sanatorium exploded as a topic of contention in the popular press. Many journalists 
and physicians were in double outrage—first, over what was considered initial poor planning, 
and second, over the possibility that the sanatorium would not be opened after so much money 
had already been spent. General consensus held that although a different location should have 
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been chosen originally, it was a larger crime to back away from the project after years of 
construction. “There is no government that thinks of the poor,” one journalist bemoaned, when 
he reported that the “palace” of Topes de Collantes had been abandoned “to its skeleton of steel, 
as if the money of the people could be thrown out.”544 The University of Havana’s Associate 
Professor of Tuberculosis commented that the “moment of debate over Topes de Collantes has 
already passed,” and the goal should be to open it as soon as possible.545 Even one of the most 
vocal opponents of the projects, Gustavo Aldereguía, stated plainly that the sanatorium “is there, 
in front of us, and also in front of us is this bloody reality: Cuba needs 4,000 beds for attending 
to its tubercular sick, and [they] demand urgent attention…It must be opened, then.”546  
The press closely covered the controversy over whether the Grau administration would 
finish the project. The writers of Noticias de Hoy disagreed with the CNT’s claims that there 
were not enough funds to finish the project. One editor had visited the facility three months 
earlier, alleging that it lacked only the “final touches.”547 They had hoped it would open in only a 
few weeks. The paper also reported that a socialist legislator had presented a bill to the Congress 
to demand that the government finish Topes de Collantes. He told his readers that based on 
Grau’s extensive public works plan, it was doubtful that lack of money was the problem.548 
Perhaps in response to popular pressure, the Health Minister told Noticias de Hoy in mid-1945 
that the government would finish the sanatorium project, and it would be dedicated to 
tuberculosis treatment.549 While this may have quelled public outrage for a few months, by the 
end of 1945, the administration had made a final decision. The CNT would not complete the 
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Topes de Collantes Sanatorium and would instead try to sell it and use the funds for other 
provincial sanatoriums.  
In the midst of public alarm over the termination of the sanatorium’s construction, Grau’s 
CNT quickly opened new institutions to show their dedication to the disease: thirteen 
dispensaries were opened by the end of 1946, bringing the island’s total to twenty-three; the 400-
bed sanatorium, Ambrosio Grillo, was promptly finished and functioning by 1945; and 
construction was commenced on a small provincial sanatorium, Pilar San Martín, on the western 
side of the island. Nonetheless, the projects initiated and put into operation by the CNT in this 
period paled in comparison to the promise that had been made to build five provincial 
sanatoriums.550 While the Ambrosio Grillo sanatorium adhered to medical and technical 
requirements, Pilar San Martín’s seventy beds fell short of the recommended bed-per-sanatorium 
minimum that Cuban physicians had espoused. More disappointingly, no new sanatoriums were 
built in the three remaining provinces. Grau’s successor, Carlos Prío Socarrás (1948–1952) (who 
was less attentive to tuberculosis than his predecessors were) continued to ignore the Topes de 
Collantes Sanatorium. The project receded from public attention, abandoned in the isolated hills 
of central Cuba.   
5.3 THE GENERAL BATISTA SANATORIUM 
In 1952, in anticipation of elections he was expected to lose, Fulgencio Batista orchestrated a 
military coup. As in the late 1930s, he rhetorically deployed tuberculosis to emphasize past 
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government failures and to offer promises of material improvement to the Cuban people under 
his rule. In 1951, Batista reflected bitterly on the state of Cuban affairs.  
From all the Nation we frequently receive letters from men and women who live over in 
the mountains or in the valleys, parents and children who long for and hope for the 
continuation of the work that official autenticismo paralyzed or destroyed. Misery, 
tuberculosis, parasitism, and ignorance have returned to a gallop, like hellish apocalyptic 
horsemen.551  
 
One of Batista’s first actions once he returned to power was to recommence the Topes de 
Collantes Sanatorium project. The press covered the visits of the Minister of Public Works and 
the Minister of Health to the facility. They reported that the sanatorium had been greatly 
neglected, with its steel structure damaged and much of its equipment stolen, but the government 
would soon begin work.552 The CNT promised to complete it “at an accelerated rhythm that will 
allow us to properly deal with the sick of the interior.”553  
In light of changing medical practices, the decision to devote significant funding to a 
high-altitude sanatorium seems incongruous. Due to the discovery and distribution of antibiotics 
in the 1940s, mortality rates began to fall throughout the world, including in Havana.554 
Renowned tuberculosis specialists, such as those in the United States, believed that streptomycin 
and the handful of other effective antibiotics promised to fundamentally alter how they treated 
tuberculosis, for it made possible effective outpatient therapy in lieu of long and costly stays in 
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closed institutions.555  As sanatoriums throughout the world began to close, such as the famous 
Trudeau sanatorium in New York, Batista and the CNT chose to resurrect the project instead of 
initiating an antibiotic distribution campaign.556 Cuban physicians, drawing on local notions of 
success in controlling tuberculosis, supported Batista’s decision; however, Batista’s political 
objectives were the most important rationale for reviving the project.557   
In contrast to the medical community’s consensus in past decades, in the early 1950s 
Cuban physicians roundly endorsed the opening of Topes de Collantes Sanatorium.558 Even 
though they knew that the mortality rate was falling, they argued that the state’s provision of 
adequate beds remained the most important measure of success in the tuberculosis campaign. 
They continued to envision a metastasizing seedbed of contagion on the island, even after the 
arrival and distribution of antibiotic therapy.559 When Bohemia interviewed a number of 
tuberculosis specialists in 1953, asking if “Topes de Collantes will serve to cure tuberculosis,” all 
fully supported the completion of the project (even though some of them had opposed the project 
in the late 1930s). They insisted that the country found itself in a precarious situation, with a bed 
shortage that previous administrations had not resolved. Alfredo Antonetti, a past critic of the 
project and the Chair in Tuberculosis at the University of Havana, estimated that 6,000 beds 
were needed, and only 2,000 were available: the completion of the sanatorium would raise the 
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count to 3,000 beds.560 Dr. Reinaldo Gómez Ortega argued that “a sufficient number of beds” 
represented “the vital issue” of any tuberculosis campaign, and therefore, Topes de Collantes 
should be opened as soon as possible.561 The physicians used the language of “scarcity of beds” 
and opined that the sanatorium would save 6,000 lives in six years alone.562 One doctor 
contended that there were 4,500 Cubans who could not be cured by surgery or antibiotics and 
instead needed the climate cure; several others emphasized that the sanatorium would be a site 
where new and old therapies (e.g., streptomycin and the climate cure) could co-exist.563 
Batista’s primary objective in reviving the Topes de Collantes Sanatorium project, 
however, was political. As part of his strategy to rule once again as a populist, he needed to 
legitimize his coup and build support for his openly illegal administration. The popular classes 
still demanded adequate beds. Throughout the early 1950s, requests for admission to a 
sanatorium came from all parts of the island. Guido García Inclán’s column in Bohemia provides 
a valuable window into the desperation for admittance to a hospital. Many of these requests and 
complaints centered on tuberculosis, and they did not diminish despite the reported drop in 
tuberculosis mortality. When one of García Inclán’s letter writers passed away “without any 
governmental help,” the journalist claimed the death represented “another painful and 
dreadful…charge” against the government.564  
With his eye on these constituencies, Batista (and the CNT) publicized the project as his 
gift to the Cuban people. Pro-Batista literature declared that the sanatorium was located in a “true 
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paradise” and was the “white elephant” of the Grau administration.565 In a book detailing the 
achievements of Batista’s rule, one of its seven chapters was devoted entirely to the Topes de 
Collantes Sanatorium.566 Both the press and CNT officials increasingly referred to the facility as 
the General Batista Anti-Tuberculosis Sanatorium.567 In the grand atrium of the sanatorium, 
carved in large letters on one of the walls, was the statement, “The ‘General Batista’ Sanatorium 
is and will be a beacon of hope for the sick.”568 Batista’s name was now explicitly linked to the 
sanatorium, a strategy undoubtedly utilized because the project still represented fertile ground for 
building legitimacy. 
Batista attempted to create a popular base of support as he had done in the late 1930s; 
however, politics in Cuba had shifted fundamentally by the 1950s. The governmental attack on 
unions had begun in the late 1940s in an international context of anticommunism. When Batista 
staged his coup d’état, which was not backed by popular mobilization, he deepened the process 
of emptying out the “populist compact.”569 In response, he increasingly relied on violence and 
bribes to garner support, and the decision to resume construction on the sanatorium must be 
placed in this broader political context. Batista used public works programs to deal with 
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unemployment, build legitimacy and handle money.570 One scholar notes that during the 1950s, 
only 50% of public works expenditures (which exceeded one billion pesos) covered the actual 
costs of the projects; the other half went to “commissions and profit margins.”571 The sanatorium 
was no doubt a project from which state officials and many of their supporters were making a 
large profit. 
In the late 1930s, the sanatorium project created a debate about the medical and technical 
bases of the project; in the mid-1950s, the controversy surrounding Topes de Collantes revolved 
instead around government incompetence and corruption. Although Batista hoped to use the 
national sanatorium to gain legitimacy, the project fell victim to the politics of embezzlement. 
The press reported on how corruption had tainted the government’s management of the 
sanatorium, with political cronies benefitting from the funds dedicated to the project. In the 
1950s, the protest song “Ya Tenemos Hospital” (“Now We Have a Hospital”) used the symbol of 
Topes de Collantes to criticize the Batista regime for its “rampant corruption…and apparent 
disinterest.”572 In 1953, Batista made the Sanatorium’s administration autonomous from the 
CNT. The regime claimed that it had created the “Autonomous Jurisdiction of Topes de 
Collantes” so that the project could run more efficiently.573 Others believed that this was a ruse 
of “rubbish and figures,” used to facilitate corruption.574 
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Another journalist, writing for Bohemia in 1954, claimed that 8,000,000 pesos had been 
spent on the sanatorium, an extraordinary sum in comparison with the smaller figures from the 
mid-1940s.575 Even though his article dealt with the sanatorium specifically, the journalist then 
referenced the anti-tuberculosis stamp campaign in the early 1940s in which funds were 
allegedly not put towards their intended target (the construction of the children’s tuberculosis 
hospital). What promise was there now, he queried, that funds would be funneled to the national 
sanatorium? One pro-Batista figure, Dr. Montoro, defended Batista and the sanatorium project 
(based on its climatological properties) in the conservative press, to which another journalist 
sardonically replied, “Is it possible that Dr. Montoro has not understood that the political-social 
problem of Cuba is, first of all, a problem of faith and confidence in the government 
authorities?”576  
Despite these scandals, construction proceeded on the project, and its grand opening took 
place amidst fanfare and pomp. On May 9, 1954, almost seventeen years after the first brick had 
been laid, Batista inaugurated the sanatorium (see Figure 11). Prior to his departure to Las Villas, 
he told the press, “Topes de Collantes is the culmination of one of the greatest desires that I have 
nurtured for years.”577 Over 1,500 individuals traveled to the province for a banquet to celebrate 
the hospital. The public inauguration ceremony was attended by national, provincial, and 
municipal officials; clergy; leaders of industry, business, and the arts; and representatives of 
labor unions. In a lengthy speech, Batista recounted his personal experience with tuberculosis in 
his own family, his arduous journey to create the sanatorium, and the obstacles faced along the 
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way, which in his estimation were posed primarily by his political adversaries. It was a paragon 
of political theater, although Batista denied claims of politicking by arguing that Topes de 
Collantes Sanatorium “was not—it is not!—a Sanatorium for Batista, a work for Batista, but 
instead for the poor sick ones and for Cuba.”578 He was met with sustained applause. 
 
Figure 11. Topes de Collantes Sanatorium, 1954.579 
 
The press closely covered the event, and many wrote positively about the facility (see 
Figure 12).580 One journalist dubbed it a “temple of health” and asserted that, like the pyramids 
of Egypt, it would have “immortality sown into its walls.”581 Another claimed that the 
sanatorium would redeem the island’s sanitary reputation. “Topes de Collantes should be a 
symbol,” penned one editor, “of hospital and welfare service.” It promised to elevate Cuba’s 
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reputation “to the highest [level] of scientific…efficiency.”582 Architects wrote that the hospital 
constituted a “model in its class to the world.”583 Past problems with the project were blamed on 
the Auténtico administrations, which “wanted no medical monument to Batista, no matter how 
much it might help the sick and the poor.”584 
 
Figure 12. Batista, “the man who had the will to conceive and execute it,” stands in front of “the pride of 
Cuba and of America.”585 
 
Shortly after these exuberant celebrations, problems with the project surfaced again. The 
inauguration ceremony had been orchestrated to coincide with several important dates on the 
political calendar. Most significantly, 1954 was an election year for Batista. The ceremony took 
place on the national “Day of the Hospitals,” but in reality, the sanatorium was not opened until 
six months later in November 1954, and journalists critical of Batista fumed about this deception 
and delay. Furthermore, instead of the promised 1,000 beds, the CNT made available only 400–
600.586 Reports indicate that many of the remaining beds were necessary for housing medical 
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personnel, who were not from Las Villas province; professionals had warned the CNT about this 
complication in the late 1930s.587  
The Topes de Collantes Sanatorium, then, fell short of the quantity of beds promised, a 
highly-politicized metric in the 1950s (as discussed in Chapter 3). In September 1956, Guido 
García Inclán wrote of the young Manuel Mayo, who had been seeking entry into a sanatorium 
for four years. García Inclán lambasted the government: 
One hears talk of new drugs….of the majestic Topes de Collantes….All that is heard and 
read, but he [Manuel] has to wait for death, in his hovel, without further consequence! 
How sad is all this, Cubans. In other nations of the Universe, when one is attacked by a 
sickness of such contagion but now of possible cure, it is pursued and isolated in a 
charitable center. Here in the fatherland of Martí, it is necessary to beg humbly for it, to 
pray for it, to request it, and to PUBLISH IT, to see if someone will pity the sick and 
achieve entry into a sanatorium for them.588 
 
As physicians and citizens reflected on the history of the sanatorium project and the broader bed 
shortage, they increasingly expressed the view that their state health care sector was 
fundamentally flawed. Governmental administrations had failed to accomplish certain medical 
goals, and the roots of these failures were interpreted as political ills ailing the nation. This had 
political consequences, contributing to the decline of Batista’s legitimacy in the 1950s and the 
advent of revolution. 
5.4 REVOLUTION AND REDEMPTION 
The new regime in 1959 was immediately concerned with the Topes de Collantes Sanatorium. 
Less than two weeks after taking power, they passed a decree to rename the facility after a fallen 
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guerrilla leader, Comandante Enrique Villegas. In 1961, Gustavo Aldereguía exclaimed, 
“Already Topes—the General Batista Sanatorium A.M.D.G. (a la mayor gloria del general) [to 
the greater glory of the general]—is closed forever…in hopes that Fidel will assign it another 
function.”589 In 1964, Castro announced that the sanatorium would become a teacher training 
school. Such a move was political gold: he took a project that had upset different constituencies, 
for different reasons, and repurposed it to address educational deficiencies. Like public health, 
education and educational services were deeply politicized in the 1950s and used by the 
revolutionary government for legitimation in the 1960s. When discussing the change, one 
journalist wrote that although the hospital had been a form of “criminal business,” the revolution 
had put an end to all that: “Immediately, the hospital underwent a radical change…Simply, it has 
been converted into a school, in which 4000 youth, funded by the Revolutionary Government, 
will be trained as teachers, prepared to serve the Country….”590  
Throughout the early 1960s, the Sanatorium continued to serve as a space for political 
contention. Insiders of the new regime and anti-Batista factions wrote about the hospital 
frequently. The Cuban press lambasted the sanatorium. One popular magazine recounted, 
“Trinidad counts among its greatest attractions the most beautiful panoramic highway of Cuba, a 
rugged passage that winds through the mountains…until reaching the top of Topes de Collantes 
above the clouds, crowned by the Sanatorium, an immense pile of concrete that alters the 
magnificence of the changing landscape.”  It was a “kind of a criollo Escorial, which a vain 
tyranny raised with the intention of perpetuating its hated name.”591  
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Batista and his supporters vociferously defended his health projects and especially the 
sanatorium. The U.S. State Department’s 1961 White Paper on Cuba cited Batista’s 
“indifference” to “medical care” and other social issues as “an open invitation to revolution.”592 
In response, pro-Batista elements summoned the image of Topes de Collantes Sanatorium as 
concrete proof that he had not been unconcerned with health matters. The sanatorium, for these 
actors, represented modernity and scientific achievement for the Cuban people, and a source of 
national pride on the international stage. One pro-Batista magazine published a bevy of 
accomplishments of Batista’s dictatorship in 1958 as his regime crumbled. The Topes de 
Collantes Sanatorium featured centrally, its photograph occupying a two-page spread. The author 
wrote: 
The hospital is, without a doubt, a source of pride for the whole hemisphere. It was 
constructed with the most modern methods and equipped with the best facilities available 
to treat respiratory disease. In addition to its unexcelled construction and equipment, the 
hospital is also endowed with a highly unusual and extremely beneficial natural location 
that in itself is of considerable aid to its numerous patients. In effect, Topes de Collantes 
is a dream that has become a reality. It is a medical center that is helping Cubans fight 
tuberculosis with all the care and aid that modern science and nature can provide.593 
 
 In 1972, one group argued, “Batista propelled education, communications, [and] public 
health. The sanatorium in Topes de Collantes, constructed by Batista in an adequate place for the 
treatment of tuberculosis, was in its time the most modern and advanced tuberculosis sanatorium 
in America.”594 Another newspaper, in 1963, featured a picture of the hospital, calling it a 
“stupendous work of the enormous labor of the Government of President Batista,” even stating 
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that it “overcame the terrible illness of the white plague.”595 As late as 1996, a radio station in 
Miami hosted a program about Batista’s rule and called Topes de Collantes Sanatorium the 
“number one” of its kind “in the world,” deeming it “the miracle on the mountain.”596  
The sanatorium was used to contrast Batista’s rule with that of Fidel Castro. In 1963, one 
exile group claimed that tuberculosis was once again a threat in Cuba, “thanks to the other 
PLAGUE…of the Castrocidades.”597 Conversely, many decades later, Batista’s son Rubén 
claimed that Topes de Collantes was “before a model hospital for the poor, and today is utilized 
[as a hotel] for the rich foreigners who pay in dollars.”598 
From the late 1950s on, Batista obsessively published statistics and compiled the 
accomplishments of his administrations. Batista argued that his hospital projects “offered silent, 
but conclusive, testimony to the interest which I shared with my associates in the health of 
Cubans in general and in medical assistance to the needy, the aged, the children, the disabled and 
the underprivileged in particular.”599 Of the Topes de Collantes Sanatorium and the Children’s 
Anti-Tuberculosis Hospital, Batista wrote, “These hospitals and the other facilities….gave the 
National Council for Tuberculosis the tools it needed. They represented an effort to eradicate 
tuberculosis unprecedented in Latin America.”600 Batista looked back on his reign much 
differently than his detractors and selected the Civic-Military Institute, the Civic-Military 
Schools, and the Topes de Collantes Sanatorium as his most essential and important works.601 
When Batista passed away in 1973, textual descriptions and visual representations of the 
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sanatorium were pervasive, with poems dedicated to the facility appearing in his funereal 
literature. One piece of poetry proclaimed, “[T]here are a thousand important works/campesinos 
and students/they are grateful to you/like the sick secluded at Topes de Collantes.”602 Images of 
the sanatorium and of Batista in Las Villas were published as well (see Figure 13). 
 
Figure 13. An exile bulletin from 1978 featured a painting of Batista choosing the site for Topes de Collantes 
Sanatorium.603 
 
Batista and his supporters failed to grasp the resentment associated with the sanatorium. 
By focusing on the modernity of the sanatorium as the exemplar for public health achievement in 
republican Cuba, they overlooked two key processes. First, the emphasis on the sanatorium’s 
grandiosity and modernity ignored the medically- and popularly-formulated conceptions of 
“success,” namely the provision of an adequate number of beds. In March 1954, when El Crisol 
printed an anniversary edition of Batista’s regime, the subtitle of the page devoted to public 
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health announced, “A bed for every tubercular and every tubercular in his bed.”604 The state had 
not made this a reality. Batista envisioned the sanatorium as a gift to the Cuban people, but over 
the years, citizens had come to expect access to hospital care as one of their rights, and Batista’s 
regime (and all republican administrations) had fallen far short of this goal. 
Second, although Batista conceded that the sanatorium had had a “dramatic history,” he 
seemed blind to the fact that this drama might represent a tragedy to the people. This had been 
caused by the detrimental interference of crude political calculations in health policy: republican 
administrations had disregarded medical advice, which had hindered construction and delayed 
the sanatorium’s opening.605 While Batista had made claims about the beneficence, modernity, 
and therapeutic effectiveness of the Topes de Collantes project, medical professionals and 
citizens evaluated the performance of the government in providing something that they had been 
promised—a sufficient number of beds in state facilities. 
Fidel Castro’s use of the sanatorium is also telling. The new government was quick to 
publicly emphasize the sanatorium’s scientific inadequacy and its history of corruption. The 
ultimate goal, however, seems to have been to erase it from historical memory. By the mid-
1960s, once the facility was repurposed, references to the sanatorium in the censored press 
disappeared. In 1969, for example, one article noted that Topes de Collantes [it is unclear if the 
article was referencing the location or the building] had been transformed and was now a site of 
a magnificent teacher-training program.606 The text did not mention from what it had been 
converted. Of course, most people would have known of the sanatorium, but it is an interesting 
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discursive shift from the vitriolic invocation of the sanatorium in documents in the first years of 
the revolutionary government. It is possible that in order for the socialist regime to continue its 
narrative that virtually no health care had existed in rural areas before 1959, the Topes de 
Collantes Sanatorium, a visible sign of health intervention, no matter how problematic, needed to 
be forgotten or downplayed.607  
5.5 CONCLUSION 
The history of the Topes de Collantes Sanatorium illustrates the contradictions of health policy in 
populist Cuba. Compared to many other nations in the interwar period, the Cuban state 
prioritized a disease of the marginalized masses and devoted considerable resources to its cure. 
However, these efforts, such as the Topes de Collantes project, were mediated, marred, and 
erratically executed due to the political objectives and needs of succeeding administrations. 
The project was, from its origins, crafted to support Batista’s political ambitions. Then 
the Grau administration abandoned the project, even though construction was nearly finished. 
This served Grau’s own political agenda, as he did not want to complete a public health project 
that would be credited to his political opponent. However, this made the project more expensive 
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than it should have been, heightening the frustration of Cubans, who increasingly perceived their 
public health sector as inadequate and inefficient. By the time the sanatorium was finally 
inaugurated, then, it was already considered a failure in many Cubans’ eyes. The decision to 
follow political objectives rather than technical advice in the conceptualization of the project also 
meant that the sanatorium fell short on the quantity of promised beds, the one metric that many 
physicians and citizens considered the definition of “success” for the facility.  
By 1959, to some observers, the sanatorium represented an achievement of the state, with 
modern architecture, a conquering of the physical landscape, and the provision of medical care 
for hundreds of Cubans who received surgical interventions, antibiotic therapy and the rest cure. 
For others, however, the sanatorium symbolized the role of graft, the politicization of health 
projects, and inefficiency in health management.  
Sick Cubans, tuberculosis specialists, and politicians had long been concerned with 
making the sanatorium cure more accessible. However, by the late 1940s, another cure had 
materialized with the discovery of streptomycin, an antibiotic that ignited the hope of those 
dying from the disease. The next chapter takes us inside the walls of Cuba’s sanatoriums, 
pharmacies, and homes, as the poor endeavored to get their hands on the precious substance and 
demanded new rights in the process.  
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6.0  “NO OTHER REMEDY”: STREPTOMYCIN AND THE POLITICAL ILLS OF 
THE CNT, 1945–1952 
In 1943, as construction workers toiled away on Batista’s “temple[s] of health,” hundreds of 
miles away a researcher witnessed something under his microscope that would make sanatoriums 
obsolete within several decades.608 At the Department of Soil Microbiology of the Rutgers 
University Agricultural Experimental Station, Albert Schatz, a graduate student under the 
direction of Dr. Selman Waksman, isolated an active strain of the bacteria Streptomyces griseus, 
which produced an antibiotic named streptomycin.609 Waksman’s team knew that they were on 
the verge of something momentous: most significantly, streptomycin mounted a formidable 
assault against the tuberculosis bacillus in in vitro tests, and human trials would soon prove that 
the antibiotic did so without fatally toxic effects in its host.610  
Many presumed that an uncomplicated scientific conquest of the disease would soon 
follow the breakthrough in the laboratory, and the press published optimistic declarations 
throughout the 1940s.611 Waksman graced the cover of TIME Magazine for his contribution; the 
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New York Times claimed that “the preliminary performances, in tests with laboratory animals, 
are almost sensational” and that “we may be standing on the threshold of one of science’s 
greatest achievements”; and, in the fall of 1947, the WHO reported that “it will be possible to 
bring tuberculosis under international control within a reasonable period of time.”612 Indeed, the 
discovery, manufacture, and distribution of streptomycin forever altered the history of 
tuberculosis on a global scale, but it did so unevenly, for the advent of a new disease technology 
has rarely meant easy and equitable access to it across political and social borders.613  
During the 1940s, streptomycin production remained exclusively in the United States. 
Consumption remained there, too, until 1946, when pharmaceutical companies had sufficiently 
increased output, and the U.S. Streptomycin Control Board set quotas and exported the precious 
substance for sale in foreign countries. Cubans became aware of streptomycin very early on due 
to the country’s proximity to the United States, the shared networks of American and Cuban 
medical practitioners, and a well-developed Cuban media, with a high national readership. As 
knowledge of the drug spread in Cuba, so too did demand for streptomycin.  
Cubans first had to contend with material scarcity of the drug. As that problem was 
solved, however, they confronted a new issue: the price of a full streptomycin treatment 
remained beyond the reach of many poor Cubans, the very population that was 
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disproportionately afflicted by the “Koch bacillus.” Frustrated by their difficulties in accessing 
the expensive drug, the sick, physicians, and activists began to articulate the right of the poor to 
free or state-subsidized medicine. Demanding that the Health Ministry and the CNT guarantee a 
free and regular supply of the antibiotic to its poor constituents meant that questions of access to 
the drug became enmeshed in debates about public health performance, and streptomycin 
became politicized as an issue of national importance. As state institutions attempted to deliver 
streptomycin to patients, distribution fell victim to the politics of the Cuban state, evidenced by 
irregular payments, the need for patronage connections to gain access to the drug, and 
government officials’ (illegal) profit from its sale.  
As a result, citizens took action, and their perceptions of the state worsened. As health 
authorities inadequately responded to grassroots demands for subsidized antibiotic therapy, 
patients in sanatoriums began to organize and strike, finding allies in the media and politically 
organized groups such as the Popular Socialist Party (PSP) and the Federation of University 
Students (FEU). Middle-class charities also returned to the anti-tuberculosis campaign, plugging 
gaps in the welfare system by helping poor Cubans obtain the drug. These efforts and episodes 
made the issue of government incompetence regarding streptomycin highly visible to a national 
audience. Thus, even though by 1953 tuberculosis mortality had plummeted (suggesting that 
enough people had gained sufficient access to antibiotic treatment to prevent or delay death), 
citizens’ denunciations of the CNT and the state health care sector intensified as they became 
convinced that Cuba’s health bureaucracy was hopelessly politicized and inefficient. 
The history of streptomycin in Cuba, like that of the Topes de Collantes Sanatorium and 
the effort to reform Cuba’s local sanitation departments, serves to explain the disjuncture 
between good health indicators and highly critical citizen perceptions of the public health sector. 
 179 
The discovery and distribution of an effective treatment (evidenced by the dropping tuberculosis 
mortality rate) represents a story of at least partial success. However, streptomycin also served as 
another highly visible marker of the problems of the republican state. Combined with the other 
condemnations of the Cuban health sector in the late 1940s—patronage, corruption, the 
abandonment of Topes de Collantes Sanatorium, and poor hospital management—the state’s 
failure to meet citizens’ expectations of access to streptomycin contributed to the unraveling of 
the consensus that the Cuban state could effectively lead the tuberculosis campaign.614 
6.1 “THE MARVELOUS DRUG” 
In early 1945, Havana proudly served as host to the Sixth Pan-American Tuberculosis Congress; 
it was here, in his role as president of the meeting, that CNT insider Juan Castillo first heard 
stories that American scientists were testing a new antibiotic in animal and human experiments. 
As director of Havana’s main tuberculosis dispensary since 1933, the news piqued Castillo’s 
curiosity, and he packed his bags and headed to meet with Dr. Emerson, head of the American 
National Tuberculosis Association, where he was informed of “the great hopes that North 
American tuberculosis specialists were putting on that drug.”615  
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The Cuban press soon printed the rumors of a new panacea for one of Cuba’s most 
vexing illnesses. “Keep Your Eye on Streptomycin!” screamed one headline in June 1945.616 Its 
subtitle must have immediately grabbed the attention of the thousands of readers who suffered 
from TB: “Tuberculosis, infant paralysis, leprosy, and other diseases may fall rapidly, shot down 
by this new drug.”617 In November 1946, through injections of streptomycin, a New York 
physician saved the life of a fifteen-year-old who had tubercular meningitis, a previously fatal 
form of the infection.618 In January 1947, Diario de la Marina, Cuba’s newspaper with the 
highest readership, reprinted the results of a Mayo Clinic study that corroborated the efficacy of 
streptomycin in fighting tuberculosis.619 These vignettes from abroad echoed loudly in Cuba, and 
press outlets continuously featured them in medicine and science columns. Soon stories of 
antibiotic success in Cuba’s own hospitals began to appear.620 Pharmaceutical companies in 
Cuba crafted advertisements to overcome any lingering doubts, announcing messages like 
“[t]uberculosis CAN be defeated.”621 Facilitated by the tightly linked information channels 
between North America and Cuba, the medical community and lay public in Cuba became aware 
of streptomycin in the mid-1940s, and such knowledge generated widespread expectations of 
access to streptomycin, which many were calling the “miracle drug.”622  
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Those expectations of access to the drug only intensified in December 1946, when the 
Cuban press reported that streptomycin had finally arrived on the island. In practice, however, 
access would be mediated by several factors: (1) availability (streptomycin’s material existence 
on the island, which was determined by U.S. production and its quota system), (2) the Cuban 
Health Ministry’s controlled distribution of the antibiotic, and (3) the cost of the drug (and the 
state’s role in controlling and/or subsidizing that cost). This section considers each of these 
variables in order, arguing that until the end of 1947, severe scarcity plagued the streptomycin 
market, as a result of restricted American export of the drug. As 1947 came to a close, the drug 
began to arrive in adequate quantities to Cuba, and as a result, availability in material terms 
ceased to be a serious problem, and the Cuban government ended its control over distribution. 
However, into the 1950s, even though the price of the drug had dropped radically, the price of 
multiple doses and especially a full streptomycin treatment remained prohibitive for many.  
The available supply of streptomycin was quickly outstripped by demand—though by 
precisely how much is unclear. Data on import totals exists for certain months or weeks in the 
late 1940s, but I have found no data on the number of individuals who received the drug.623 And, 
trying to translate aggregate data into an estimate of how many individuals accessed 
streptomycin would be problematic. In 1947, Cuban physicians prescribed a range of 40 to 360 
grams per person for a total treatment (usually administered over three months).624 It is probable 
                                                                                                                                                             
1947, Diario de la Marina ran at least several stories a month regarding the drug. For references to the “miracle 
drug,” see, for example, “La estreptomicina hace ‘milagros’ en el tratamiento de la tuberculosis,” Diario de la 
Marina, February 1, 1947, 10; Guido García Inclán, “En la feria de la actualidad,” Bohemia 41, no. 12 (March 26, 
1949): 34.  
623 Consistent and comprehensive data on Cuba’s changing quota and its monthly import amounts does not exist. 
The U.S. did not provide annual streptomycin-specific export information until 1951.  
624 There are many reasons for such a wide difference in total grams for treatment. First of all, the drug was still in 
an experimental stage, and physicians were attempting to standardize dosage amounts. This differed across nations, 
with North American physicians more aggressively injecting their patients in the mid-1940s, and then decreasing the 
daily and total dosage amounts by the late 1940s. In comparison to U.S. physicians, the CNT-employed doctors used 
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that most prescribed 3–4 grams per day, over the course of “several months,” thus, totaling 
anywhere from 180–360 grams. Even with this range in mind, however, it remains difficult to 
ascertain how many people obtained the drug. One cannot simply divide an import total by the 
total number of grams considered necessary to complete a regimen because the Cuban 
government did not distribute streptomycin in this manner, at least not in the first half of 1947. 
Instead, it allocated several doses to as many supplicants as possible (instead of distributing a 
complete treatment to fewer patients).625 Even if the aggregate data cannot be plausibly 
converted into a number of individuals who would have received streptomycin from Cuba’s 
pharmacies and hospitals, knowing the standard dosage helps to provide a sense of how 
inadequate imports were (keeping in mind that the government calculated that 40,000 people in 
Cuba had the disease).626  
The drug’s material availability on the island was determined primarily by U.S. 
pharmaceutical production and the U.S. government’s control over streptomycin exports. In the 
United States, the Civilian Production Board, a holdover from the Second World War, continued 
to strictly regulate the domestic distribution of the drug though a newly created Streptomycin 
Control Board (SCB).627 When production finally satisfied enough of the U.S.’s domestic need 
                                                                                                                                                             
fewer grams (a range of 40–125 grams in a 1947 CNT experiment, versus the approximate 360 grams used in the 
pioneering Mayo Clinic trials the year before.) There were also differences within national medical communities, 
however, and it is probable that on average, Cuban physicians prescribed 3–4 grams per day. There were also 
differences even within a single study: the total grams applied varied from person to person, depending on factors 
such as age, type of tuberculosis, and severity of the disease. Chardiet, “La estreptomicina abre,” 46; Castillo, 
“Nuestra experiencia streptomicinoterápica,” 47; Guido García Inclán, “En la feria de la actualidad,” Bohemia 39, 
no. 41 (October 12, 1947): 18; Luis de la Cruz Muñoz et al., “Estreptomicina en el tratamiento de la tuberculosis 
pulmonar,” Revista Cubana de Tuberculosis 15–16, nos.1–4, 1 (1951–1952): 8.   
625 The Health Director, Dr. Pedro Nogueira, reported on February 15, 1947 that 130 expedientes had been initiated, 
and the official in charge of streptomycin’s distribution made a delivery of at least two doses in each case. 
“Actualidad nacional: Salubridad: La liberación de la streptomicina,” Diario de la Marina, February 15, 1947, 2. 
626 Pedro Domingo, “Puede erradicarse la tuberculosis de Cuba?” Revista Cubana de Tuberculosis 9, nos. 2–4 
(April–December 1945): 170. 
627 “The Nation: Streptomycin,” New York Times, April 21, 1946, 76. In March 1946, eleven companies produced 
28,000 grams of streptomycin: 19,000 went to the military and government agencies, leaving only 9,000 for use in 
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in the fall of 1946, the government announced that streptomycin could be exported, but only 
under license and with a specific quota set for each country, each established by the SCB.628 In 
December 1946, the Cuban press announced that the head of the SCB had informed Cuba’s 
Health Ministry that they would begin receiving a monthly quota of 25 grams, a trivial amount 
that had increased more than tenfold by January 1947, undoubtedly due to rapidly expanding 
production of the substance in the U.S.629 Spurred by the mounting national and international 
publicity in response to promising streptomycin trials in 1945 and 1946, American 
pharmaceutical companies geared up to satisfy the demand; within several years, they had 
exponentially increased production of the drug for clinical use.630 Table 5 presents periodic 
monthly outputs by American pharmaceutical companies, the sole producers of the drug during 
this period. While the table demonstrates a steadily accelerating growth in streptomycin 
production, for those on the ground in Cuba, the shortage of the drug in 1947, partially due to the 
restrictions set in place by the U.S. quota system, seemed anything but short-lived. 
Table 5. American Production of Streptomycin631 
Date  Grams produced 
September 1945 3,000 
March 1946 28,000 
September 1946 140,000 
                                                                                                                                                             
clinical medicine. Physicians had to offer sufficient burden of proof that their patients had urgent cases of specific 
forms of the disease.  
628 This system continued until December 1948, when the U.S. Commerce Department ended licensing requirements 
for the export of streptomycin. “Streptomycin May Now Be Exported without License Except to Europe,” New York 
Times, December 25, 1948, 21.  
629 “Enviarán 25 gramos mensuales de estreptomicina a Cuba,” Boletín del Consejo Nacional de Tuberculosis 
(December 1946): 20; “Drug is Effective for Tuberculosis,” New York Times, December 1, 1946, 60; “Aumenta el 
envió de estreptomicina,” Diario de la Marina, January 10, 1947, 12.  
630 For instance, in August 1946, Merck & Co. dedicated two new plants exclusively to streptomycin production. 
“Drug Production Begun,” New York Times, August 21, 1946, 33. 
631 Numbers calculated from “The Nation: Streptomycin,” 76; “Streptomycin Wonders,” TIME Magazine 48, no. 12 
(September 16, 1945): 56; “Streptomycin Released,” New York Times, July 4, 1947, 9; “Streptomycin Output 
Jumps,” New York Times, January 1, 1948, 40; “Streptomycin Output Sets Mark,” New York Times, August 24, 
1949, 27. 
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Table 5 (continued)   
Date  Grams produced 
July 1947 550,000 
December 1947 1,660,000 
June 1949 7,300,000 
 
In the first seven months of 1947, the U.S.-determined quota for Cuba hovered around 
3,000 grams before rapidly increasing in the fall. In certain moments, this amount was increased 
when the Cuban Health Ministry successfully leveraged Cuba’s ambassador in Washington D.C. 
to petition for special shipments of streptomycin. Moreover, the drug could enter the country 
outside of both U.S. and Cuban governmental channels, creating a black market.632 As the stream 
of requests for streptomycin began to pick up, the Cuban government declared a crisis in the 
summer of 1947. They reported on July 8th, for example, that only 12 grams existed in the 
country. As a result, the Cuban government petitioned the U.S. government, which raised Cuba’s 
monthly quota to 4,000 grams in August and sent an emergency shipment of the drug to quell the 
chaos. By the early fall of 1947, as a function of increased pharmaceutical output in the U.S., 
streptomycin began to enter the country in an ever-increasing stream (see Table 6).  
Table 6. Grams of Streptomycin Imported into Cuba, 1947633 
Dates Total (g) Daily average 
July 5–August 27 (54 days)  11,675 216.2 g 
August 28–October 16 (50 days) 17,178 343.6 g 
November 5–17 (13 days) 6,900 530.8 g 
 
                                                 
632 For instance, in June 1949, the U.S. Department of Commerce suspended the export license of Milton Berk for 
violating the export control regulations for a streptomycin shipment to Cuba. “Export License Suspended,” New 
York Times, June 4, 1949, 19.  
633 No monthly aggregate data on imports was reported prior to July 1947. For speculative comparative purposes, if 
the country received only its quota amount of 3,000 grams, we can assume that the daily average in the spring and 
early summer of 1947 was 100 grams. “11.675 gramos de streptomicina distribuidos en 52 días,” Diario de la 
Marina, August 28, 1947, 13; “Gastan $178.544 los cubanos en streptomicina,” Diario de la Marina, October 17, 
1947, 16; “La estreptomicina será rescatada de los especuladores,” Diario de la Marina, November 19, 1947, 16. 
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The Cuban government’s controlled distribution of the drug constituted the second 
barrier to accessing streptomycin. Considering the drug’s scarcity and possible toxicity if taken 
outside of medical supervision (and the U.S.’s similar procedure of regulating domestic 
distribution), the Cuban Health Minister, Dr. Andreu, and the National Health Director, Dr. 
Nogueira, appointed one official (Dr. Ilisátegui) to control the sale of the antibiotic from a new 
post within the Health Ministry.634 Scarcity meant that the Cuban government would approve the 
purchase of the drug “only in cases of emergency and upon proof of critical need.”635  
The sick and their relatives had to traverse several bureaucratic steps to gain access to the 
drug: first, a physician had to determine that streptomycin would indeed be efficacious for the 
patient’s particular form of tuberculosis. If the physician deemed it so, he wrote a prescription. 
With that sheet of paper, the patient and/or his relatives filed a request for the drug from the 
Health Ministry. Finally, weighing the particulars of the case and with a register of all the 
streptomycin stock in the country by pharmacy, Ilisátegui determined which patients could 
receive what amount of the drug. These fortunate few then received from the Health Ministry a 
license to purchase the drug from a specific pharmacy. By the fall of 1947, Diario de la Marina 
provided daily reports of the amount of streptomycin disbursal approved by the government, and 
the pharmacy that filled them, evidence not only of intense citizen interest in the drug, but also of 
the government’s need to publicly satisfy that escalating demand.636 The Cuban government 
retained control over the drug’s distribution until November 1947, when American production 
and export to Cuba had increased sufficiently. The Health Ministry continued to exert some 
                                                 
634 “Enviarán 25 gramos,” 20. 
635 Ibid. It is no surprise then that in Cuba and throughout the Western hemisphere, a black market for the drug 
quickly grew up, so that people with enough resources could spend exorbitant amounts to receive the drug outside of 
governmental control. 
636 See, for example, Rogelio Franchi de Alfaro, “Misceláneas de Salubridad: Control de la estreptomicina,” Diario 
de la Marina, October 15, 1947, 18.  
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control over the process, requiring pharmacies to freeze and store 20% of all imports, which 
could be thawed in case of emergency. This reserve seemed to have been at the disposal of the 
government, to ensure that stocks never ran out and to distribute licenses to certain individuals to 
purchase the drug at specific, controlled prices.637  
The third and final impediment to accessing the drug concerned its price. One aspect of 
Cuban governmental control of streptomycin included an agreement on price limits between the 
Ministry of Commerce and importers of the drug, which were predominantly foreign-owned 
enterprises.638 Despite this agreement on paper, Cubans encountered great variation in price 
when attempting to buy the drug, and the Cuban government’s control over the cost of the drug 
seems to have been tenuous. For example, the government asked the public to assist them in 
November 1947 when they ended total control over the drug’s distribution: if an individual 
encountered a price higher than that set by the Ministry of Commerce at a pharmacy, they were 
asked to not purchase the drug, but to go to the Health Ministry to obtain documents to buy it at 
the indicated price.639 Additionally, a black market soon developed for the drug. The price 
inflation in this parallel market skyrocketed in the interior of the island, which often remained 
beyond the reach of the Health Ministry. Diario de la Marina confirmed that some citizens in 
these areas paid $20 for a gram of streptomycin while others in Havana were paying 
approximately $5 a gram.640  
                                                 
637 “De nuevo a control la estreptomicina de venta al público,” Diario de la Marina, November 22, 1947, 16.  
638 Prior to the 1959 revolution, 70% of the Cuban pharmaceutical market was foreign-owned. José Ramón Ruíz 
Hernández, La salud pública: Su desarrollo en el periodo revolucionario (1959–1980) (Havana: Instituto de 
Desarrollo de la Salud, Ministerio de Salud Pública, 1986), 25–28. 
639 “De nuevo a control,” 16. 
640 “Se está pagando a $20.00 el gramo de la estreptomicina,” Diario de la Marina, November 13, 1947, 16.  
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Despite this variation and exploitation, throughout 1947, the price of the drug slowly 
decreased. In February 1947, the government set the price at $7.50 per gram.641 In October 1947, 
Diario de la Marina reported that since July, Cubans had spent, on average, $6.50 per gram.642 
By November of 1947, the average price had fallen to $4.75 per gram.643 When the government 
ended controlled distribution, the cost of the drug briefly jumped ($5.95 per gram), but by late 
December, U.S production and exports had increased so much that the average price paid for the 
drug had fallen to $3.70 per gram.644  
Despite the trend of decreasing cost, for many people, paying for a complete drug 
regimen remained prohibitively expensive. Although a few exceptions existed, overall, 
individuals bore the cost of the drug on their own, for the Cuban government declared that it 
could not afford to subsidize large amounts of the drug, especially in 1947.645 In June 1947, 
Diario de la Marina estimated the total cost of treatment to be $800.646 Even when the price 
dropped in the fall to around $4 a gram, one journalist noted that treatment remained simply “too 
expensive.”647 Another physician reported that one of his poor habanero clients would have to 
pay $200 to cure her daughter.648 While the cost of the treatment was now a quarter of the 
estimate from June 1947, the physician was painfully aware that the mother, a cook, only earned 
                                                 
641 “Declara Salubridad la venta libre de la droga llamada streptomicina,” Noticias de Hoy, February 12, 1947, 6.  
642 “Gastan $178.544,” 16.  
643 “Se está pagando,” 16. 
644 “De nuevo a control,” 16; “Desde ayer se puede adquirir el gramo de estreptomicina a $3.70 con permiso de 
Sanidad,” Diario de la Marina, December 2, 1947, 16; “Resumen de las actividades oficiales durante el año 1947: 
Salubridad,” Diario de la Marina, January 2, 1948, 20.  
645 One exception was the CNT streptomycin experiment on 100 patients (at La Esperanza Sanatorium), led by Juan 
Castillo over the course of 1947.  
646 “Solo cura dos variantes de la tuberculosis la streptomicina,” Diario de la Marina, June 17, 1947, 30.  
647 Guido García Inclán, “En la feria de la actualidad,” Bohemia 39, no. 41 (October 12, 1947): 18.  
648 Arnaldo Coro del Pozo, Usted y la tuberculosis (Havana, 1957), 31. Unfortunately, Coro does not provide a 
specific date for this observation; it was sometime between December 1946 and November 1948. 
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$20 a month. At $200, the total treatment regimen would consume over 80% of the family’s 
yearly income. 
Each of these variables that affected access—availability; governmental distribution; and 
cost—fluctuated in importance across time. Throughout 1947, material scarcity of the drug, 
shaped first and foremost by American production and distribution, channeled the public’s focus 
onto the issue of availability of the drug on the island and the U.S. quota. For instance, Guido 
Garcia Inclán first addressed streptomycin in late April 1947: “A good criollo, a good husband 
writes me wanting his words to jump from the paper.” The man’s wife was “wasting away,” and 
he feared being left alone with their four children, and begged for streptomycin. “In Cienfuegos,” 
he continued, “it has not been possible to find the medicine that she needs,” even with the 
prescription of their physician.649 Other press outlets focused on the Cuban government’s efforts 
to get more of the drug into the country. Aware of material shortages, very few critiqued the 
performance of the Cuban state or even the U.S government at this stage. 
The government was not unaware of the potential political effects of scarcity, however, 
and they carefully crafted messages to the public to emphasize the limits and disadvantages of 
the drug. Not coincidentally, in June 1947, at the beginning of a crisis of extreme scarcity, Diario 
de la Marina announced that “The Government Cannot Acquire Streptomycin,” and the CNT 
made the following warnings to the public: the drug was still in an experimental phase, and if 
applied without attention to contraindications, the toxicity of the drug could create serious 
problems. Most significantly, the CNT director summarized, “It is a drug that is highly costly 
and beyond the financial reach of the CNT.”650 He concluded that he could not “wantonly 
                                                 
649 Guido García Inclán, “En la feria de la actualidad,” Bohemia 39, no. 16 (April 20, 1947): 26. 
650 “El gobierno no puede adquirir streptomicina,” Diario de la Marina, June 4, 1947, 3; “Hacen aclaraciones 
respecto al uso de la streptomicina en los casos de tuberculosis,” Noticias de Hoy, June 4, 1947, 5.  
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recommend its acquisition to the Government until they have the assuredness that it will really 
work, since this would mean wasting money that could serve other needs.”651 In August, the 
Health Minister formally recommended to the President to not procure large quantities of the 
drug, based on the decisions of the CNT’s Board of Governors. Instead, he recommended the 
purchase of a limited amount of the drug for the CNT to use in human trials.652 For the moment, 
the government could refuse to buy large stocks of the drug, shielded by scarcity and the need for 
more experimentation. 
There was at least one important exception to the tempered response of the citizenry to 
the drug shortage, a foreshadowing of the politicization of the drug to come. On July 10, 1947, in 
the midst of a national crisis of streptomycin scarcity (only twelve grams remained in the 
country), the family members of patients in La Esperanza Sanatorium planned to stage a 
demonstration in the centrally located Parque de la Fraternidad to demand “that the 
Government acquire a sufficient quantity of the drug called streptomycin so that they will apply 
this treatment to all the sick of the Republic, since the efficacy of this medicine has been proven 
in the treatment of this terrible sickness.”653 Five days later, the patients at Ambrosio Grillo 
Sanatorium also issued a manifesto, which demanded the “shipment of streptomycin to that 
center, so that the patients can radically and immediately improve.”654 Rejecting the CNT’s 
                                                 
651 “El gobierno no puede,” 3. 
652 “No comparan streptomicina en cantidades,” Diario de la Marina, August 1, 1947, 2.  
653 “Concentración el día 24 de los familiares de los tuberculosos,” Noticias de Hoy, July 10, 1947, 5. This brings up 
one other source of friction that developed between the government and the popular sector regarding the efficacy of 
the drug. Physicians expressed concern about the drug’s safety and efficacy until the end of 1947. And, after that, 
they continued to recommend the drug in moderate amounts for certain forms of the disease, while preferring other 
interventions (e.g., sanatorium residence, surgery) for others. However, popular audiences, especially the sick and 
their families, crafted their own understanding of the drug. They believed it to be a “cure-all” or a “miracle drug” 
despite governmental and medical warnings to not do so. Juan J. Castillo, “Demuestra un tisiólogo todas las ventajas 
y perjuicio de la estreptomicina hasta ahora,” Diario de la Marina, December 24, 1947, 3. In this article, Castillo 
reported the results of a streptomycin trial done at La Esperanza Sanatorium, in which the drug showed promising 
results for some forms of tuberculosis and no improvement for other forms. 
654 “Enfermos del Hospital ‘Ambrosio Grillo’ piden estreptomicina,” Noticias de Hoy, July 15, 1947, 6.  
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admonition to not treat the medicine as some miracle cure, the patients demanded their 
immediate access to the drug.  
The Health Minister’s promise to visit La Esperanza Sanatorium to investigate its daily 
operations and his announcement that the U.S. government had granted Cuba a special quota of 
8,000 grams of streptomycin, to arrive by the first week of August, quelled the agitation as the 
family members cancelled the planned demonstration. Nonetheless, by the next summer this 
initial ripple of discontent would turn into more powerful waves against government 
performance, driven by a shift in the discourse throughout 1948: with the problem of extreme 
scarcity solved, citizens began to put the blame for difficulty in purchasing the drug squarely at 
the feet of the government. 
Based on a broad interpretation of laws and past practices, many Cubans expected the 
state (whether national or municipal) to provide medicines free of charge to the poor.655 
However, even after streptomycin’s price plummeted, it stretched the limited resources of the 
Health Ministry’s and the CNT’s dependencies, which were already having trouble paying their 
bills. The extant evidence points to the very limited role of the government in subsidizing or 
purchasing the antibiotic for its poor citizens in the late 1940s.656 The CNT director had 
                                                 
655 Since 1909, several municipal health departments, especially those in the larger cities, provided medicines to 
poor citizens, undoubtedly in limited quantities and usually in external dispensaries attached to municipal hospitals. 
While only the revolutionary government of 1933–34 explicitly declared that it was the duty of municipalities to 
provide medicine for the poor, in the 1940s, hospitals, including tuberculosis sanatoriums, dedicated part of their 
budgets to medicine. Foreign Policy Association, Problems of the New Cuba: Report of the Commission on Cuban 
Affairs (New York: Foreign Policy Association, 1935), 107, 165; Dr. Juan M. Pla, “La Dirección de Beneficencia,” 
Boletín Oficial de la Secretaría de Sanidad y Beneficencia 1, no. 1 (April–June 1909): 33; “Fondos municipales para 
los pobres; Decreto 2435,” 14, legajo (leg.) 23, expediente (no.) 791, Fondo Partido Revolucionario Cubano 
(Auténtico) (PRC-A), Archivo Nacional de la República de Cuba (ANC). In 1944, 1945, and 1946, respectively, the 
budget of La Esperanza Sanatorium dedicated $8,000; $12,000; and $43,274 to “drugs of all kinds.” See leg. 22, no. 
749, PRC-A, ANC; Bartolomé Selva León, Un año de lucha antituberculosa en Cuba, 1944-1945 (Havana: Consejo 
Nacional de Tuberculosis, 1946), 315.  
656 The municipal government also played a role, however small, in funding antibiotic therapy. Throughout 1947, the 
Municipal Respiratory Dispensary, funded by Havana’s municipal government, reported that it had “freely 
administered” penicillin and streptomycin “to the population, and this dispensary is acquiring an adequate number of 
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promised in 1947 that if the drug proved effective in experiments, “we will be the first to obtain 
all the quantity necessary for our sanatoriums since we consider it our duty to serve the sick in 
everything.”657  
However, the CNT had little room in its existing budget to buy the costly drug, as its 
operating budget devoted most of its funds to personnel salaries and new facilities (i.e., research 
institutions, sanatoriums, dispensaries). These constraints forced the CNT to rely upon special 
credits issued from the central government to purchase the drug. In April 1948 and August 1948, 
for example, the CNT director reported that the CNT received credits of $6,000 and $10,000, 
respectively, to purchase the drug to distribute to its patients.658 In August 1948, the CNT 
claimed to have distributed (to date) 15,000 grams free of charge.659 CNT Director Bartolomé 
Selva León attempted to spin this investment positively, claiming (incorrectly) that Cuba was the 
only country in the world to distribute streptomycin without cost to its poor population.660 When 
a new CNT director took over in late 1948, he spent $20,000 on streptomycin in his first three 
months of office; it is unclear, however, if he continued to spend at that level over the course of 
                                                                                                                                                             
units and grams of these for clinical application every month” (158). However, it spent approximately $3,860 in 
1947 on streptomycin, which in no way could have served the many citizens in Havana who needed the drug (160).  
Anuario de Sanidad Municipal, 1947–1948 (Havana: Alcaldía de la Habana, Departamento de Sanidad Municipal, 
1948). 
657 “El gobierno no puede,” 3; “Hacen aclaraciones,” 5. 
658 “El Sanatorio ‘La Esperanza’,” Diario de la Marina, April 8, 1948, n.p.; “Unos 15,000 gramos de estreptomicina 
distribuidos gratis,” Diario de la Marina, August 4, 1948, 28. 
659 Although the CNT did not reveal how many people had been treated, using the CNT standard range of dosages 
(40–125 grams), 120–375 individuals could have received a complete treatment (although it is more likely that more 
people were served, but only given partial treatment through small amounts of the drugs). 
660 “Unos 15,000 gramos,” 28. By 1948, some municipal health departments in the United States, such as the one in 
Baltimore, had begun very small-scale funding of the drug in their public hospitals. Between 1952 and 1953, they 
started offering antibiotic therapy free of charge to all patients. City of Baltimore, Health Department, One Hundred 
and Thirty-Fourth Annual Report of the Department of Health ([Baltimore?], 1948): 27, http://health.baltimorecity. 
gov/sites/default/files/City%20of%20Baltimore%20134th%20Annual%20Report%20of%20The%20Department%2
0of%20Health.pdf; Samuel K. Roberts, Infectious Fear: Politics, Disease, and the Health Effects of Segregation 
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2009), 201–2.  
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his tenure.661 By the early 1950s, a paltry 200 grams of streptomycin were given monthly to each 
CNT dispensary (along with a number of tablets of a new hydrazide drug).662  
Beyond the issue of subsidization, the CNT hospitals could not adequately stock the drug 
in their pharmacies for patients to purchase, reflective of the broader situation of scarcity (e.g., 
food, instruments) plaguing hospitals. When streptomycin was not materially available in the 
sanatoriums, patients’ relatives had to search out the drug in pharmacies outside the medical 
facilities.663 The system, then, was experienced by patients and their relatives as ineffective. The 
CNT could not ensure a steady supply of antibiotics for the poor patients in its facilities, nor 
could they finance a regular distribution of the drug. Furthermore, the historical evidence also 
suggests that the system was plagued by more than inefficiency: the press published convincing 
allegations that the poor constituents of the CNT saw little if any of the special credits issued 
expressly for streptomycin purchase, as patients reported that they had to pay for any doses 
administered (an allegation discussed in greater detail below).664 While some of Cuba’s poor 
may have received free or subsidized streptomycin in certain moments, the evidence 
persuasively suggests that most patients had to draw on their own meager resources to purchase 
the drug from state hospitals or private-sector pharmacies.  
Traditional mechanisms of health care in the republic (charity and patronage) emerged to 
answer this crisis of Cubans unable to afford the antibiotic. The Cuban media broadcast urgent 
appeals for the drug and/or cash donations. Guido García Inclán hoped to appeal to the charity of 
middle-class and wealthy Cubans and, in particularly egregious cases, public officials. Indeed, 
                                                 
661 Pedro Díaz y Rodríguez, La lucha antituberculosa en Cuba (Havana, 1949), 2.  
662 The dispensaries also received “3 to 5,000 tablets of hydrazide” every month, but I am unsure of how many 
tablets were prescribed for a daily dose or total regimen. Pedro Iglesias Betancourt, “No justificación de Topes de 
Collantes,” Bohemia 46 (June 20, 1954): 91.  
663 “Cínica propaganda en torno al Sanatorio ‘La Esperanza’,” Noticias de Hoy, April 17, 1948, 1, 6.  
664 “De pésima calidad la comida que se sirve en el Sanatorio La Esperanza: Grave situación confrontan los 
hospitalizados,” Noticias de Hoy, August 11, 1948, 5. 
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for certain cases, the columnist reported that the CNT Director or the First Lady of the Republic 
had intervened to resolve the plight of a letter writer. García Inclán had to request that his readers 
not send in their electoral cédulas. He knew they hoped that they would receive money or 
streptomycin in return, but he emphasized that he was not seeking political office.665 
By 1948, letters concerning streptomycin began to pour into García Inclán’s office. He 
despaired, “Every day there are more people that come to us in supplication for streptomycin. 
The marvelous drug is prescribed by physicians, but…the poor cannot buy it!...and anguish and 
desperation begin.”666 In August, the columnist begged his readers for patience, reporting that he 
received an “average of 40 letters a day,” asking for help. When the CNT reported a recent 
purchase of the drug, García Inclán directed the letter-writers to CNT headquarters for 
assistance, but this does not seem to have happened frequently.667 In 1949, the situation had not 
let up, and García Inclán prefaced his column with the following admonition: “IMPORTANT 
NOTE: Every day the letters that we receive asking for streptomycin are more numerous.”668  
These requests emanated from all corners of the island, from the metropolitan centers of 
Havana and Santiago, as well as from tiny hamlets like Los Arabos, Rodas, and Camajuaní. In 
one Bohemia issue alone, requests for the drug were published on behalf of Cubans from Las 
Villas, Luyanó, Velasco, Havana, Santiago de Cuba, Central “Francisco,” and Camagüey.669 
Many of the letters came from patients already interned at one of the island’s three state 
                                                 
665 Guido García Inclán, “En la feria de la actualidad,” Bohemia 42, no. 14 (April 2, 1950): 120.  
666 Guido García Inclán, “En la feria de la actualidad,” Bohemia 40, no. 13 (March 28, 1948): 26. 
667 Guido García Inclán, “En la feria de la actualidad,” Bohemia 40, no. 31 (August 1, 1948): 26. 
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sanatoriums, and patients at La Esperanza were even given certificates, presumably from the 
sanatorium staff, to fill out and send to acquaintances to request donations so that they could buy 
the antibiotic.670 The CNT’s patients, who had already fought against great odds to be granted 
admission to a tuberculosis facility, had to work to raise the money needed to buy the drugs 
before the hospital staff could administer them. 
Even though García Inclán, other allies, and the sick leveraged traditional mechanisms of 
patronage and charity, most hoped for a more bureaucratic, technical and fair distribution of the 
drug, and in the process, they began to articulate a grassroots definition of the state’s duty to 
subsidize antibiotic therapy for the poor. Some spoke generally of vague humanistic concerns 
and governmental duties. These citizens demanded that the government fulfill its responsibility 
of “protection.”671 When the Health Ministry and CNT did not provide antibiotic therapy, many 
alleged that they were committing “crimes against humanity.”672 Others explicitly used the 
language of patients’ “right to recover their health.”673  
Many civic actors wanted some version of a government-run and -funded streptomycin 
bank to provide free access to the drug for the poor. García Inclán considered the absence of a 
National Streptomycin Bank to be a glaring fault. He wrote, “It is incredible that the Government 
of LOVE, with so many millions in income, is not capable of having a Streptomycin Bank, for 
these desperate cases. Turning its back on the people is committing a crime against humanity.”674 
He considered such a bank “the most fundamental thing.”675 Aware that streptomycin worked 
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better for some forms of the disease than others, García Inclán fumed that the government did 
not ensure that the drug was furnished for these patients. He opined, “Streptomycin is the savior 
of this specific form of tuberculosis. But…the Government does not listen to this.”676 In another 
case, he wrote, “It seems impossible that our Government does not have a Streptomycin Bank for 
these cases, where the drug operates in a direct and efficient manner.”677  
Cubans interpreted the government’s reticence to fund a streptomycin bank in divergent 
ways, few of them positive. Some citizens criticized North American pharmaceutical companies’ 
greed. However, most critiques concerned the Cuban government’s inability, indifference, or 
malfeasance concerning streptomycin.678 Citizens and journalists blamed Cuban politicians for 
the privileges granted to the U.S. pharmaceutical industry in the 1930s, to the detriment of the 
Cuban people.679 In the late 1930s, government officials had established regulations over the 
price of medicine, and many press outlets reported that many concessions had been granted to 
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the magnates of the “Trust del Dolor,” the caustic appellation by which Cubans indicted the 
industry. The critical press alleged that the “Trust del Dolor” and the CNT were involved with 
specific abuses regarding streptomycin. At the end of 1948, Bohemia journalist Enrique de la 
Osa accused CNT Director Selva León of directly profiting from the sale of streptomycin. “The 
Director had organized a true racket with streptomycin.” He clarified, “When an influential 
politician requested the saving substance, the request was made for quantities much higher than 
what was required, and the surplus thus accumulated was resold…to the laboratories.”680 As late 
as 1952, de la Osa continued to rail against the “abusive business of drugs,” arguing that while 
the nation was “one of the countries with the highest medicinal consumption in relation to its 
population—50 million pesos sold in 1951—it was, also, the center of the most scandalous 
speculation with the price of medicine.”681 
When news of streptomycin’s discovery reached the press in 1945, in both Cuba and the 
United States, headlines optimistically presaged scientific conquest. By the late 1940s, these 
narratives had unraveled in Cuba, replaced by a more critical assessment of Cuba’s public health 
sector. In many citizens’ eyes, the government had performed poorly in the first years of 
streptomycin’s arrival in Cuba, and the inability of patients to gain access to the drug served as a 
material measure of state incompetence or complicity. In response, patients began to mobilize for 
change. 
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6.2 GRASSROOTS MOBILIZATION 
Tuberculosis may have enervated their bodies, but those who had secured a bed at one of Cuba’s 
public tuberculosis hospitals did not react passively to what they perceived as the CNT’s 
mounting indifference. Unlike sanatoriums in other urban metropolises in Latin America, patient 
strikes in Cuba did not seem to be the norm (or at least did not receive national coverage) in the 
1920s and 1930s.682 However, beginning in 1946, strikes organized within sanatoriums erupted 
sporadically in Cuba. Some were in reaction to the practices of individual institutions, and others 
sought to build on the momentum of strikes that had begun in hospitals in other cities. This cycle 
persisted until the presidential administration of Carlos Prío Socarrás aggressively quelled a 
highly-publicized strike at La Esperanza Sanatorium in 1951.  
One strike in August 1948 is illustrative of the motivations, methods, and objectives of 
tuberculosis patients who mobilized in the late 1940s. On August 5th, a large group of angry 
patients exited Ambrosio Grillo Sanatorium, outside of Santiago de Cuba. They purposefully 
blocked vehicles on the central highway, “paralyzing the flow of traffic in protest of the bad 
quality and quantity of food, screaming that they were hungry, that their clothes were dirty…”683 
The doctors at Ambrosio Grillo admitted that the patients had every reason to be upset: for the 
past several months, the sanatorium administrators had fallen significantly behind on paying the 
food vendors and had resorted to watering down milk, replacing butter with a poor quality oil 
(which irritated the patients’ stomachs), and serving lower quality and smaller portions of 
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meat—some of which had worms, according to patient allegations.684 A contingent of the armed 
forces was called out to convince the patients to leave the highway and return to the sanatorium, 
but they did so only on several conditions, the most important of which was that CNT Director 
Selva León visit the sanatorium in person to hear their list of demands. 
When Selva León arrived, he did his best to dispel the patients’ anger, promising that he 
had checks to (partially) pay suppliers; what was still owed would be paid by September 15th.685 
Selva León spent most of his time passing the buck, but his maneuverings served only to 
illustrate the fractious, chaotic, and politicized nature of the Cuban government. Selva León 
reported that he had to visit the Minister of the Treasury in person in order to get a check to pay 
the sanatorium’s debts. While the facility owed 50,000 pesos to suppliers, Selva León received 
enough only to liquidate 15,000 pesos of that debt. He then revealed that the Treasury owed 
more than 40 million pesos to suppliers throughout the island.686 As would be repeated in press 
coverage of future strikes, government officials’ public acknowledgment of the dysfunctional 
operation of state institutions encouraged a growing perception that the public health sector was 
inadequate and a national embarrassment.  
Reports of this strike and subsequent sanatorium rebellions also indicated that 
antibiotics—or lack thereof—functioned as a spark to mobilization. One Bohemia journalist who 
interviewed the patients at Ambrosio Grillo disclosed, “[T]he new drug…has been taken as the 
pennant of the patients’ upheaval.”687 Physicians also expressed frustration concerning this issue. 
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With Selva León present, “Doctor Venzant, distinguished Doctor of the sanatorium, made a 
careful presentation about the problem of streptomycin.” In response, “Dr. Selva defended 
himself against the charges. He signaled the very high price of the drug; its scarcity; and 
highlighted his doubt about its efficacy in many cases.”688 When the press, mostly based in 
Havana, heard about Ambrosio Grillo, they turned to La Esperanza in their backyard to ascertain 
if the patients’ demands in Santiago had any validity. Despite the two facilities being on opposite 
ends of the island, with one on the periphery and the other in the medical and governmental core, 
the reporters confirmed that they shared many worrying problems, and streptomycin constituted 
a top concern.689  
Discontent in the sanatoriums was aggravated by news reports that the CNT had 
purchased streptomycin, while the patients still had to pay for the drug out of their own pockets.  
One journalist reported, “Right now there is a muffled protest over what is happening with 
Streptomycin, which it has been said has been acquired by the CNT. According to Señor Selva 
León, 10,000 pesos have been invested in the drug, but the sick have to pay with their own 
money for the doses that they need.”690 When Diario de la Marina reported in April 1948 that 
the CNT had spent around $6,000 on streptomycin for its patients in the first several months of 
the year, Noticias de Hoy responded with incredulity.691 They were disgusted with this “criminal 
lie,” which was disputed by the fact that many relatives had to “anxiously journey” to try to find 
the drug for their interned family members.692 An outraged journalist bemoaned that the hospital 
did not have “credits available to cover this fundamental aspect of public health care!” And, 
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perhaps more importantly, he alleged, “And if there are, they steal them.”693 When the hospital 
did have stocks of streptomycin, the paper reported that it did not sell the drug at low prices, and 
patients and relatives had to make “great sacrifices” to purchase the prescribed grams.694 To add 
insult to injury, in Lebredo Hospital, the patients had to even buy the syringe to inject 
streptomycin; in one hall of the hospital, with 28 patients, there was only one syringe supplied.695  
Once patients began to be interviewed, journalists discovered that racketeering, 
favoritism, and patronage characterized the distribution of the drug within state sanatoriums. In 
Ambrosio Grillo, one journalist reported, “[W]hile streptomycin is scarce, a favored patient has 
received almost 200 grams of the drug for his personal use from the official sphere. All of this 
echoes and disorders the morale of the establishment.”696 An exposé on La Esperanza in Noticias 
de Hoy demanded to know how the CNT had spent the credit expressly issued for purchasing the 
drug: “Where has the streptomycin, that should be handed out [distribuido] among the sick of La 
Esperanza Sanatorium who need it, gone to? Could it be that Dr. Selva León distributes it 
exclusively among some protected ones (algunos protegidos)?”697 Earlier in the month, Noticias 
de Hoy had already alleged, “Dr. Selva León carries with him ‘some grams of streptomycin’ to 
give to the sick who have requested them in advance.”698 Prensa Libre connected the corruption 
concerning medicine to a broader web of problems: “The credits for medicine vanish. Supplies 
are trafficked, which is like trafficking in the blood, pain and flesh of the unfortunate compatriots 
who, without resources for the expensive treatment required for the disease that has taken hold in 
their bodies, go to that hill [La Esperanza] seeking relief, to be equipped with supplies to battle 
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against death.”699 Unfortunately, admission did not guarantee that one would “be equipped with 
supplies.” 
When Selva León returned from Santiago to Havana, he attempted to dispute many of the 
patients’ and journalists’ reports. He thanked the director of the conservative Diario de la 
Marina for his “sensible editorials” about the influence of “poisonous communism” within Cuba, 
and by extension, the halls of the CNT hospitals.700 Selva León insisted, “[T]he patients never 
lack anything.” Instead he alleged that “[w]hat happened in the ‘Ambrosio Grillo’ Sanatorium is 
a display of what communism, trying to mislead public opinion, can cause.” According to Selva 
León, communist patients within the sanatorium had fomented anarchy in the facility. When 
hearing about the failure to pay suppliers, “[a] group of 5 or 6 communists took advantage of the 
opportunity.”701 In a political climate of staunch anti-communism, Selva León tried to discredit 
the movement by attributing it solely to communist agitation.702 One Bohemia journalist partially 
agreed, observing that the leaders of the strike “spoke a communist and pseudo-revolutionary 
language.”703 
 When Selva León publicly undermined the patients’ demands, the director of Ambrosio 
Grillo retaliated against the strikers by expelling two of the protest leaders from the sanatorium, 
citing indiscipline. Noticias de Hoy reported that Luis Felipe Rivero and Benito Suárez “were 
criminally thrown out,” without being given any money for transportation. Felipe Rivero was 
seriously ill but was refused entrance into Santiago’s general hospital, which did not admit 
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tubercular patients. One paper alleged, “The ‘Ambrosio Grillo’ Hospital has been converted into 
a concentration camp. More than twenty soldiers, under the command of a lieutenant, surround 
the sanatorium to prevent any protest movement of the patients. The patients continue to totally 
lack food.”704  
While some journalists considered some of the patient claims about abuse at the 
sanatorium to be patently false, almost every newspaper agreed that the patients had a right to be 
upset about other issues and that the central governing board of the CNT was to blame. For 
instance, while one reporter remained skeptical about the claims against the sanatorium’s 
mayordomo, he conceded that the “politicking attached to almost of all the institutions of our 
State permeates the organization of this center too much.”705 He condemned the highest 
authorities for failing to exert authority. “[T]here is no other remedy,” he concluded, “but to find 
the governmental system guilty.”706 In the end, allegations of serious administrative malfeasance 
at Ambrosio Grillo Sanatorium could not be denied, and Selva León had to designate an 
investigator for the sanatorium in late August 1948, in order to probe for “anomalies.”707 Even 
though the chaos at Ambrosio Grillo had died down, strikes and protests continued to plague the 
tenure of the Auténtico CNT directors. Strikes took place at Ambrosio Grillo and/or La 
Esperanza in February 1946, August 1948, November 1948, October 1949, November 1949, 
February 1950, and August 1951. 
In the wake of these sanatorium strikes, Gustavo Aldereguía attempted to leverage 
national discontent, proposing the organization of those with tuberculosis into a union: the 
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National Union of Tuberculosis Patients and Ex-Patients (Unión de Enfermos Tuberculosos y Ex-
Enfermos) (UNETE).708 Patients and physicians like Aldereguía understood the mechanics of the 
political system, which was particularly responsive to organized groups.709 Efforts to create a 
union illustrate how medical care (and drug availability and distribution in particular) had fallen 
prey to the logic of the Cuban state. Aldereguía used Bohemia as a platform to call for 
registration, which resulted in “hundreds of letters, all responses lit by fever and faith.”710 
According to historians, UNETE even published a monthly journal, but the union’s efforts 
appear to have been short-lived.711 Reports on strikes from the early 1950s, including ones 
authored by Aldereguía, make no reference to UNETE.  
Even without a national organizing body, patients persisted in taking matters into their 
own hands, and streptomycin continued to function as a material motivator for mobilization. In 
the October 1949 strike at La Esperanza, patients “were united in their petition to secure better 
care,” and they presented a memorandum to the President, asking for “sufficient credits to be 
allocated to the Sanatorium…for the nutrition of the patients and the provision of medicine.”712 
Later that month, the patients at Ambrosio Grillo followed the example of the La Esperanza 
patients and organized a strike again, “asking for improvement in food, medicine, and care in 
general.”713 By the end of the month, Selva León dispatched by air 1,300 grams of streptomycin 
to the sanatorium in Santiago, to be distributed free of charge; this effectively subdued the 
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upheaval.714 These piecemeal responses, which provided streptomycin only in the aftermath of 
nationally publicized episodes of patient mobilization (in contrast to a more organized and 
regular bureaucratic distribution), point to the lack of efficiency in the public health system.  
These strikes were motivated primarily by the streptomycin issue, but also by broader 
dissatisfaction with the CNT in the late 1940s. During almost every month of 1948, Bohemia ran 
lengthy editorials and small opinion pieces on the problems plaguing the CNT. That 1948 was an 
election year illuminates how politically contentious and salient tuberculosis had become. 
Allegations swirled around multiple issues: the “abandoned” state of tuberculosis facilities; the 
politically-motivated decision to not finish Topes de Collantes sanatorium; corruption and 
favoritism among administrators; continued practices of patronage in admission process; and 
gross negligence. Gustavo Aldereguía branded the CNT as the “Consejo Nacional de 
Politicosis,” an organization infected by the political ills affecting many health institutions.715 
Patients who initiated strikes believed CNT and hospital administrators were 
mismanaging sanatoriums. Problems with antibiotics went hand in hand with other difficulties of 
daily life in the sanatoriums, as José Chelala Aguilera observed when he made a surprise visit to 
La Esperanza Sanatorium in March 1948. This investigative report was prompted by the dozens 
of letters that Bohemia’s editorial board had received about the state of affairs in the nation’s 
premiere tuberculosis treatment center.716 Chelala reported on a severe disconnect between the 
needs of the facility (articulated by the medical faculty), and the budget and distribution 
networks set up by the CNT, whose representatives rarely visited the hospital complex. For 
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instance, the budget allocated 45 cents per person for food daily, while one hospital administrator 
reported needing to spend 71–73 cents.717 Admission decisions were made not by dispensary or 
hospital doctors but “from above,” issuing down from somewhere in the CNT’s central 
administration. While the number of patients kept increasing, the quantity of medical personnel 
decreased.718 Like other hospitals in the republic, La Esperanza ran a monthly deficit, and 
Chelala advised health officials and private donors to act fast, for “[a]lready the moment is 
arriving in which the hospitals will have to close their doors.”719 
While Chelala praised some of the more orderly and hygienic sections of the sanatorium, 
he also stumbled upon several makeshift living quarters, many of which were in the basement, 
informally thrown together to house numerous servants and low-paid employees (see Figure 14). 
He concluded that these rooms represented a real hazard for the health of these employees. “The 
environment and the furniture,” Chelala penned, “denounced an extraordinary misery and an 
adequate source for cultivating and spreading the Koch bacillus.”720 Chelala could not 
“comprehend that such a room existed in La Esperanza Sanatorium—our principal and best 
surgical-medical center for the treatment of tuberculosis.”721 Other reports corroborated the 
horrific conditions of the island’s sanatoriums.722 One journalist, for instance, described 
Ambrosio Grillo as a “tomb of living men.”723 
                                                 
717 Ibid., 65. 
718 Ibid., 66. 
719 Ibid., 67. 
720 Ibid., 90. 
721 Ibid.  
722  “Cínica propaganda,” 1, 6; “Miente el ‘Diario de la Marina’,” 5; Gustavo Aldereguía, “Mi visita al Sanatorio 
Hospital Ambrosio Grillo,” Bohemia 41, no. 5 (January 30, 1949): 24–25, 89. 
723 “Cunde la rebeldía entre los enfermos abandonados del Hospital ‘Ambrosio Grillo’,” Alerta, August 29, 1951, 
16.  
 206 
 
Figure 14. A photograph published with Dr. Chelala's exposé at La Esperanza Sanatorium. It featured beds 
“whose rusty racks held up discolored mattresses.”724 
 
Past scholarship has often described the pre-revolutionary period’s public health sector in 
static terms of corruption and inefficiency.725 A closer analysis of these decades, however, 
reveals a significant intensification of these practices during the Auténtico years. The political 
designs of Machado and Batista in launching tuberculosis initiatives had been transparent to 
many Cubans. Journalists and physicians had publicly discussed them from their respective dates 
of inception. Nonetheless, the severity and scope of the critiques of the CNT in the late 1940s 
constituted a departure from previous forms of criticism.726  
All of this frustration culminated in the most disruptive and infamous sanatorium strike in 
republican Cuba, which burst out of the gates of La Esperanza Sanatorium in the late summer of 
1951. Trouble had been brewing in the months leading up to the strike. Tensions increased as 
patient expectations were continually not met: the CNT’s apparent disinterest and 
mismanagement meant the hard-working sanatorium staff often did not have the resources to 
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Transaction Publishers, 2008), 14. 
726 Although critics accused Batista for using the CNT to build political legitimacy and for making decisions first 
and foremost on political and not scientific objectives, I have uncovered no claims in the press during the late 1930s 
and early 1940s that Batista or his cronies embezzled CNT funds. 
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adequately care for patients. On August 7th, when the male patients were served lunch, they 
refused to eat it on the grounds of its poor quality. Later in the afternoon, patients at the 
adjoining Lebredo Hospital created more disorder, “throwing plates, glasses, and spoons into the 
street, at the same time exhorting their compañeros who left for the public road to make 
‘demonstrations on the street’.”727 The disorder turned from local to national: the patients at 
Ambrosio Grillo, “[l]ost in the eastern extreme of the island, at the mercy of official charity,” 
began to protest against their own situation at the same time of the La Esperanza strike.728  
 
Figure 15. The patients march to the theater of the sanatorium.729 
 
 In response to the growing disorder, La Esperanza Director Dr. Carlos Guerrero ordered 
the gates of the sanatorium to be closed. Meanwhile, representatives of the Federation of 
University Students (FEU) and the press came to the scene, as well as family members of 
patients, who had heard about the situation. When the director refused to open the doors, several 
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patients and FEU students proceeded to open one of the gates, and all headed to the theater of the 
sanatorium where they “improvised various acts of protest” (see Figure 15).730 
The patients at La Esperanza were denouncing lack of food, overcrowding, unsanitary 
conditions, and, of course, insufficient antibiotics. They insisted that they had not seen the effects 
of the 30,000-peso credit that the government had given to La Esperanza in response to 
intensifying patient complaints in the summer months.731 Instead of attempting to pacify the 
patients and focus on funneling more resources into the hospital, the government’s response to 
the protest came swiftly and aggressively. The sanatorium staff decided to call the police, who 
rounded up 115 patients, five of who were women, and transferred them, “as detainees” for their 
indiscipline, to a police station in Havana.732 Two days after the event, President Prío named 
Col. Dr. José Randin Vergara, previously director of the Police Hospital, as military supervisor 
of the sanatorium.733 The Havana Post noted that this was necessary as “[t]hroughout the 
morning yesterday, the patients still remaining in the hospital maintained their protest, which 
grew more violent after the expulsions Tuesday. The patients spent the morning throwing bottles, 
plates and other objects into the streets of the Sanatorium and the doctors declared they could not 
restore order.”734 
The public response to this episode echoed widely and loudly. The visual record of the 
event proved shocking—weakened tuberculosis patients were treated as criminals and lay across 
the floor of the police station (see Figure 16). The papers featured stories of suffering at the 
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station, with one striker, for instance, experiencing an episode of hemoptysis. In response, the 
FEU opened the University Stadium to the expelled patients, neighbors brought food and milk, 
and doctors from the nearby Calixto García Hospital treated them. The day following the 
expulsion, the FEU demanded better food and medicine for patients at La Esperanza, the re-
admittance of the strikers, and “the resignation of the Minister of Health for his ‘unjust and 
inhumane’ attitude in ordering the patients out of La Esperanza.”735 The active involvement of 
the FEU in these conflicts speaks to the growing political importance of the disease. Other 
politically prominent figures, even those not directly connected with the health sector, 
condemned the conditions in La Esperanza. For example, Juan Marinello, head of the PSP, 
deemed the strike a “just protest.”736 
        
Figure 16. Bohemia published photographs of the arrested patients on the floor of the police station.737 
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The pressure grew to be so great that the Health Minister and the CNT promised to make 
changes. Labor leaders, including CTC leader Eusebio Mujal, and the student leaders of the 
FEU, met with Prío and secured the re-admittance of the strikers to La Esperanza.738 The new 
administration of the sanatorium reported immediate improvements in the management and 
infrastructure of the facility.739 The critical press, however, reported that in the aftermath of the 
strike, the new administration exerted a firm grasp over La Esperanza, and despite Prío’s 
promises, within weeks all had returned to normal and the scope of changes were limited.740  
Respected national figures, such as Guido García Inclán, Gustavo Aldereguía, and Juan 
Marinello, wrote throughout 1951 about the failed promises of the Prío administration regarding 
the strike.741 Roughly a month after the strike, based on a patient’s letter, Marinello informed the 
audience of La Última Hora, “[T]he promises have not been fulfilled, the money has not arrived 
to the sanatorium and the situation is practically the same as that which caused the loud and 
justified protest.”742 By the end of the year, Marinello penned: 
Never have things gone very well in the official service to tuberculars nor in the internal 
management of La Esperanza Sanatorium. But the situation of this sanatorium has 
reached such a point that it would not be an exaggeration to call it a national shame. It 
could not be otherwise, the predatory and lazy plague of the Prísta bureaucracy having 
fallen on the important center of treatment. For a long time, waste and dishonesty have 
been vast in the management of La Esperanza. In this each administration has surpassed 
the previous one. But the criminal neglect and the absence of all scientific standards have 
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never been so absolute as now. Place of theft and deaths. That is La Esperanza. Good 
image of the government that serves it and destroys it.743  
 
Despite these reports, by mid-1952, the chapter of this “crisis” had been declared closed by the 
CNT. Its journal reported on all of the improvements made at the sanatorium by Col. Randin, 
alleging that discipline had been restored for the benefit of the hospital.744  
Taken as a whole, the episodic strikes reveal how desperate the situation had become for 
those lucky enough to have secured one of Cuba’s scarce sanatorium beds. In 1949, one reporter 
conjectured that tuberculosis sanatoriums were “one of the gravest problems, and perhaps the 
sharpest of all, created by the sanitary policy of the Auténticos.”745 The internal management of 
sanatoriums was seen as a microcosm of Cuba’s national politics. Reporting on the 1948 
Ambrosio Grillo strike, another journalist concluded, “‘Ambrosio Grillo is not an exception…In 
any zone of the State, the situation is the same. The government has lost credit; has ignored its 
own program; has disrupted its authority; has twisted the Constitution and laws to its whim; has 
allowed excesses, plunder, and crime.”746 
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6.3 THE RETURN OF CHARITIES 
Running parallel to this cycle of radical protest, upper- and middle-class citizens began to 
mobilize to deal with the urgent issue of tuberculosis care. Unlike strikers’ disgust with the 
material shortcomings of a corrupt administration, these citizens hoped to supplement the CNT’s 
work, drawing upon traditional notions of charity and humanitarian philanthropy.747 In the late 
1940s, physicians and civic figures formed private voluntary associations, which, among other 
goals, sought to facilitate access to streptomycin. With the advent of antibiotic drugs for the 
disease, treatment, while still costly, was no longer prohibitive for wealthy individuals or groups 
of middle-class citizens. In short, antibiotics had the potential to decentralize state-provided 
health care. Private citizens providing health services to the poor worked against the principles 
undergirding Batista’s design for a welfare state and used traditional mechanisms of class-based 
charity to provide health services. 
Dr. Arnaldo Coro del Pozo, a tuberculosis specialist, was the architect behind this new 
wave of associational activity. In his narration of the origins of the new organizations, class and 
racial power dynamics are clearly evidenced: 
In 1946 the discovery of Streptomycin by professor Wassman [sic] was officially 
announced….We decided to go to the Mayo Clinic to observe the results and learn the 
application of Streptomycin under the expert direction of Drs. Feldmann and Hinshaw. A 
few weeks after our return, Streptomycin was already for sale in Cuba, but at a soaring 
price…Then we saw una muchacha de color, 15 years old, who presented with a form of 
pulmonary tuberculosis that I had already seen evolve towards cure with streptomycin 
treatment at the Mayo Clinic, but this case was in the Laennec Dispensary [in a 
neighborhood of Havana], which translated means that the patient was poor, and poor de 
qué manera; her mother was a cook and earned $20 a month, they lived in one room in a 
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solar, in the picture of misery that can be imagined. It was not possible to propose to this 
mother that she needed to obtain, by any means, the approximately $200 needed for the 
cure of her daughter; I thought about it various times but it was impossible for me to put 
the dagger in the chest of this Cuban mother, and I simply asked God for help.748  
 
The next day, still distraught, Coro ran into a friend, a fellow member in the local Rotary Club. 
He explained his despondency, and his friend abruptly drove him to the exclusive Biltmore Club. 
There, his colleague “directed himself to a group of peers from the Club and he requested from 
each one a quantity of money, five, ten and twenty pesos.” After his rounds, he told him, “Coro, 
smile a little, change your face, for already your patient is going to be saved. Here is the money 
so that you can buy Streptomycin.”749  
From this experience, Coro and his Rotary companions realized the potential of 
fundraising for the drug, and they drew from the far-reaching social connections of the Rotary 
Clubs to launch a network of streptomycin banks.750 At first, they grafted onto the existing state 
infrastructure, forming a bank at the Laennec dispensary, in the heart of central Havana; 
however, by 1949, they began to form independent municipal anti-tuberculosis leagues with 
streptomycin banks. Leagues sprang up in Bauta, Regla, Punta Brava, Guanabacoa, Isla de Pinos, 
and at the CMQ radio station. These leagues relied on subscriptions from individual and 
associational members; donations and special deals from laboratories (e.g., Pfizer, Squibb); and 
fundraising events. The local leagues vetted patients based on access to economic resources: 
those who were very poor received streptomycin free of charge, while others were given loans 
that they had to pay back in easy installments.  
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Philanthropic intentions surely played a central role in this story, as Coro himself 
recounted.  The network of leagues partially filled a gap in a critical arena in which the state was 
failing. However, the system that ensued possessed fundamental flaws. The first concerns the 
coverage that such associations provided. The municipal leagues popped up predominantly in the 
greater metropolitan area of Havana. Citizens in rural areas and eastern cities had fewer 
resources to call upon, and efforts to raise money for the drug were spontaneous and transitory. 
For example, before what was perceived as “the passivity of the government,” a group in 
Cienfuegos organized to raise money to save the life of a fellow resident of the city.751 While 
admirable and resourceful, such piecemeal responses could not answer the great need of the large 
pool of tuberculosis victims in the country. The quantity of people that the leagues could serve 
was also limited. For example, in the course of approximately nine years, the Bauta League 
supplied only forty residents with medicine (135 total were assisted more generally). In Punta 
Brava, in six years, nineteen citizens received medicine.752 Several of the clubs sought to run 
their own dispensaries, but soon found themselves physically and financially exhausted, and 
redirected these populations to CNT dispensaries. 
Second, the leagues contributed to the maintenance of ideas about traditional charity and 
did not base their actions on any notion of a right to health care. Batista’s CNT had been a key 
part of the effort to build a welfare state, one built on “the recognition of the right that the poor 
sick have to receive the benefits of institutions created for their aid, without having to use the 
clout of recommendations, nor receiving it through gifts or alms, as happens when they solicit a 
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service in the other institutions for the poor.”753 Instead, in the late 1950s, Coro sang the praises 
of these municipal banks, for not only “were many lives saved,” but “the poor family did not 
have to resort to public charity nor to moneylenders to obtain Streptomycin.”754 While he 
denigrated public charity, models of private charity were implicitly deemed beneficial. Instead of 
insisting that the state use their money efficiently and effectively, Coro argued that the onus lay 
with civilians, asking them to make charitable donations.755 
Efforts to create a parallel private, charity-based health system accompanied the 
weakening of the consensus that the Cuban state could lead the tuberculosis campaign (even if 
many continued to believe that theoretically a state should do so). These efforts also contributed 
to that consensus by highlighting the shortcomings of the public health sector. Throughout the 
1940s, politically active physicians exhibited disillusionment with the state for not endorsing and 
carrying out their professional projects.756 When Bohemia announced its own streptomycin bank, 
with intentions of eventually turning it over to the government once off the ground, one activist 
responded quickly and fiercely, begging that Bohemia not put the bank in the hands of the 
government: “Because, if they control it, we will be buying streptomycin for ‘them,’ those who 
sell it for votes, as they sell beds at ‘La Esperanza.’ Streptomycin would not arrive to those most 
in need, but instead to those most addicted to the regime.”757 She insisted that this was not a 
matter of which party was in power, but a fundamental flaw of Cuba’s system of governance: “It 
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matters little if the President is named Juan or Pedro, if the First Lady is Panchita or Mariquita, if 
in the high administration of the CNT figure the politicians…of the Orthodox, the Liberal, or the 
Auténtico Party; whatever the case, it will be the same.”758 She concluded that under 
governmental control, “streptomycin would not be distributed by scientific criteria”; therefore, 
“we cannot allow our streptomycin bank to be placed under its subvention.”759  
6.4 CONCLUSION 
In May 1947, choreographer Alberto Alonso unveiled his latest work at the Teatro Auditorium in 
Havana. The ballet, titled Antes del Alba (Before the Dawn), represented a significant break from 
traditional ballet compositions, not least of all for placing social critique at the heart of the 
performance.760 Its protagonist, played by Alicia Alonso, was a woman sick with tuberculosis, 
residing in one of Havana’s notorious solares; the ballet’s central motifs were suffocating 
poverty, eviction, and sickness. Haunted by the loss of love, the police, her landlord, 
hallucinations, and the all-consuming symptoms of tuberculosis, the widow metaphorically 
brought down the curtain by committing suicide by fire, her only ticket out of her predicament of 
impoverishment and disease.  
The ballet debuted in the very moment that foreign news reports were broadcasting the 
great hope that streptomycin might pose for those with tuberculosis. While the well-to-do and art 
critics lambasted the ballet, “representatives of the progressive intelligentsia, university students, 
professionals and the humble sectors of the population…understood the validity of its 
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audacity.”761 Many Cubans found Chela’s decision to commit suicide to be plausible, reflective 
of the ways in which poverty and disease had become interlocked for many of Cuba’s citizens. 
The narrative of triumph over tuberculosis would take root much later in Cuba than in the United 
States. 
Streptomycin, as a curative drug technology, possessed the potential to help the 
government achieve many of its goals. It was not a panacea, as streptomycin cured only certain 
forms of the disease; however, its use in outpatient care and surgery resulted in a remarkable and 
swift drop in disease incidence in certain corners of the globe (including Cuba). But the 
Auténtico administrations’ governance over the issue proved tenuous and fragile, and the issue 
further contributed to citizen discontent with government authorities and the public health sector.  
At first, Cubans were concerned with the issue of scarcity and poorly managed 
distribution by the government; however, by 1948, the state ended controlled distribution in 
response to increased production. Nonetheless, a streptomycin regimen remained prohibitively 
expensive for ordinary Cubans. In response, the poor and their allies articulated the right to free 
or state-subsidized medicine. The CNT and the Health Ministry proved incapable not only of 
paying for the drug, but of regularizing its distribution in a fair and efficient way; patronage, 
inefficiency, and corruption undermined the process. As the poor mobilized with the help of 
student groups and labor unions, they politicized the issue further and made their negative 
experiences in trying to access what they believed to be a “miracle drug” visible to the nation. By 
the 1950s, many Cubans had become convinced that their state was not capable of effectively 
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managing the tuberculosis campaign, and charities returned to assist the state, a telling 
indictment of the Cuban public health sector.  
While the issue of antibiotic therapy energized the poor, physicians found themselves 
equally concerned with the BCG vaccine, a technology that prevented tuberculosis infection and, 
if used on a mass scale, could lower Cuba’s morbidity rate. In the 1950s, the CNT changed its 
motto to “For the Cure of the Sick and Defense of Healthy.”762 While the CNT had not met 
citizen expectations on the first count, physicians hoped that the state would effectively wield the 
vaccine in the 1950s to ensure the health of its population.  
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7.0   “IN DEFENSE OF THE HEALTHY”: BCG VACCINATION IN CUBA, 1927–
1965 
In May 1950, Dr. Edward J. O. Brien, president of the American Tuberculosis Sanatorium 
Commission, embarked on an international journey, where he “studied the conditions of various 
countries regarding tuberculosis.” He came back convinced that “the only hope of ending the 
disease is mass vaccination with the BCG…vaccine.”763 Bohemia reported on his trip, 
acknowledging that although the vaccine did not help those who already had tuberculosis, “if all 
the children of the world were vaccinated with BCG, the disease would be completely eliminated 
in a few generations.”764 One year earlier a columnist at Prensa Libre penned, “The World 
Health Organization of the United Nations just reported that around five million children in 
different areas of Europe have been examined and vaccinated against tuberculosis.”765 He posed 
a question to his readers: “And why does Cuba not bring that famous vaccine to save us so much 
horror and so much pain?”766 
Researchers at the Pasteur Institute in Paris discovered BCG (Bacillus Calmette-Guérin), 
an attenuated strain of the bovine tuberculosis bacillus, in 1908 and developed it into a successful 
vaccine by 1921.767 In the decade that followed, the vaccine was implemented on a wide scale in 
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France, and to a lesser degree in Germany.768 In the wake of World War II, during which 
tuberculosis morbidity and mortality surged, many countries turned to the BCG vaccine to 
control the disease, for it was more cost-efficient than sanatorium construction. In the late 1940s 
and accelerating in the 1950s, various international organizations initiated mass BCG vaccination 
campaigns in places as diverse as India, Yugoslavia, Poland, Jamaica, and Mexico.769  
In Cuba, after a brief and experimental phase with BCG vaccination in the late 1920s, the 
state neglected this method of disease control, focusing instead on sanatorium projects. 
Reflective of the CNT’s tendency to ignore the advice of technocrats, they took action regarding 
BCG vaccination only when physicians’ reform efforts coincided with foreign scientists’ interest 
in Cuba’s BCG program. As a result of this pressure, in 1942, the CNT founded a BCG 
Laboratory to produce the vaccine and conduct experimentation on a small scale. In 1950, the 
government elevated the Laboratory to an Institute, with the goal of carrying out mass 
vaccination across the national territory.  
By the mid-1950s, Cuba possessed an institute that produced the vaccine, legislation that 
made vaccination obligatory, and significant funding to be used for mass vaccination. 
Nonetheless, the BCG Institute fell short of annual vaccination goals, due to an insufficient rural 
health network, lack of political will, and citizens’ resistance. While the CNT achieved medical 
success in its production and export of the BCG vaccine by the 1940s, it experienced failure in 
the field of public health in the 1950s by continually underperforming in the practice of 
vaccination.  
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When the revolutionary government came to power in 1959, they initiated a successful 
mass BCG vaccination campaign. By making adjustments to correct for past failures in the 
CNT’s immunization program, MINSAP vaccinated large numbers of Cubans throughout the 
1960s. Tuberculosis policy makers dedicated resources to popular education; they forged cross-
institutional partnerships with non-health-related organizations; and they adjusted to on-the-
ground limitations by simplifying vaccination procedures. In short, during the 1960s, political 
will bolstered the vaccination campaign. The effort, however, owed part of its success to the 
excellent vaccination resources developed by republican administrators in the 1940s and 1950s.  
BCG vaccination has encouraged scholarly interest, but much of it has been concerned 
with understanding which nations widely used the vaccine and why. While the vaccine invoked 
acrimonious controversies about its safety and efficacy (the latter continues to be the subject of 
debate in international health circles), scholars have argued that ideological orientation, and more 
specifically a country’s attitude toward social welfare, is the variable that most adequately 
explains why western European countries and the United States adopted or did not adopt the 
vaccine.770 The case of Cuba complicates this narrative. Even though government and public 
health officials were firmly in the pro-vaccine camp by the late 1940s and were even producing 
the vaccine domestically, Cuba never carried out mass vaccination until the 1960s. This chapter 
argues that variables such as political will, state capacity, and citizens’ reception should be 
included when comparing national vaccination efforts.  
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By analyzing a preventive health measure, this chapter considers a different aspect of 
Cuba’s tuberculosis campaign than those discussed in previous chapters. With the arrival of 
antibiotic therapy, the number of tuberculosis-related deaths decreased; however, physicians 
observed that the number of Cubans who contracted the disease, representing dangerous sources 
of contagion, did not diminish. In response, doctors began to take a greater interest in BCG 
vaccination, for it promised to protect many Cubans, especially children, against the tenacious 
and ever-present threat of infection by the tuberculosis bacillus. In their view, any effective 
tuberculosis campaign should pursue vaccination, for it prevented illness and controlled disease, 
the fundamental purpose of a public health sector. The CNT’s inability to vaccinate en masse 
influenced physicians’ view of the state and informed the vaccination program that the new 
regime adopted. BCG vaccination, then, is yet another example of a national medical success 
(i.e., the local production of the BCG vaccine) that was experienced as a failure. 
7.1 FIRST STEPS, 1927–1951 
Developed in France in the 1920s, the BCG vaccine produces immunity against tuberculosis, 
although the effectiveness of the vaccine and the duration of immunity have always been debated 
in scientific circles.771 Compared to other forms of vaccination, BCG was fairly complex, usually 
requiring at least three interactions with a medical professional. First, a Mantoux tuberculin skin 
test was performed, in which a tuberculin purified protein derivative was injected into the 
forearm. After a short period of time (usually 48 hours), the individual would return for a 
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reading. Those who showed serious reactions (such as raised, swollen, or hardened skin at the 
injection site) had already developed resistance to the disease (from an earlier infection) and 
would not be vaccinated. The non-reactors were given a stronger dose of tuberculin and asked to 
return in a few days. If they still showed no reaction to the skin test, they would then be 
vaccinated.772 BCG was administered orally or via intradermal injection. Because the vaccine did 
not offer lifelong immunity, the medical community advised that individuals, especially children, 
submit to re-vaccination at specific intervals.  
Facilitated by their scientific connections with France, Cuba began a small-scale human 
trial of BCG very soon after the vaccine’s development. Receiving a donation from Calmette 
himself and authorization from the Secretariat of Sanitation in 1927, Dr. Alberto Sánchez de 
Fuentes and Dr. Clemente Inclán immunized 126 children in different hospitals with the oral 
BCG vaccine. Many of the children selected had parents with tuberculosis and were therefore at 
a high risk for contracting the disease.773 If, however, these children did not become ill, the 
researchers could report data that supported the vaccine’s efficacy. The trial showed promising 
results, but its timing was not fortuitous.  
In 1930, disaster struck. In Lübeck, Germany, seventy-two infants died (27% of those 
vaccinated) when they were administered a virulent human strain of BCG (instead of an 
attenuated, bovine strain). This disaster echoed widely and “set back the vaccination program all 
over the world.”774 When news of Lübeck arrived in Cuba, Cuban pediatricians launched a 
                                                 
772 This procedure is described in Brimnes, “Vikings Against Tuberculosis,” 420–21.  
773 Cuba, Secretaría de Sanidad y Beneficencia, 1926–1931: Cinco años de labor sanitaria y de beneficencia pública 
(Havana: Imprenta y Librería La Propagandista, 1931), 48. 
774 Donna Harsch, “Medicalized Social Hygiene? Tuberculosis Policy in the German Democratic Republic,” Bulletin 
of the History of Medicine 86 (2012): 415. Attenuated vaccines are “[l]ive vaccines prepared from microorganisms 
which have undergone physical adaptation (e.g., by radiation or temperature conditions) or serial passage in 
laboratory animal hosts or infected tissue/cell cultures, in order to produce avirulent mutant strains capable of 
inducing protective immunity.” “Attenuated Vaccines,” Online Medical Dictionary, accessed August 15, 2016,  
 224 
campaign to oppose the vaccine. Tuberculosis specialists, on the other hand, still supported it.775 
The social struggles that characterized the late years of the Machado government, which 
interrupted the regular functioning of many aspects of the sanitation branch’s tuberculosis 
service, also created problems for the pro-vaccination camp, and the vaccination experiment 
fizzled out in the tumultuous and uncertain years of the early 1930s.776 
Despite these circumstances, throughout the 1930s and 1940s, a small group of 
physicians, primarily tuberculosis specialists, persistently asked the government and the CNT to 
devote increased funding and resources to this prophylactic measure. They hoped that the 
founding of the CNT would allow them to re-insert vaccination as a cornerstone of the revived 
and expanded national tuberculosis campaign. One year after the CNT’s founding, the clinical 
chief at La Esperanza Sanatorium, Dr. Francisco Nuñez Llanes, wrote, “So important is the 
Calmette Vaccine in these moments, that a serious anti-tuberculosis campaign” without “said 
vaccine is inconceivable.”777 Alberto Sánchez de Fuentes, who had co-led the vaccination studies 
under Machado and who still occupied a position of prominence as director of the Jacobsen 
Dispensary in a poor Havana suburb, published frequently on the topic in the late 1930s and 
early 1940s.778 To those eminent pediatricians who continued to express reservations about the 
                                                                                                                                                             
http://www.online-medical-dictionary.org/definitions-a/attenuated-vaccines.html. 
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vaccine, this cadre of tuberculosis experts pointed to the earlier vaccination experiment: of the 
126 children vaccinated in the late 1920s, only four had tuberculosis by 1939.779  
Once it became clear that the CNT did not plan to pursue vaccination as part of its 
campaign, these physicians employed a stronger and more critical tone in their articles. They 
insisted that any effective tuberculosis campaign had to include BCG vaccination.780 One BCG 
vaccine specialist, Dr. Rita Shelton, claimed that the delay in vaccinating had already cost lives. 
She argued that if Cuba had continued vaccination during the 1930s, it would have experienced 
mortality drops on par with Sweden and Holland, two countries that vaccinated widely and 
reported very low rates of the disease.781 
Reflective of the CNT’s tendency to ignore the advice of technocrats in their employ (and 
especially outside of it), they took significant action regarding BCG vaccination only when 
physicians’ reform efforts coincided with the pressure of international scientific attention. One of 
these moments arrived in the early 1940s, when the CNT founded a national BCG Laboratory. 
At the 1940 Pan-American Tuberculosis Congress held in Buenos Aires, delegates selected 
Havana as seat and Juan Castillo (of the CNT) as president of the next Congress. Latin American 
tuberculosis specialists had overwhelmingly embraced the vaccine (in contrast to Britain and the 
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United States), and they selected BCG as one of the central themes of the next meeting, to be 
held in 1942.  
A number of Cuban physicians, including Castillo, seized this opportunity to push the 
CNT to act. They argued that it would be a source of national embarrassment if the international 
congress met in Havana to discuss BCG, and delegates realized that the country practiced no 
vaccination. With “new urgency” given to the issue, the CNT responded promptly.782 In 1942, 
one Rockefeller Foundation official noted, “It appears that a Latin-American tuberculosis 
meeting is to be held in Havana in June, and the Tuberculosis Association [the CNT] wished to 
show the meeting that they too are doing something about BCG.”783   
In late 1942, the CNT inaugurated the BCG Laboratory and appointed Dr. Pedro 
Domingo Sanjuan, a Spanish tuberculosis expert living in exile, to head its operations. The 
laboratory focused on the production of the vaccine, while also engaging in small-scale human 
trials of the vaccine (see Table 7 for numbers). In March 1944, the Laboratory set up a service at 
the Jacobsen Dispensary. This center represented a prime spot from which to begin vaccination. 
Sánchez de Fuentes, one of the vaccine’s primary proponents who had experience with BCG in 
1927, directed this unit. Furthermore, the population of the dispensary reported high tuberculosis 
rates: located in the Jesús del Monte neighborhood, near the large Las Yaguas shantytown, it 
served an overwhelmingly poor and indigent population.  
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Throughout the 1940s, the BCG Laboratory earned a certain level of regional 
notoriety.784 Pedro Domingo and colleagues developed EBCG (an extract of BCG) as a new 
method for tuberculosis testing, arguing that it was more effective than the protein derivative 
used in the traditional Mantoux tuberculin test. By the late 1940s, Cuba exported the BCG 
vaccine to Mexico, Colombia, El Salvador, Panama and Guatemala.785 The Laboratory also sent 
their employees overseas or invited foreign medical practitioners to Cuba to train personnel from 
these countries in proper vaccination techniques.786  
Despite these accomplishments, Cuban physicians were not satisfied with the scope of 
vaccination within Cuba. During the 1940s, the highest annual vaccination number was just 
under 4,000 children. CNT employees pointed to other countries in an attempt to interest the 
CNT Board of Governors in funding more widespread vaccination. In a report on the 1945 Pan-
American Tuberculosis Congress, Castillo noted that Cuba possessed “more limited experience” 
in vaccinating than Brazil and Argentina.787 From 1925 to 1945, Castillo reported, Uruguay had 
vaccinated 115,000 people; Argentina, 200,000; and Brazil 330,000.788 At this point, Cuba had 
vaccinated less than 3,000 in the previous twenty years.789 Pedro Domingo published an article 
in the CNT’s scientific journal, observing that Cuba lagged behind other national vaccination 
programs. In Brazil, for instance, “vaccination with BCG had reached better development” than 
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in Cuba.790 Domingo noted that 27,000 (not a paltry 3,000) should have already been vaccinated 
if Cuba wanted to match the percentage of the population that Brazil had vaccinated.791 Also, the 
Uruguayan government vaccinated four times more people than Cuba did every year.792   
In the late 1940s, physicians once again referenced the precariousness of Cuba’s 
reputation on an international stage to push for more BCG funding. In the post-war period, mass 
X-ray examination and mass vaccination gained greater acceptance as tools to eliminate 
tuberculosis. In 1950, Domingo pronounced, “In the period in which all civilized countries of the 
world are implementing vaccination; when France, Belgium, the Scandinavian countries, Brazil, 
and others make it obligatory; in the moment in which the World Health Organization is 
developing in Europe a vaccination campaign intended to immunize more than 15 million 
children, freeing them from the torment of the white plague, we would be guilty of being 
insensible if we did not cry out for Cuba to achieve the benefits that the others are getting.”793 
These physicians argued that foreign medical figures were already noting the 
contradiction of Cuba’s vaccination policy: it produced an effective vaccine and trained non-
Cubans in vaccination techniques, yet did not widely immunize its own population. Diario de la 
Marina reported that the CNT Director “witnessed the spectacle of scholarship students from 
different countries coming to Cuba to receive training in anti-tuberculosis vaccination who left 
saying: Cuba is a marvelous country, studying and preparing the best BCG vaccine in the world; 
they give it to other countries that implement it with magnificent results, but they do not 
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vaccinate anyone.”794 Domingo noted, “Our attendance at international Congresses and constant 
publications about this theme…in medical journals of different nations gave us great 
international importance.” When compared with the practice of vaccination, however, he opined, 
“It is not hard to understand that we had already left the sphere of neglect and entered into one of 
ridicule.”795  
Unsatisfied with this situation, in late 1948, a BCG committee formed within the CNT, 
who went to the Board of Governors to push for mass vaccination.796 On May 29, 1950, the 
Health Ministry elevated the BCG Laboratory to become the BCG Institute, and the President 
called for the expansion of vaccination. A year later, Congress appropriated a credit of $100,000 
to support the Institute.797 Marianao served as the seat of the Central Vaccination Dispensary 
(annexed to the BCG Institute and the headquarters of the CNT). With the objective of making 
vaccination truly national in scope, each provincial capital was slated to receive a vaccination 
dispensary, with a doctor, nurse, and visiting doctor at each unit. Domingo pronounced, “With 
the inauguration of the BCG Institute in 1950, one stage of vaccination in Cuba closed. During it, 
tuberculosis specialists had been carrying out the toughest work, in waking up the interest of 
responsible authorities and the public.”798  
This legislation coincided with physicians’ growing fears of contagion in the late 1940s 
and early 1950s. With the arrival of antibiotic therapy, mortality began to drop, but morbidity did 
not. In fact, physicians were concerned about those individuals who did not die (due to antibiotic 
therapy), but were still not completely cured and therefore represented a dangerous source of 
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contagion. In 1951, one BCG advocate spoke publicly about “the impetuous advance of the 
terrible disease,” warning of the threat posed to the “great majority of the Cuban population” of 
“the most imminent contamination.”799 Juan Castillo believed that Cuba, “because of its high 
morbidity,” had entered into a phase that he termed “Tuberculous Intensification.”800 To combat 
this, what was especially important were “preventive instruments, like BCG vaccination.”801 
Physicians had finally achieved their goal of garnering adequate state funding for 
vaccination. They hoped that the CNT would correct the fundamental contradiction of BCG 
vaccination in Cuba: the Laboratory had achieved great success in medical research and vaccine 
production, yet the public health sector had not extended the vaccine to benefit the Cuban 
people. The government had legislated a new stage of mass vaccination; it remained to be seen if 
they could immunize large numbers of people throughout the island or if BCG vaccination would 
serve as yet another example of the shortcomings of the public health system. 
7.2 NATIONAL VACCINATION, 1950S 
The foundation of the BCG Institute increased the number of annual vaccinations. After 
providing 7,400 vaccinations in 1950, health workers employed by the BCG Institute 
administered over 20,500 vaccines in 1951 (see Table 7). Although the data is hard to parse, it 
appears that the state measured number of vaccines administered, not the number of individuals 
who were vaccinated (no data is available in the 1950s that breaks the total vaccination count 
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into first vaccinations and re-vaccinations.). By 1956, the number of vaccinations had more than 
doubled from 1951, reaching over 45,000. By 1958, however, vaccinations dropped to under 
20,000, probably a result of the political chaos engulfing the country.   
Table 7. Annual Number of Vaccines, 1943–1958802 
Year Vaccinations 
1943 522 
1944 922 
1945 1,398 
1946 2,243 
1947 3,741 
1948 3,413 
1949 3,975 
1950 7,359 
1951 20,521 
1952 28,891 
1953 N/A 
1954 N/A 
1955 N/A 
1956 45,739 
1957 N/A 
1958 17,154 
 
Despite this improvement in vaccination across the 1950s (and in comparison with the 
low numbers of the 1940s), the campaign underperformed on two central measures. The BCG 
Institute aimed to implement a mass vaccination campaign that extended across the national 
territory. On the first count, the BCG Institute fell far short of its own goals. In 1950, Dr. Pedro 
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Domingo, head of the BCG Institute, declared that Cuba should be “annually vaccinating 
150,000 newborns in the urban and rural areas of the country.”803 He also noted that the Institute 
should conduct more than 650,000 exams annually, to identify those children and adults who 
needed to be re-vaccinated. 804 Several years later, another high-ranking BCG Institute official 
modified the annual goal to be 380,000 vaccinations (80,000 newborns; 200,000 children older 
than 3 months; and 100,000 re-vaccinations).805  
The BCG Institute never vaccinated in numbers that would qualify it as a “mass” 
campaign. In 1953, the Director of the Central Vaccination Dispensary of the BCG Institute, Dr. 
Rafael Ballestero Sierra, summarized, “Although the number of BCG vaccinations carried out in 
Cuba is growing significantly from year to year, nevertheless it has not arrived at the minimum 
necessary for achieving the optimal results that it can produce in the prophylaxis of 
tuberculosis.”806 The number of vaccines administered to infants in 1952 (19,224) was “frankly 
insufficient, since they barely represent one quarter of those necessary for a very efficient 
prophylaxis.”807 By the end of the 1950s, even though the number of annual vaccinations had 
increased, the highest annual total was 45,769 vaccinations, a far cry from the 380,000 
recommended.808 
The BCG Institute also underperformed on the second issue of importance: a vaccination 
campaign that extended across the national territory (see Figure 17). In the provinces of 
Matanzas, Las Villas, and Camagüey, the BCG Institute managed to immunize in numbers 
proportional to the provincial population. On the other hand, Oriente Province—Cuba’s most 
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populous province with 30.8% of the national population—accounted for only 6.25% of the 
vaccines administered in 1953.809 By 1956, this had improved slightly, with the province 
receiving 12.8% of vaccines. By contrast, 47.4% of vaccines were administered in the Province 
of Havana (with approximately 26.4% of the national population).810  
 
Figure 17. As with other medical resources, the largest percentage of total vaccinations took place in Havana 
Province and Oriente was particularly neglected. 
 
Physicians took note of this disparity and petitioned the state for a change. The director of 
the Central Vaccination Dispensary published a report in the CNT’s journal, pressing them to 
allocate more vaccinations to Oriente. He pointed out that not only was this the most populous 
section of the country, but it also reported the highest tuberculosis incidence.811 During a 
national tuberculosis conference held in Santiago de Cuba in 1953, a cadre of physicians took the 
opportunity to highlight this problem. In the presence of members of the Cuban Society of 
Phthisiology, the National Tuberculosis Council, the Society of Clinical Studies, the Society of 
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Surgery, the Santiago de Cuba Society of Pediatricians, and the Santiago de Cuba chapter of the 
Medical College, these physicians demanded better and expanded vaccination in the region. One 
of the specific problems they noted was that Holguín, the third largest municipality in the 
republic, merited its own vaccination center and should not have to rely on the services located 
in Oriente’s provincial capital (Santiago de Cuba).812  
The BCG Institute also underperformed in an international context. While Cuba reported 
mortality data and health indicators on par with the most developed regions in the Americas, they 
could not match their vaccination rates. Brazil and Chile, both reporting good health statistics 
and possessing a relatively well developed public health sector, vaccinated 4.1% and 5.67% of 
their populations, respectively, in 1956.813 While Cuba performed better than those Latin 
American countries with notoriously insufficient health ministries (e.g., Bolivia, which 
vaccinated 0.07% of its population), it only vaccinated 0.73% of its national population in 
1956.814  
By the mid-1950s, health officials and tuberculosis specialists reported concern with 
these low vaccination numbers. Octavio Montoro, an eminent Cuban physician, served on 
Batista’s Advisory Council (Consejo Consultivo), where he introduced an initiative in 1954 to 
make BCG vaccination compulsory and to increase funding for the Institute. The Council 
approved the legislation and sent it on to Congress.815 Passed in 1955, the law required a number 
of institutions to vaccinate newborn children: municipal, provincial, and state hospitals; private 
and mutual aid health centers; and other dispensaries, crèches, and clinics. Those who birthed 
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children outside of these institutions were required to vaccinate them within three months of their 
birth. The law mandated that two years after its passage, families would have to show a 
certificate of vaccination before schools admitted them. The Ministry of Education was asked for 
its cooperation in this matter.816 Certificates would also be required for those working in the 
public sector, domestic service, or the armed forces.817  
The legislation noted that “more resources and a more adequate organization” were 
needed to achieve immunization of the largest possible number of Cuban children. Funding was 
increased to 360,000 pesos.818 These efforts seem to have improved vaccination, as the number 
of vaccines climbed to roughly 45,000 in the year following the passage of the law, but total 
vaccination still did not come close to the number desired by tuberculosis specialists. In an 
international comparative context, the BCG vaccination campaign in Cuba seems to have been 
well funded. The decree in 1951 appropriated $300,000 annually to the BCG Institute. By 
comparison, in India from 1948–1951, the International Tuberculosis Campaign tested 4 million 
individuals for only $448,000.819 In short, it is unlikely that lack of money handicapped the 
Cuban campaign.  
Instead, I argue that three factors stunted vaccination efforts: lack of political will behind 
the issue, citizen resistance, and an inadequate rural health infrastructure. Even though the CNT 
formed the BCG Institute in 1950, the topic of vaccination seems to have not captured the 
attention of the population or of important governmental leaders. The press infrequently 
discussed vaccination, and following Batista’s return to power, publicity and attention shifted 
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even more to hospital projects, especially the Topes de Collantes Sanatorium. In early 1954, as 
Batista rushed to finish and inaugurate the facility in time for the National Hospital Day 
ceremony in May, the BCG Institute reported that it had to stop production of the vaccine “for 
lack of material” and for “not having paid its suppliers.”820 It is likely that in early 1954 the CNT 
diverted money away from the BCG Institute in order to finish construction on Topes de 
Collantes. In the situation of “irregularities” in which the CNT found itself, one journalist 
doubted that the “excellent [compulsory vaccination] proposal of the Advisory Council will 
culminate in a practical reality.”821  
The significance of political will is highlighted by episodes in which the government 
carried out mass vaccination. For example, in 1949, the Ministry of Health feared an outbreak of 
smallpox, when a case was reported after a young Cuban returned from Mexico. In a very short 
period of time, the Health Ministry initiated a campaign of vaccination in Havana and planned a 
campaign outside of the capital.822 After two weeks, 800,000 Cubans had been vaccinated.823 
When political will and public concern coalesced, the Cuban state was very capable of mass 
vaccination.824 The BCG vaccine, on the other hand, prevented a chronic disease; it did not 
capture the attention and resources of the state like vaccinations against epidemic diseases.  
A second factor hindering the campaign was resistance to vaccination. Opposition to 
vaccination has a long history, crossing borders and centuries.825 The case of resistance to BCG 
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vaccination in Cuba, however, had a specific historical precedent, one that directly increased 
fears of the BCG vaccine and accusations of the Cuban state’s incompetence. In the spring of 
1948, the press published an account of “the strange case of Public School No. 40.” In late 1947, 
the Ministry of Education carried out an epidemiological survey in several Havana public 
schools, including one in Jesús del Monte, a working-class Havana neighborhood. They tested 
for many diseases, including tuberculosis, and physicians administered EBCG tests in order to 
determine the index of tubercular infection at each school. (This was purely a survey, and they 
were not vaccinating the children with the BCG vaccine).  
Several days after these tests had been given, a large number of female pupils began to 
present severe and disturbing reactions. For some, the abrasion caused by the test did not scar 
over (as was the normal reaction); instead, tumor-like eruptions formed at the site, the scar 
remained open, and the wound began to ooze.826 Even more serious and bizarre symptoms were 
reported: loss of appetite and weight; general weakness; pain in the legs and arms; high fever; 
and even one case of facial paralysis.827  
Then, panic broke out when the doctor who had administered these tests could not return 
to the school to answer parents’ questions because he had been hospitalized. The Ministry of 
Education downplayed the incident, not taking the parents’ understandable distress into account. 
The Ministry sent another physician to the school, who declared that the “matter lacked 
importance.”828 He recommended only that parents feed their children a nutritious diet and 
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provide them with vitamins. In response, the parents brought a lawsuit against the 
government.829  
In March 1948, the incident gained national attention when Bohemia brought the “strange 
case” to light, asking a myriad of questions that it believed needed to be answered. The 
inflammatory language of Bohemia served to broaden the ire and anxiety surrounding the 
situation. In its first article, the magazine asked its readers: “What has happened? Has 
the…doctor committed some error, injecting the girls with another virus? Is it due to an error or 
deficiency in the preparation of the vaccine that is made in the laboratory of the National 
Tuberculosis Council? Why has this event been kept a secret for three months? Have these 156 
girls contracted the terrible illness [TB]?” In the late 1940s, distrust of the state and the CNT was 
at an all-time high, and the author concluded, “[I]t would be nothing unusual if we were in the 
presence of a typical case of negligence or criminal ineptitude.”830 Much like the strikes in 
Cuba’s sanatoriums, this incident—covered over the course of several months by the national 
press—contributed to citizens’ critical perceptions of the public health system and its 
institutions.  
The language and photographs published by Bohemia stoked public fear. For instance, 
one journalist spoke to a tuberculosis researcher, Dr. Pulido, who did not hesitate to claim that 
many of the children had tuberculosis (without adequately emphasizing that they might have 
been infected before the skin test). When Bohemia asked him if the situation might be similar to 
what happened at Lübeck, he replied, “Anything is possible.” He continued by stating how easy 
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it was for germs to turn virulent, a claim with which many physicians took issue.831 This 
specialist also had questionable motives, for he was developing a serum he claimed would cure 
tuberculosis.832 In the interview with Bohemia, he offered to treat the girls with this substance.833 
The photographs published by the magazine also contributed to panic (see Figure 18). 
 
Figure 18. Bohemia published many photographs of the afflicted schoolchildren. Pictured above is a group of 
girls showing the “pustules” that remained at the site of injection.834 
 
The government responded slowly and with little transparency. When confronted with the 
incident in late 1947, the government did not proactively try to understand what went wrong, 
assign blame, and provide explanations (and medical treatment) to the parents and school 
children of Public School No. 40. In March, in response to Bohemia’s first exposé, the Cuban 
Society of Tuberculosis Specialists (the CNT’s scientific society) publicized the safety of EBCG. 
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This was an inadequate response, for many had already begun to suspect that BCG, not EBCG, 
had been administered.835 In April 1948, governmental ministries began passing the buck. For 
example, Health Minister Riva said the incident was not his or the Ministry of Health’s fault.836 
The “responsible sanitary organizations” had not been conscientious, and Bohemia felt the need 
to safeguard the reputation of the BCG vaccine, something that all government organizations 
involved—the CNT, the Health Ministry, and the Ministry of Education—should have been 
doing.837  
The exposé—and recurrent follow-up essays—pushed the government and the medical 
community to act. Six months later, Bohemia published the findings of the investigation that the 
Medical College of Havana had conducted. Instead of being administered the EBCG skin test 
(which could determine past exposure to the tuberculosis bacillus), the health workers of the 
Ministry of Education had administered the actual BCG vaccine. It was unclear, however, who 
had made the mistake of supplying BCG vaccines instead of EBCG, although the Ministry of 
Education blamed it on the CNT.838 
 Like the tuberculin skin test, EBCG tests were given prior to the BCG vaccine for two 
primary reasons. First, if a health worker vaccinated someone who had been previously been 
infected with tuberculosis, the reaction at the site of vaccination could be severe and scar the 
person who had been vaccinated. Second, physicians wanted to avoid claims that the BCG 
vaccine had directly infected people. Giving a skin test first would determine if someone had the 
disease or not. While the international medical community had reached the consensus that it was 
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not possible for the BCG vaccine to cause the disease, large numbers of civilians still believed 
this to be a risk. The Medical College insisted to readers that even in the case where BCG 
vaccine was accidentally administered, local reactions would have no long-term effects. Their 
thorough investigation (though the use of pre-existing medical records) determined that those 
children who reported more severe symptoms—facial paralysis, tuberculosis infection—had 
been diagnosed with these conditions before the BCG incident. The report also ascertained that 
the doctor who had administered the vaccines and then had been hospitalized had suffered from a 
medical condition not related to the BCG incident.839  
Havana’s physicians tried to reframe the controversy, pointing to the high tubercular 
infection rates that the epidemiological survey had uncovered (50–80% of children in Havana’s 
public schools were infected with “virulent tuberculosis.”)840 They recommended “systematic 
anti-tuberculosis vaccination whenever possible,” and ironically concluded that the children of 
Public School No. 40 had been done a favor—unlike other schoolchildren of the republic, they 
had been immunized against a terrible disease.841  
Despite this measured and convincing report, the damage to the BCG vaccine’s 
reputation had been done. The Medical College of Havana explicitly rejected Pulido’s 
comparison to Lübeck in their report, but perhaps they had not convinced the public. One 
medical student recounted, “The case was talked about throughout the island; all the doctors 
received inquiries from their clients on their opinion on the matter…The anti-tuberculosis 
vaccine was confused with tuberculosis, Lubeck was remembered, and the problem was greatly 
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exaggerated.”842 In the month following the first Bohemia exposé, the Ministry of Education 
changed its policy to require parental consent before giving any medical tests, vaccinations, or 
medications in schools.843  
It is highly likely that by the early 1950s, parents throughout the island, and especially in 
Havana, remembered this incident and refused vaccination. The compulsory legislation of 1955 
may have been prompted in part by citizen resistance or ambivalence about the vaccine. As late 
as 1957, one tuberculosis specialist trying to promote BCG vaccination felt the need to insist in a 
popular health bulletin, “We can inform parents that our BCG Vaccine is as good as the best, that 
it has all the guarantees of creating true immunity in our children without producing any 
damage…”844 
One final issue that handicapped the mass vaccination effort concerns Cuba’s insufficient 
rural health network. BCG vaccination procedures were, in comparative terms, complex; the 
methods developed by Cuba’s BCG Institute were especially intense. The Institute required five 
“contacts” between medical personnel and the individual being vaccinated. In addition to the 
three contacts mentioned at the beginning of the chapter, the Institute also required follow-ups 
after the vaccine had been injected. Five days later, a nurse or physician would check the 
injection site: if a nodule formed, then the individual had already been infected (he or she was 
thus considered to not be vaccinated). Ten to thirty days after the injection, the site would be 
read a final time: if a nodule formed (considered normal), the individual had been successfully 
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vaccinated.845 Medical personnel were not only to perform all of these steps, but also to keep 
detailed records to give to the BCG Institute, which would serve as an epidemiological 
clearinghouse. One could see how such a complex process could be difficult to maintain even in 
an area like Havana, which was saturated with physicians and medical infrastructure; in rural 
areas, even one trip to a vaccination center might be prohibitive (and five visits certainly were). 
In order to carry out vaccination, the BCG Institute had been endowed with funds to 
create vaccination dispensaries in provincial capitals and mobile units for traveling to more 
isolated areas. By the early 1950s, ten mobile units were functioning, and they provided typhoid, 
smallpox, and BCG vaccines to the communities they visited.846 The Central Vaccination 
Dispensary (in Marianao, a municipality of Havana) quickly opened, and by the mid-1950s, five 
provincial vaccination centers were in operation.847 This institutional design made sense in 
Cuba’s political system, where health posts were distributed as a crucial part of the patronage 
system. The BCG Institute and its vaccination dispensaries constituted “yet another vertical 
structure” in Cuba’s public health sector.848 The decision to not decentralize vaccination, 
integrating it into general local health units followed the logic of Cuban politics, but it also spoke 
to the stunted effort to reform Cuba’s unidades sanitarias (the subject of Chapter 4). During the 
1950s, these health posts remained wedded to local politics, were often manned by unqualified 
candidates, functioned only part-time, and struggled to keep up with their duties. The BCG 
Institute, even if it had wanted to, could not graft onto a pre-existing adequate rural health 
infrastructure to carry out local vaccination campaigns. 
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One final note is the curious trend of the BCG Institute to not alter its vaccination 
procedures in response to these logistical difficulties and limits. During the first international 
BCG vaccination drive, when the Scandinavian-led International Tuberculosis Campaign moved 
from Europe to India in 1947, they were forced to simplify BCG vaccination practices. 
Confronted with India’s massive population and stunted health infrastructure, a “simplified 
technique” developed, in which only one test was administered; keeping epidemiological records 
fell by the wayside; and lay vaccinators were employed.849  
For unknown reasons, Cuban health officials did not adopt these sorts of adjustments. 
Perhaps politicians, nurses and physicians balked at giving up the economically and politically 
valuable posts. By May 1950, officials had already begun to appoint nurses and physicians to fill 
these posts, even though the vaccination centers were not yet constructed.850 The Cuban BCG 
Institute themselves recognized that there would be cases where “for not having adequate 
resources or technical personnel,” more convenient methods of administration would be 
necessary: in these situations, they deemed that the oral form of vaccination would be most 
feasible.851 However, even with this recognition, the Cubans seemed to have relied little on oral 
BCG. In 1952, for example, only 3% of vaccinations were oral, and they were administered only 
in Havana, which arguably was the easiest region to follow the complex five-contact 
procedure.852 The records of the BCG Institute offer no explanation for this discrepancy, so it is 
unclear if a rigid commitment to the most modern methods of vaccination or if poor central 
planning was to blame.  
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In sum, then, a variety of factors coalesced in the 1950s that limited the BCG campaign 
effort, even though it had been endowed with significant funding, compulsory legislation, and an 
infrastructure capable of producing the EBCG test and the BCG vaccine. In the final years of the 
1950s, political chaos interrupted vaccination, which plummeted to levels similar to those 
preceding the formation of the BCG Institute. As the guerrilla army fought its way across the 
island, a number of medical personnel accompanying them began to note that tuberculosis—the 
“gusanera real” —was causing “casualties in their ranks.”853  When these same individuals were 
appointed as health officials after 1959, they would make significant changes in vaccination 
policy and practice.  
7.3 MASS VACCINATION 
The health administration of the new revolutionary government made mass BCG vaccination one 
of its top priorities. In comparison to the performance of the republican state in the 1950s, the 
data from the early 1960s is impressive. Several Cuban physicians reported that in nine years of 
the 1950s (1950–1958), 277,380 vaccines were administered.854 From January 1959–June 1962 
(three and a half years), the government had already more than tripled this number to 927,043.855 
In 1964, 1965, and 1966, the Health Ministry administered 289,917; 368,873; and 338,107 
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doses.856 In 1952, a CNT physician lamented that the state had not vaccinated even a quarter of 
the number of newborns that needed to be vaccination.857 By 1964, MINSAP had vaccinated 
almost 93% of institutional births and 62% of total births; by 1966, they administered the BCG 
vaccine to approximately 70% of the newborn population. 
The government was able to achieve these figures by making a number of significant 
changes to the BCG vaccination campaign. The first concerns political will: this was a public 
health effort supported not only by tuberculosis specialists, but also by the authorities of the 
Health Ministry and even the Prime Minister (Fidel Castro). When new administrators began to 
make tuberculosis policy, they elevated BCG vaccination to be one of the cornerstones of the 
public health campaign to control the disease. In 1960, “intensifying BCG vaccination,” 
especially in the “urban and rural schools” was listed first among the priorities of the anti-
tuberculosis campaign.858 When MINSAP formed the Program of Tuberculosis Control in 1963, 
mass BCG vaccination figured among its five central methods of disease control.859 
Governmental officials also integrated BCG vaccination into several highly publicized 
public health efforts to reach previously marginalized populations. In early 1960, as droves of 
young Cubans headed to Varadero Beach to be trained for the literacy campaign, health workers 
tested them for tuberculosis and vaccinated them against the disease. During “Operation 
Varadero,” 15,000 literacy brigadistas were given oral BCG vaccines.860 A similar campaign 
took place among the civilian population of Zapata Swamp in the summer of 1961. Dubbed 
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“Operation Ciénaga de Zapata,” health workers and volunteers traveled around the region in 
mobile units, vaccinating the population against four diseases (tuberculosis, typhoid, tetanus and 
polio), while also giving X-ray examinations and hospitalizing active cases of the disease. 
During this five-week health operation, 30,000 BCG vaccinations were administered, a number 
that surpassed many of the annual totals of the 1950s.861  
At the end of this health campaign, Fidel Castro traveled to the area, which was dubbed 
the “most unhealthy and forgotten region” in all of Cuba. On the sands of Playa Girón, where the 
failed Bay of Pigs invasion had taken place only three months earlier, Castro declared the region 
the “first territory free of tuberculosis.”862 One journalist present penned, “In a period of five 
weeks the Cuban Revolution carried out what no government has ever attempted in fifty-eight 
years of subordination to imperialism.”863 Politicking about tuberculosis had long been a feature 
of national politics; in the early 1960s, this tradition took on an anti-imperialist cast. 
Furthermore, it began to involve vaccination, which had been little emphasized by Batista and 
other political leaders, who chose to focus the biggest share of their resources and speeches on 
hospital projects and other institutions.  
MINSAP began a popular education campaign concerning vaccination, a second major 
adjustment from previous vaccination efforts. They secured advertising space in major national 
publications that had a wide readership, including Bohemia and Zig Zag (see Figure 19). Fears 
about vaccination were taken seriously, and MINSAP instructed physicians to convince patients 
of the safety and efficacy of vaccination. This was considered part of physicians’ broader 
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mandate to “mobilize the campesinos to bring their children to the vaccination sites.”864 One 
physician employed with the Rural Medical Service (discussed more below) held educational 
talks in the neighborhoods he served. He recalled, “A very lively discussion among the 
campesinos followed, since none of them had been vaccinated against any disease, and they were 
worried about the reactions that could occur and the way in which vaccination is carried out.”865 
The topic also generated “a hectic campaign” in his clinic, where he conversed with mothers 
privately about the benefits of immunizing their children, themselves and their spouses.  
   
Figure 19. MINSAP promoted BCG vaccination by publishing advertisements in popular magazines.866 
 
The physician was careful to emphasize that vaccines were innocuous; furthermore, by 
ensuring the community that he would be the vaccinator, he was able to build trust. While it is 
unclear how such efforts played out in other municipalities, this physician happily reported that 
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on the first Saturday that vaccinations were offered, the community members had formed a long 
line to be immunized.867   
MINSAP also leveraged cross-institutional partnerships to build synergies and share the 
burden of vaccination efforts. Operation Varadero drew on the resources of multiple 
organizations: the National Literacy Commission, the National Institute of Tourism, the National 
Agrarian Reform Institute, and the Ministry of Public Health. These same four institutions also 
collaborated to carry out the work in Operation Ciénaga de Zapata, for they recognized “the 
binding links between the development of human life and activity and the protection of 
health.”868  
Beyond special vaccination campaigns, officials integrated vaccination into general 
health units (versus the specialized tuberculosis vaccination centers created in the 1950s). In 
response to the politicized absence of medical care in rural areas, by 1960, the government had 
created the Rural Medical Service (Servicio Médico Social Rural), which put recent medical 
graduates to work in the countryside for at least six months (in 1960, 318 were employed by the 
state).869 These rural doctors, sent to posts in isolated areas, worked in conjunction with 
municipal health units that were simultaneously being set up throughout the island. These 
physicians provided vaccination to many who had had little to no interaction with formal medical 
services in the past.  
The revolutionary government anticipated and adjusted policy for on-the-ground 
difficulties that had stunted vaccination efforts in the previous decade. Related to cross-
institutional partnerships, MINSAP employed a number of laypersons to help with vaccination 
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efforts. As part of more mass involvement in public health matters, during Operation Varadero 
more than one hundred professionals, employees, and workers participated in defining how the 
health operation would play out. Daily meetings were held, where all employees—from the 
highest trained medical professional to the most menial laborer—were called upon to voice 
concerns and suggestions. Bohemia noted that, in fact, many of the initiatives were offered by 
those less qualified workers, whose suggestions were “incorporated consciously into the process” 
of what was being deemed a “mass sanitary activity.”870 Literacy brigadistas were also 
instructed in their own revolutionary duty to participate in popular health campaigns.  
In Operation Ciénaga de Zapata, literacy campaign members worked alongside medical 
professionals to administer vaccines. The exodus of medical professionals from Cuba in the early 
1960s necessitated this action, but the government framed the use of non-technical personnel as 
more fitting for a social revolution. Bohemia triumphantly concluded, “Operation Varadero has 
been revealed as a new technical modality, a revolutionary sanitary specialty, in which collective 
work has played an important role and for which it is necessary to assign a large part of the 
achieved success.”871   
Finally, the revolutionary government made the decision to utilize the oral form of BCG 
vaccine. For those children under 45 days old, the campaign still administered the vaccine via 
intradermal injection. However, the oral form was used in settings with older children and adults. 
Pedro Domingo developed this vaccine, which was suspended in ice cream (Glacivacuna). This 
strategy was pursued for several reasons. First, auxiliary personnel with little training could 
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easily administer the vaccine.872 Second, based on tests done by Pedro Domingo, Glacivacuna 
could be given indiscriminately without posing danger—that is, no prior tuberculin testing was 
needed.873 Instead of administering a tuberculin test, sending the patient away, and then asking 
them to return a few days later for a reading and vaccination, large groups of children could be 
vaccinated in a short time, requiring only one contact with medical personnel. In 1952, only 3% 
of vaccines administered by the BCG Institute were oral;874 by comparison, from July 1960–
December 1961, 76.5% of vaccine doses administered were oral.875  Although MINSAP 
transitioned back to the intradermic method by the end of the 1960s, for the early years of the 
revolution, many mass campaigns relied on oral BCG (see Figure 20).876  
 
Figure 20. The BCG vaccine was mixed with vanilla ice cream and distributed to children.877 
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The success of the mass vaccination campaign, however, cannot be linked only to the 
policies and efforts of health officials in the 1960s. The campaign owed part of its success to the 
medical infrastructure developed during the 1940s and 1950s, specifically the informational, 
infrastructural and human resources developed at the BCG Laboratory and BCG Institute. Due to 
strained economic relations with the U.S., Cuba experienced severe pharmaceutical shortages in 
the early 1960s. In fact, the negotiations over Americans imprisoned after the Bay of Pigs 
debacle took the form of a hostages-for-drugs exchange.878 Cuba, however, was not dependent 
on the U.S. or any other foreign country for the production of the BCG vaccine, and Cuba 
continued to produce the vaccine. Pedro Domingo, who had headed the BCG Laboratory since 
the early 1940s, stayed on during the revolution to develop and produce Glacivacuna.879  
This combination of factors led to successful mass vaccination campaigns throughout the 
1960s.880 These efforts had long-term epidemiological consequences, protecting large numbers 
of the population and lowering tuberculosis morbidity. The short-term effects of these efforts are 
harder to measure. The letters sent to the Lyceum and Lawn Tennis Club, discussed in Chapter 3, 
point to the continued economic and social hardship of those suffering from the disease. On a 
microhistorical scale, vaccination seems to have played little role in alleviating their suffering—
they still needed money to pay for medicine, admission to hospitals, and additional economic 
assistance for paying bills while they could not work. By the late 1960s, the Cuban government 
recognized many of these issues and began to pass legislation to soften the economic blow of 
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Department of Public Health, Miami, Florida,” 22, Folder 160, Box 7, Cuban Refugee Center Records, CHC-UM. 
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contracting tuberculosis, but during the early years of the revolution, even if they had more 
health resources to call upon, many of the poor who were sick continued to struggle, leveraging 
state resources and older forms of charity to try to scrape by.   
7.4 CONCLUSION 
Across the globe, in the anti-tuberculosis campaigns of the mid-twentieth century, BCG 
vaccination represented a crucial weapon in fighting the disease, as it held the promise of 
immunizing children at a relatively low cost (versus expensive curative interventions like the 
sanatorium cure, antibiotic therapy, and lung surgery). Cuba’s experience with this vaccine 
illustrates some of the strengths, weaknesses, and contradictions of its health sector. Reflective of 
the CNT’s tendency to ignore the advice of technocrats in the pursuit of political objectives, they 
took significant action regarding BCG vaccination only when physicians’ reform efforts 
coincided with the pressure of international scientific attention.  
Vaccination represented another area (like sanatoriums and streptomycin) in which the 
state made significant steps towards improving the public health sector, and yet citizens and 
physicians perceived the effort as a failure. Cuba achieved medical success in developing and 
exporting both EBCG and the BCG vaccine. However, despite the passage of legislation, 
increases in funding, and new vaccination dispensaries in the 1950s, the CNT and other public 
health institutions never adequately or effectively implemented this technology that was central 
to the control of the disease. Lack of political will and an insufficient rural health network 
thwarted widespread vaccination. Citizens in the republic took an active role in demanding 
certain rights and shaping their public health sector, pushing the state to fund more sanatoriums 
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and streptomycin treatment. And, in the case of vaccination, citizen resistance to BCG probably 
played a role in hampering the immunization campaign.  
After 1959, MINSAP launched a new vaccination campaign, one that health 
administrators considered to be one of their top priorities in eliminating tuberculosis as a public 
health problem. They took popular education seriously, sought out cross-institutional 
connections, and simplified the operation of the campaign by using a different form of the 
vaccine and by training non-medical personnel to administer it. The campaign, however, drew on 
past resources that had been developed under republican administrators.  
By 1965, MINSAP’s tuberculosis policies seemed to have stabilized. They had 
institutionalized a new public health network, which continued to carry out mass X-ray 
examination and BCG vaccination. Sources report that the mortality rate began to drop every 
year after 1963 and the total number of new tuberculosis cases began to decline after 1965.881 
The state opened a new chapter of tuberculosis care by passing a law in 1969 that guaranteed 
patients 100% of their salaries while under treatment.882 In 1971, the government initiated 
directly observed treatment, and, in 1982, they implemented DOTS (directly observed treatment, 
short course).883  
These promising epidemiological trends have been lauded as major achievements, one 
more aspect supporting the general assessment of the socialist Cuban public health sector as a 
model to emulate. However, a number of questions remain that need to be explored, especially 
regarding how these changes and policies were experienced on the ground, across racial, class, 
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gender and geographical boundaries, differences that historians have proven continued to matter 
in daily life, despite the revolution’s rhetoric.884  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
884 See, for example, see Alejandro de la Fuente, A Nation for All: Race, Inequality, and Politics in Twentieth-
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2010): 268–89.  
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8.0  CONCLUSION 
Almost eighty years after workers laid the first brick on the Topes de Collantes Sanatorium and 
over sixty years after its inauguration, the formidable structure still stands, a jarring juxtaposition 
of human engineering in the midst of a dense forest, a historical text made of concrete that 
demands to be deciphered. What was this strange building? What does the effort to erect it tell us 
about the not-so-distant past? What human dramas swirled inside and outside of its walls? Once 
the focus of the revolution’s condemnation and then redemptive refashioning, the facility 
eventually faded from national importance. However, questions about it continue to be asked and 
to be answered. Throughout the years, elements of the story of the building in Topes de Collantes 
have been dissembled, invented, and recombined, part of the slippery process of historical 
memory.  
Tourists still trek to the isolated region, a respite from the sweltering heat and 
cacophonous bustle in the island’s cities. Those who research the area before arriving will find a 
revisionist history of the eponymous (former) hospital, a structure that continues to evoke strong 
emotion in its observers. One travel writer, for instance, chronicles, “The park takes its name 
from its largest settlement, an ugly health resort founded in 1937 by dictator Fulgencio Batista to 
placate his sick wife, for whom he built a quaint rural cottage. The architecture went downhill 
thereafter with the construction of an architecturally grotesque tuberculosis sanatorium (now a 
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health ‘resort’) begun in the late ‘30s but not opened until 1954.”885 Wikipedia repeats a similar 
narrative, but shifts the characters slightly; in this account, it is Batista’s second wife who was 
sick: “Coffee growers were living in the area when president Fulgencio Batista ordered the 
construction of a massive battleship-like Art Deco sanatorium for tuberculosis patients in 1954. 
Rumor has it that his wife Martha was battling against this illness and once there she fell in love 
for [sic] the place. As a result, she persuaded Batista to build her a cottage in the zone as 
well.”886  
There is historical evidence to dispute the veracity of both of these stories, but they are 
instructive for revealing how the public continues to remember Topes de Collantes Sanatorium— 
and health care before 1959 writ large. Even in the absence of state propaganda and scholarly 
works, popular knowledge insists that the former tuberculosis sanatorium—one embodiment of 
Fulgencio Batista’s policies—reveals something nefarious about republican public health.887 The 
two narratives above merge both periods of Batista’s rule into one monochromatic interval and 
elide the eight-year-reign of the Auténticos. The intricate twists and turns of the sanatorium’s 
history have been forgotten. Instead, Cubans have assumed that the well-known corruption, graft 
and patronage that ran through many state projects by the 1950s must also have defined and 
poisoned this particular structure.888 Unaware of the facility’s popular reception in the 1930s, the 
critique of its abandonment in the 1940s, and demands for its resumption in the early 1950s, 
contemporary voices repeat “rumors” that collapse the building’s history into a narrative of 
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extreme nepotism, in which a sanatorium was built and funded on the public’s dime, on the self-
interested whim of the First Lady. However, a careful historical reconstruction of Topes de 
Collantes Sanatorium reveals a more complicated story about health before 1959.  
Other health programs and institutions—not as strongly tied to Batista’s legacy and with 
less sensational backgrounds—have simply been forgotten. Residents, especially those born 
before the revolution, might be able to tell you what the often-abandoned buildings near their 
neighborhoods once were. But, for decades, the history of the health sector before 1959 has been 
reduced in the national imaginary to a string of egregious errors. For many scholars, the 
revolution solved the public health problems that the republican government had created; 
therefore, the topic has been considered a nonissue, not worthy of research and analysis.889 
However, as this dissertation argues, republican political leaders and health officials did 
attempt to control tuberculosis through serious state-building efforts prior to 1959. In the early 
1900s, tuberculosis specialists persistently pushed the national government to attend to 
tuberculosis, which they believed to be one of the nation’s primary public health problems. The 
state, however, proved mostly deaf to these requests. By the 1920s, however, politics had shifted 
in Cuba, and the reformist and populist-leaning government of Machado finally began to allocate 
resources towards “national” diseases, among which tuberculosis figured centrally. 
State attention, in turn, heightened the visibility of the disease, and a number of public 
and medical debates highlighted the limits of Machado’s anti-tuberculosis campaign. Of 
particular importance were Afro-Cuban figures who widened the meaning of citizenship to 
include the right to health, a concept that challenged elite discourses of hygienic citizenship. 
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Physicians also critiqued the Machado administration’s reliance on private charities for 
managing and funding anti-tuberculosis efforts. By the end of the 1930s, these activists achieved 
a measure of success: the right of the poor to health services was codified in the 1940 
Constitution, and Fulgencio Batista launched a massive, state-led anti-tuberculosis campaign to 
deal with one of the deadliest diseases to Cuba’s poor and working classes.  
Batista hoped to satisfy physicians, public figures, and ordinary citizens’ demands for 
better health care when he founded the Consejo Nacional de Tuberculosis. From 1936 on, the 
Cuban state expanded the tuberculosis diagnostic and therapeutic infrastructure throughout the 
island. The campaign not only erected large hospitals but also set up a string of provincial and 
municipal dispensaries, sent out mobile units to reach rural areas, and disseminated health 
education materials. By the late 1950s, national tuberculosis health indicators had improved from 
the 1920s, partially as a result of easier access to medical services.890  
Nonetheless, citizens raised a number of damning critiques of this project and the wider 
public health sector. The heightened visibility of tuberculosis, achieved in part by the claims-
making of citizens, channeled state attention towards a disease of the poor, but it also distorted 
the design of projects, making them inefficient and openly political. Frustrated by their 
difficulties in accessing antibiotics, the sick began to articulate the right of the poor to free or 
state-subsidized medicine, which the state proved unable to provide. Transnational efforts to 
reform the local health system could not uproot the dense web of traditional patronage politics. 
Physicians expressed discontent with the state’s neglect of preventive methods of tuberculosis 
                                                 
890 Several scholars have recently suggested that Cuba’s excellent performance (relative to other Latin American 
nations) in health indicators by 1959 was partially due to the “relatively easy access to fairly high quality health care 
for an unusually large share of the population (by then-current Latin American standards).” James W. McGuire and 
Laura B. Frankel, “Mortality Decline in Cuba, 1900–1959: Patterns, Comparisons, and Causes,” Latin American 
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control, namely the stunted effort to immunize the population with BCG. And, the state’s 
inability to provide the popularly- and medically-formulated goal of a specific number of 
tuberculosis beds delegitimized the CNT in many constituents’ eyes. Even if academics 
convincingly argue that Cuba had relatively advanced health indicators by 1958, many Cubans 
perceived the tuberculosis campaign as an effort that had largely failed.  
These discontents fed into the broader processes of revolution and regime change. As a 
result, the socialist government oriented its tuberculosis programs to respond to the failures of 
the CNT. Nonetheless, their own campaign was marked by certain shortcomings, such as the fact 
that tuberculosis resources remained over-concentrated in Havana and under-concentrated in 
Oriente. Moreover, some of their successes, such as mass BCG vaccination, relied on resources 
developed under republican administrations. The revolution, however, more successfully 
attended to the health of its population, an achievement that marked the perceptions and 
experiences of Cuban citizens and facilitated the erasure of past tuberculosis control efforts.  
8.1 HEALTH & CITIZENSHIP 
This dissertation speaks to issues beyond Cuba, to the broader relationship between health(care) 
and citizenship. Medical historiography has employed teleological explanations and/or 
Foucauldian frameworks to explain the “growing rapport between medicine and the state” in the 
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twentieth century.891 Two leading scholars in the field have recently pointed out the limits of this 
approach: 
Medical knowledge, which has increasingly multiplied in a large diversity of scientific 
and popular viewpoints on health and illness, was not only deployed to further the power 
of the medical profession, insurance companies, pharmaceutical industries, state agencies 
and welfare bureaucracies. Information about health and illness has also increasingly 
been used by voluntary associations, social interest groups, patient organizations and 
individual citizens for their own purposes…Citizens may play an active role in defining 
health and illness and in utilizing regular or alternative health care services.892  
 
In the republican period, ordinary citizens, public intellectuals, civic actors, and journalists 
became health activists, making the plight of tuberculosis sufferers nationally visible, pushing for 
the codification of health care as a right, and demanding that tuberculosis treatment and medical 
services be available to all, especially the poor. In the 1920s, black politicians and intellectuals 
insisted that access to state health care constituted a crucial component of citizenship. In the 
following decades, other Cubans participated in defining the right to health and in demanding its 
implementation. They did so by mobilizing sanatorium patients, writing letters to the First Lady, 
and publishing newspaper exposés. Such efforts contradict politicians’ claims that they 
bequeathed the expanding network of health services to the people. “On the question of 
tuberculosis,” Batista may have “had an extraordinary obsession,” but physicians and 
intellectuals had previously catapulted the disease to national attention.893 Others have suggested 
that the revolutionary government introduced the principle that “health is a right of the 
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population.”894 Instead, I argue that it was citizens themselves, and often those with the least 
power, who played fundamental roles in shaping state-building efforts and in defining citizenship 
and rights in republican Cuba. 
8.2 STATE-BUILDING IN LATIN AMERICA & THE CARIBBEAN 
Once those health rights were articulated, the struggle to make them a reality on the ground 
became tied to national politics. This dissertation contends that in the 1930s and beyond, health 
care became a privileged site for state-building in Cuba. And, as Jorge Domínguez has argued 
for other state institutions in Cuba, health care became tied to the performance of the republican 
state.895 Political objectives influenced health policy, and tuberculosis programs and projects 
informed the processes of political legitimation. This dissertation contends, then, that to 
understand the modern Cuban state and populism, studying health care is as essential as the 
analysis of labor unions or the economy.  
Freeze the frame, for instance, on the mountaintop on which Topes de Collantes 
Sanatorium sits. In the early decades of the republic, the pristine landscape remained untouched 
by the reach of the Cuban government. To take advantage of its climate, small numbers of 
individuals sick with tuberculosis ventured to the region and set up tents.896 Here, at their own 
expense and in harsh conditions, they sought their cure.  
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In the late 1930s, the mountains began to come alive, buzzing with the visits of men in 
military uniforms, architects and senators, and construction lorries. Reflective of the rise of a 
new kind of state, Batista’s government had brought its arm to the once-ignored region. As 
workers poured a foundation and hoisted steel beams, Batista’s designs for a welfare state began 
to be realized. 
In certain periods after 1936, reflecting the Second Republic’s political divisiveness and 
inefficiency, construction came to a standstill and workers emptied out of the region, leaving 
behind an unfinished frame. By the mid-1950s, however, the region bustled once again with 
construction activity and then with the arrival of weakened yet hopeful patients. The Cuban state 
had finally conquered the mountainous terrain, raised a hospital, and provided medical care to a 
number of citizens suffering from the white plague.  
When the revolution took power in 1959, they quickly changed the name of the facility, 
but the building’s purpose remained in question. While the regime pushed an official narrative of 
unopposed revolutionary change, the hospital quietly transitioned, first into a military fort and 
then into a prison for counter-revolutionaries, as a little-known civil war raged in the Escambray 
Mountains.897 In 1964, Cuba’s Communist newspaper announced that the government had 
repurposed the tuberculosis sanatorium. Redeeming a relic of “the tyranny of Batista,” the 
revolution renamed the building Manuel Ascunce, repurposing it to house scores of teacher-
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trainees who spent several years at the school, in austere accommodations, in preparation for 
their careers.898   
 
Figure 21. Kurhotel Escambray in 2014. Photograph by author. 
 
 Sometime after the mid-1970s, the government discontinued the training program at 
Manuel Ascunce and the building became a hotel. Reflective of tourism’s increasing weight in 
the island’s economy, the hotel (Kurhotel Escambray) is now owned by the “military’s tourism 
wing, Gaviota” (see Figure 21).899 It caters to tourists seeking ecological immersion and the 
health benefits of the region; the hotel continues to be fully staffed with medical professionals 
for health tourists.900 Opponents of the socialist state disparage what they consider to be one 
more betrayal by the revolution, as it caters to “the rich foreigners who pay in dollars.”901 
Throughout the years of the twentieth century, then, the activity on this plot of land has reflected, 
and at times even influenced, the island’s politics and political economy.  
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8.3 HEALTH IN CUBA 
Since the 1960s, scholars have engaged in an unresolved debate about health care in Cuba prior 
to 1959. Demographers and political scientists have persuasively contended that Cuba achieved 
impressive advances in health statistics before 1959, strong evidence of prerevolutionary 
modernity.902 For example, the tuberculosis mortality rate in Havana declined from 360.8 deaths 
(per 100,000 population) in 1901 to 41.3 deaths (per 100,000 population) in 1953.903 Others have 
argued that health care was disastrous in the republican period, extolling the virtues of the 
revolution that they believe created a successful health care system for the people.904  
This dissertation has similarly demonstrated a striking disjuncture in the republican 
period between “modern” health statistics and highly critical popular perceptions of health care 
on the island (on the basis of vernacular metrics of good health care).905 By complementing 
health outcomes and statistics with a multifaceted social and political history of tuberculosis in 
the period, and by balancing attention between state health efforts and grassroots definitions of 
medical success, this dissertation has proven that both sides in this debate are correct. On many 
counts, Cuba’s health care system proved to be well developed and more advanced than regional 
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neighbors, as the Cuban state pursued serious health initiatives: the CNT, experimentation with 
modern health units, tuberculosis sanatorium construction, new drug therapy, and BCG 
vaccination. This system also produced significant successes, evidenced by mortality declines 
and good health indicators by Latin American standards.  
Yet, ordinary Cubans had negative experiences in interacting with health institutions.  
Heightened claims-making and increased state attention to the disease made it a visible issue of 
national political significance throughout the Second Republic. While national politics favored 
attention to tuberculosis and state-building efforts in the public health sector, they also 
undermined efforts to control the disease. The projects of the CNT and other health institutions 
became marred by corruption, patronage, and inefficiency. The politicization of these programs 
also meant that they were subordinated to changing political priorities and non-technical 
bureaucracies, rather than the modern, technical organizations that physicians and citizens 
desired.  
After 1959, a new government introduced many changes in Cuba’s public health sector 
and tuberculosis control and treatment programs. Health continued to be a politicized issue after 
1959 and an arena in which the revolution was legitimized and institutionalized. In response to 
the republican state’s failures, the revolutionary government made the extension of efficient 
health services throughout the island one of its central goals. This made disease control and 
health care even more visible, encouraged a bio-medicalization of its population, and increased 
citizen expectations. As anthropologist Sean Brotherton has recently argued, “The socialist 
health care doxa has saturated people’s everyday lives and mundane practices,” while also 
“producing state-fostered expectations and feelings of entitlement to a particular form of 
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biomedical health care.”906 The long-term consequences of this biopolitical project are not yet 
clear, although the historical narrative suggests that they could be politically problematic in the 
current period, as state performance in the health sector falters.  
8.4 EPILOGUE 
Beginning in the 1990s, as the Cuban government instituted economic reform to deal with the 
crisis of the fall of the Soviet Union, resources have been shifted away from certain medical 
services on the island. For instance, through the Family Physician and Nurse Program (Programa 
del Médico y la Enfermera de la Familia), Cubans had access to a doctor and a nurse on their 
block or in their community. By the early years of the 2000s, many of these doctors had been 
sent to work in Venezuela’s Misión Barrio Adentro program (part of the oil-for-aid agreement 
between Castro and Chávez).907  
There are other signs pointing to the deterioration of medical services on the island. 
Although it is unclear how trustworthy these reports are, a subgenre of political propaganda 
against Castro’s regime documents the medical horrors on the island. The On Cuba website, for 
instance, provides photographic evidence of the Pilar San Martín tuberculosis sanatorium (turned 
psychiatric hospital) that now sits “abandoned in the mountains.”908 The once-modern Lebredo 
Hospital became a well-regarded maternity hospital after 1959. It has since been deserted and 
fallen into disrepair, hidden behind the still-functioning units at the former La Esperanza 
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complex (see Figures 22–23).909 Many Cubans, both on and off the island, are unhappy with the 
hospital’s closure, for they now have to travel farther to seek medical attention.910 
 
Figure 22. Lebredo Hospital during the Second Republic.911 
 
 
Figure 23. Lebredo Hospital in 2014. Photograph by author. 
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Pointing to a number of derelict hospitals that have fallen from glory, however, does not 
provide an adequate measure of national health care. Cuba continues to report promising health 
indicators. The WHO recently certified Cuba as the first country to eliminate mother-to-child 
HIV transmission;912 it is also in the running to become the first country to eliminate 
tuberculosis. Despite recent changes in the health sector, the state insists that it is using the funds 
generated by its booming medical tourist industry to maintain its renowned primary health care 
system. Nonetheless, evidence suggests that citizens have increasingly negative perceptions of 
their health care system. Sean Brotherton writes, “The período especial called into question the 
moral legitimacy of the state, and it had indelible social and political consequences for both the 
revolutionary government and the popular support citizens and health professionals gave it.”913 
The history of Cuba’s anti-tuberculosis campaign might be instructive for the future of 
health care and politics on the island, for contemporary conditions bear striking similarities to the 
1950s. At that time, Cuba had achieved modern health indicators, but its citizens’ subjective 
experiences with the health care sector were deteriorating. For decades, they had presented 
demands to the state, but their expectations had not been met. A host of Cubans believed that 
only serious political change could improve the public health sector, which gave many citizens 
another reason to welcome the revolution when it arrived in 1959. The future of Cuba remains 
uncertain on many measures, but the deeply political nature of health on the island suggests that 
the state’s ability to continue to fulfill the obligations of health citizenship will play a role in 
shaping the path that is taken.  
                                                 
912 Donald G. McNeil, Jr., “Cuba Wins W.H.O. Certification It Ended Mother-to-Child H.I.V. Transmission,” New 
York Times, June 30, 2015, accessed October 14, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/01/health/who-certifies-
end-of-mother-to-child-transmission-of-hiv-in-cuba.html?_r=0. 
913 Brotherton, Revolutionary Medicine, 20. 
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APPENDIX A 
SECRETARIES OF SANITATION/MINISTERS OF HEALTH 
Dr. Santiago Verdeja Neyra: January 24, 1934–August 19, 1934 
Dr. Rafael Lorié Marín: August 20, 1934–March 10, 1935  
Dr. Aurelio Ituarte Gutiérrez: March 11, 1935–November 6, 1935 
Dr. Leonardo Anaya Murillo, Interim: November 7, 1935–January 12, 1936 
Dr. Emilio Martínez Martínez: January 13, 1936–May 19, 1936 
Dr. Manuel Mencía y García: May 20, 1936–November 11, 1936  
Dr. Carlos Peláez y Cossío, Interim: November 12, 1936–December 7, 1936 
Dr. Manuel Mencía y García: December 8, 1936–December 24, 1936 
Dr. Zenón Zamora y García: December 24, 1936–August 10, 1938  
Dr. Manuel Costales Latutú: August 11, 1938–May 16, 1939 
Dr. Domingo F. Ramos Delgado, Interim: May 17, 1939–May 26, 1939 
Dr. Juan de Moya y Flamand: May 27, 1939–May 13, 1940  
Dr. Joaquín Ochotorena, Interim: May 14, 1940–May 20, 1940 
Dr. Juan de Moya y Flamand: May 21, 1940–October 9, 1940 
Dr. Demetrio Despaigne y Grave de Peralta: October 10, 1940–July 17, 1941  
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Dr. Sergio García Marruz: July 18, 1941–February 1, 1942 
Dr. Domingo F. Ramos y Delgado: February 2, 1942–June 21, 1942 
Dr. Gustavo Adolfo Bock y Jorge: June 22, 1942–August 17, 1942 
Dr. Juan M. Portuondo Domenech: August 18, 1942–March 6, 1944 
Dr. Alberto Recio Forns: March 7, 1944–October 9, 1944 
Dr. José A. Presno Bastioni, October 10, 1944–April 16, 1945 
Dr. Octavio Rivero Partagás, April 17, 1945–June 2, 1947 
Dr. José R. Andreu Martínez, June 3, 1947–December 4, 1947 
Dr. Ramiro de la Riva y Domínguez, December 5, 1947–October 9, 1948 
Dr. Alberto Oteiza Setién, October 10, 1948–June 23, 1949 
Dr. Carlos Ramírez Corría, June 24, 1949–September 27, 1950 
Dr. José Antonio Rubio Padilla, September 28, 1950–April 3, 1951 
Dr. Jose R. Andreu Martínez, April 4, 1951–March 10, 1952 
Dr. Enrique Saladrigas y Zayas, March 11, 1952–August 9, 1953 
Dr. José Elías Olivella Lastra, August 10, 1953–August 4, 1954 
Dr. Carlos Salas Humara, August 5, 1954–February 23, 1955 
Dr. Armando J. Coro y de la Cruz, February 24, 1955–July 18, 1955 
Dr. Alberto Recio y Forns, July 19, 1955–January 29, 1956 
Dr. Carlos Salas Humara, January 30, 1956–March 5, 1958 
Dr. Octavio Montoro y Saladrigas, March 6, 1958–March 12, 1958 
Dr. Manuel Ampudia González, March 13, 1958–January 5, 1959914 
                                                 
914 Information from César Rodríguez Expósito, La primera Secretaria de Sanidad del mundo se creó en Cuba, 
Cuadernos de Historia de la Salud Pública 25 (Havana: Ministerio de Salud Pública, 1964), 142, 144. 
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